( 1. ) BY this writ petition preferred under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India the petitioners have prayed for quashment of order dated 7-7-1984, Annexure P-3, passed by the respondent No. 2 whereby a draft statement was published under the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976.

( 2. ) MR. L. N. Namdeo, learned Counsel for the petitioner, has raised two fold contentions, namely, the land of the petitioners was not included in the master plan of Jabalpur and, therefore, it could not have been treated as vacant land and, therefore, determination of land as surplus as has been done by the competent authority under the Act is null and void in view of the decision rendered in the case of Atia Mohammadi Begum v. The State of U. P. and Ors. , AIR 1993 SC 2465, and the decision by this Court in W. P. No. 833/91, decided on 12-12-1995 (Trilok Singh Yadav v. Stale of M. P. and Ors.); and secondly the possession of the land having not been taken over as envisaged under Section 10 of the aforesaid Act the possession cannot be taken over at this juncture.

( 3. ) MR. Ajay Raizada, learned Government Advocate, has submitted that the decision rendered in the case of Atia Mohammadi Begum (supra), has been partially overruled by the Apex Court in the decision rendered in the case of State of A. P. and Ors. v. N. Audikesava Reddy and Ors. , (2002) 1 SCC 227. It is also putforth by him that the possession in question had already been taken in 1984 and, therefore, Section 4 of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Repeal Act, 1999 (hereinafter referred to as "the Repeal Act) would not render any assistance to the petitioners.

( 4. ) TO appreciate the rival submissions raised at the bar it is apposite to refer to the decision rendered in the case of N. Audikesava Reddy (supra), wherein a three Judge Bench of the Apex Court came to hold as under:

"11. If the expression "commencement of the Act" is read with reference to the aforesaid Explanation, the area of doubt about the correctness of the decision of Atia Begum becomes very narrow, e. g. a few observations therein which are these:- (SCC p. 549, para 4)

"just as the holder of the land cannot by his subsequent actions reduce the area of the vacant land in excess of the ceiling limit, the authorities too cannot by any subsequent action increase the area of the excess vacant land by a similar action. "

12. The observations that the authorities by their subsequent action after 17-2-1976 cannot alter or introduce the master plan which has the effect of increasing the area of excess vacant land do not represent the correct view of law. The aforesaid Explanation to Section 6 (1), inter alia, provides that where any land, not being vacant land, situated in a State in which this Act is in force has become vacant land by any reason whatsoever, the date on which such land becomes vacant land would be the date of the commencement of the Act as regards such land. 13. Development and town planning are ongoing processes and they go on changing from time to time depending upon the local needs. That apart, the definition of "master plan" in Section 2 (h) is very significant. It reads as under: "2 (h ). master plan", in relation to an area within an urban agglomeration or any part thereof, means the plan (by whatever name called) prepared under any law for the time being in force or in pursuance of an order made by the State Government for the development of such area or part thereof and providing for the stages by which such development shall be carried out. " The above provision, inter alia, contemplates the master plan prepared under any law for the time being in force for development of an area. The plan shall also provide for the stages by which such development shall be carried out. It is evident from the aforesaid definition of master plan that it takes in view any plan prepared even subsequent to the coming into force of the Act. Further, the Explanation to Section 6 (1), as not