( 1. ) THE decision rendered in this second appeal shall also govern disposal of other connected second appeal being S. A. No. 573 of 2002 because both these appeals arise out of the same judgment/decree so too the suit.

( 2. ) THIS second appeal is filed by the defendant No. 1 under Section 100 of CPC against the judgment/decree dated 23-9-2002, passed by learned IVth Additional District Judge, Mandsaur, in C. A. No. 3-A of 2001, which in turn arises out of Civil Suit No. 6-A of 2000, decided by Ist Civil Judge, Class I, Mandsaur, on 17-11-2000. Both the Courts below, i. e. , Trial Court as well as First Appellate Court have decreed plaintiffs suit giving rise to filing of this second appeal by defendant No. 1 whereas, the other second appeal (573 of 2002) is filed by defendant Nos. 2 to 6 contending that the appeal involves substantial question of law as is contemplated under Section 100 of CPC. So the question that arises for consideration in these appeals is, whether appeals involve any substantial question of law, or not ?

( 3. ) HEARD Shri A. K. Sethi, learned Counsel for the appellant on the question of admission.

( 4. ) AT the out set it may be taken note of that in an eviction suit, a decree for eviction can be claimed on any of the ground contained in Section 12 (1) of the M. P. Accommodation Control Act. In other words, though the legislature has provided several grounds to seek eviction of a tenant, yet one ground is held sufficient to evict the defendant/tenant, if made out on facts and in confirmity with the requirement of ground contained under Section 12

(1) ibid. It is not necessary for the landlord to establish existence of each and every ground though taken in the plaint.

( 5. ) IT is an eviction matter. Respondent No. 1 filed a suit against the appellant (defendant No. 1) and respondent Nos. 2 to 6 (defendant Nos. 2 to 6) for their eviction from the suit accommodation inter-alia on the ground covered under Section 12 (1) (c), (e) and (o) of the M. P. Accommodation Control Act. So far as Trial Court was concerned, it decreed the suit on the grounds covered under Section 12 (1) (c) and (e ). However, in first appeal filed by the defendants and also by the plaintiffs, the First Appellate Court not only confirmed the decree passed under Section 12 (1) (c) and (e) ibid by dismissing the appeal filed by defendants but proceeded to decree the suit on the ground failing under Section 12 (1) (o) ibid. In other words, the First Appellate Court has decreed plaintiffs suit in entirety on all the three grounds. As is clear so far as grounds under Section 12 (1) (c) and (e) ibid are concerned, they are of affirmance. It was held so far as ground under Section 12 (1) (e) ibid was concerned that plaintiff being the owner/landlord of the suit accommodation needs the house in suit for his residence as also for the members of his family and that he has no other house of his own in city.

( 6. ) IT is now a too well settled principle of law laid down by the Supreme Court in series of cases and which is being consistently followed by the High Courts as law laid down under Article 141 of Constitution of India that a question of bona fide need set up by the plaintiff (landlord) whether for residential purpose or non-residential, is a question of fact. It is only when the finding so recorded on this issue is found to be dehors the pleading or against the evidence led or is based on no evidence, or is against the statutory requirement of law [12 (1) (f) of the Act], or it is so bad that no judicial man can ever reach to its conclusion, then such finding is amenable to interference in second appeal. When I examine the facts of this case keeping in view these parameters then I am unable to notice any such infirmity in the impugned judgment and hence, it deserves to be upheld.

( 7. ) COMING to the facts of the case, I find no case to upturn the finding in so far as it relates to ground of bona fide need under Section 12 (1) (e) ibid i