( 1. ) IN this writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution, the petitioner has challenged the order of detention, detaining him under Section 3 (2) of the National Security Act, 1980 (for short "the Act" ).

( 2. ) THE facts briefly are that on 3-4-2008 the District Magistrate, Katni, in exercise of powers conferred under sub-section (2) of Section 3 of the Act passed an order of detention, detaining the petitioner in the Central Jail, jabalpur. The matter was referred to the Advisory Board and pursuant to the opinion given by the Advisory Board the State Government confirmed the order of detention and directed that the petitioner shall continue to be under detention for a period of 12 months from the date of detention till 2-4-2009. Aggrieved, the petitioner has filed this writ petition praying for quashing the order of detention.

( 3. ) MR. Manish Tiwari, learned Counsel for the petitioner, submitted that the detention order has been passed against the petitioner for political reasons and was not necessitated under Section 3 (2) of the Act and this would be clear from the grounds of detention served on the petitioner.

( 4. ) MR. Vivekanand Awasthy, learned Deputy Government Advocate, on the other hand, submitted that the grounds of detention served on the petitioner would show that right from 1987, the petitioner has been indexing in various criminal acts and considering the propensity of the petitioner to commit repeated violent acts, the District Magistrate, Katni, passed the order of detention under sub-section (2) of Section 3 of the Act and on the basis of the opinion given by the Advisory Board, the State Government has confirmed the order of detention.

( 5. ) THE law is well settled in Lakshman Khatik Vs. The State of West bengal, AIR 1974 SC 1264, Golam Hussain Vs. Commissioner of Police, calcutta, AIR 1974 SC 1336 and in Gora Vs. State of West Bengal, AIR 1975 SC 473 that there must be a close proximity between the offending acts mentioned in the grounds of detention and the order of detention and there should not be too long and unexplained intervals between the offending acts and the order of detention. The Supreme Court has, however, held that no mechanical test by counting the months of the interval is sound and it all depends on the nature of the acts relied on, grave and determined or less serious and corrigible, on the length of the gap, short or long, on the reason for the delay in taking preventive action, like information of participation being available only in the course of an investigation.

( 6. ) THE Supreme Court has also held in series of cases that there is a clear distinction between law and order and public order. In Victoria femandes Vs. Lalmal Sawma and others, AIR 1992 SC 687, the Supreme Court held :-

"the distinction between the areas of law and order and public order is one of degree and extent of the reach of the act in question on society. It is the potentiality of the act to disturb the even tempo of life of the community which makes it prejudicial to the maintenance of the public order. If a contravention in its effect is confined only to a few individuals directly involved as distinct from a wide spectrum of public, it would raise the problem of law and order only. It is the length, magnitude and intensity of the terror wave unleashed by a particular eruption of disorder that helps distinguish it as an act affecting public order from that concerning law and order. The question to ask is : Does it lead to disturbance of the current life of the community so as to amount to a disturbance of the public order or does it affect merely an individual leaving the tranquillity of the society undisturbed ? This question has to be faced in every case on its facts. [see : Dr. Ram Manohar lohia Vs. State of Bihar, (1966) 1 SCR 709 = (AIR 1966 SC 740); aran Ghosh Vs. State of West Bengal, (1970) 3 SCR 288 = (AIR 1970 SC 1228) Ram Ranjan Chatterjee Vs. State of West Bengal, (1975) 3