The Labour Court, as a special statutory authority, does not have the power to condone delay in the absence of such a provision in the statute.

Dipak Misra, J.

1. As the factual matrix and questions of law are common this batch of writ petitions was heard analogously and is disposed of by this common order. For the sake of clarity and convenience the facts in Writ Petition No. 60/2000 herein are adumbrated.

2. The facts as have been uncurtained are that the Public Health Engineering Department required services of certain Pump Operators and accordingly a requisition was sent to the Project Commandant. In the process of selection the petitioner was found suitable for appointment against the vacant sanctioned post of a Pump Operator. He joined the post in Sub-Division No. 29 which was managed and controlled by the Sub-Divisional Officer, Public Health Department, Ambikapur, the respondent No. 2 herein. While he was performing his duties there was no complaint whatsoever, against him. However, his services were orally terminated with effect from 30-4-1992. Before termination of his services no opportunity of hearing was afforded to the petitioner and no enquiry was held. In this background the petitioner filed an application under Section 31 (3) of the M.P. Industrial Relations Act, 1960 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'). Along with the said application an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act was also filed.

3. The respondents No. 1 and 2 resisted the claim of the petitioner contending, inter alia, that the petitioner was employed on daily wage basis by way of adhoc arrangement and he was never appointed against any permanent vacancy. It was also set forth that there was no relationship of employer and employee between the parties. It was also highlighted that the salary of the petitioner was being paid by the Project Commandant. It was also stated that as the petitioner was a daily wage employee there was no necessity for holding of an enquiry. An objection was also raised that the application preferred by the petitioner under Section 31 (3) of the Act was barred by limitation.

4. The Labour Court framed issues and parties adduced evidence. Thereafter, by Order dated 30-4-1996, Annexure P-3, the Labour Court partly allowed the appeal and directed reinstatement of the petitioner in his services without back wages. Being dissatisfied with the aforesaid Order the respondents No. 1 and 2 preferred an appeal before the respondent No. 3, namely, the Industrial Court, Raipur. The Appellate Court by Order dated 12-12-1999, Annexure P-4, allowed the appeal holding that the provisions of the Limitation Act are not applicable to the proceeding under the Act and, therefore, the workmen could not have been given the benefit of the Limitation Act. It was also observed that the application filed for condonation of delay was a vague one and without any material particulars. On the basis of the aforesaid foundation, the appellate Court came to hold that the Labour Court has no jurisdiction to entertain an application under Section 31 (3) of the Act and accordingly allowed the appeal.

5. It is averred in the writ petition that the Order passed by the Appellate Court is erroneous and illegal inasmuch as it has exceeded to its jurisdiction while interfering with the reasoned Order passed by the Labour Court. It is also put forth that the Limitation Act applies and the Labour Court has correctly applied the provisions of the Limitation Act and the findings recorded by it did not warrant interference, but the Appellate Court has erroneously interfered with the same.

6. I have heard Mr. Alok Aradhe, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr. V.K. Shukla, learned Government Advocate for the respondents-State.

7. Mr. Aradhe, learned counsel for the petitioner has raised a singular contention that the appellate authority has misdirected itself in coming to hold that the delay in filing the application under Section 31 (3) of the Act was not condonable.

8. Combating the aforesaid submissions learned Government Advocate has contended that in absence of any provision for condonation