The exemption under Section 3 (2) of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961 applies to both lessees and sub-lessees, and the Act does not come into operation in cases where the accommodation is exempted.

S.C. Pandey, J.

1. This is an appeal filed by the tenant under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure against the judgment and decree dated 18-1-99, passed by the Additional District Judge, Raipur, in Civil Appeal No. 43-A of 1997, arising out of judgment and decree dated 17-5-96, passed by IVth Civil Judge Class-II, Raipur, in Civil Suit No. 342-A of 1992. The learned Additional District Judge has reversed the judgment and decree of the Trial Court and granted a decree of eviction against him.

2. The disposal of this appeal shall also govern Second Appeal Nos. 320 of 1999, 321 of 1999, 322 of 1999 and 323 of 1999.

3. The point that has been sought to be urged in this case is that the appellant is a lessee of the respondent. However, the respondent itself is the lessee of Dudhadhari Shri Vaishnava Trust Fund, Raipur. It is not in dispute that the accommodation belonging to the aforesaid Trust has been exempted from the operation of Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961 by a notification issued by the State Government under Section 3 (2) of the said Act. The notification reads as under :--

"Notification No. 2037-1100/II-A (3)-- In exercise of the powers conferred by sub-section (2) of Section 3 of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (No. 41 of 1961) the State Government hereby exempts the plot of land bearing Khasra No. 260-2 Mahal No. 2, Baijnath Para, Raipur, in the Raipur District, together with the cinema house called Kamal Talkies, (now known as Amardeep Talkies) and with the out houses, stalls and other structures, standing thereon, which is owned by Dudhadhari Shri Vaishnava Trust Fund, Raipur and Educational and religious Institutions, from all the provisions of the said Act."

The aforesaid notification was issued by the State Government on 13th of May, 1964 and was published in the M.P. Gazette dated 22nd May, 1964.

4. It is not disputed before me that the decision rendered by this Courl in the case of Cintamani Chandra Mohan Agrawal Vs. State of M.P., reported in 1994 MPLJ 597, was set aside by the Supreme Court by its decision in Civil Appeal No. 9909 of 1995, arising from S.L.P. (Civil) No. 4360 of 1994, decided on 19th of October, 1995. However, the decision of the Supreme Courl in the aforesaid appeal was not brought to the notice of Their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the case of Mangilal Vs. Shri Chaturbhuja Mandir, reported in JT 1998 (6) SC 491 and, therefore, the appeal filed by Mangilal against Shri Chaturbhuja Mandir, which was a Trust, was allowed and the suit for ejectment was dismissed on the ground that it was not based on Madhya Pradcsh Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (henceforth 'the Act'). Subsequently, another decision has been rendered by the Supreme Court in Betibai and others Vs. Nathooram and others, reported in AIR 1999 SC 1767. In that case it has been noticed in Paragraph 6 of the judgment that the decision of this Court in Chintamani Chandra Mohan Agrawal's case (supra) has been set aside upholding the notification dated 7-9-1989. This decision was rendered on 19th of October, 1995, as stated above, in Civil Appeal No. 9909 of 1995. Their Lordships distinguished the case of Mangilal (supra) holding that in that case the point regarding the vires of notification was not raised and considered. It appears to this Court the decision of the Supreme Court in Mangilal's case (supra) that the fact of setting aside the decision of this Court in Chintamani Chandra Mohan Agrawal's case (supra) was not brought to the notice of Their Lordships of the Supreme Court. The decision of the Supreme Court in the said Betibai's case (supra) confines the legal position that the notification issued on 7-9-1989 under Section 3 (2) of the Act is a valid piece of legislation.

5. The above facts have been mentioned in order to show that in the cases which have been brought to my notice during motion hearing of this case, the vires of sub-section (2) of Section 3 of the Act was have chall