KHAN J.

( 1. ) - Petitioner Giyasilal (after his death, Harnarain and Santoshilal were placed on the record as legal representatives) filed the suit against defendant Kanhaiyalal, his tenant seeking eviction from the rented premises (a shop) on the ground that the shop was genuinely required by him to set up his son in business as a cloth merchant. The defence was that the notice served by the plaintiff is invalid, and, that the plaintiff does not genuinely require the accommodation. The trial Court decreed the suit. On appeal the learned District Judge, Gwalior, recorded a curious finding to the effect that because the plaintiff had inherited a flourishing money lending business from their deceased father, and, was already running a grocery business, therefore, it does not stand to reason why he wants to start a new cloth business. The plea of genuine necessity has been negatived on the ground that if a man is doing one business, then he is not supposed to start or do another business. There is neither rhyme nor reason in the assumption and I regard the finding as perverse. The first appellate Court also held that the notice to quit given by the plaintiff was invalid and in result dismissed the suit. This is plaintiffs second appeal.

( 2. ) I shall first take up the question whether the notice is valid or not. The tenancy in the instant case was created by virtue of a rent-note dated 26-2-1944, and was for a period of one year. In 1944, the Gwalior Letting of Residential Accommodation Control Order (No. 107 of 26th January 1944) was in force and according to section 12 (A) (1), "a tena.nt in possession of a house shall not be evicted therefrom, whether in execution of a decree or otherwise and whether before or after the termination of the tenancy, except in accordance with the provisions of this clause." It will thus appear that after the efflux of the period of his tenancy, the tenant became a statutory tenant, because there is nothing on record to incline me to hold that the "landlord entered into any fresh contract of tenancy."

( 3. ) Their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Ganga Dutt Murarka v. Kartik Chandra Das and others(AIR1961 SC 1067), have held that where a tenant has acquired the status of statutory tenant, notice prescribed by section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act was not necessary. In this view of the matter, following this Supreme Court ruling, I hold that no notice was necessary and therefore the question of invalidity does not at all arise.

( 4. ) Regarding the other question "whether the landlord genuinely requires accommodation for continuing or starting business", occurring in Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Order of 1955, the first appellate Court has held that because the landlord is already doing some other business which he had inherited from his forefathers he was not therefore prepared to believe that the landlord would start another business, I am of the opinion that this finding is perverse. Mr. Mungre, learned counsel for the appellants, submits that the determination of the question "landlord genuinely requires accommodation" occurring in section 4 (h) of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act of 1955, is not a question of fact, but is a mixed question of fact and law. He relies upon a decision of the Supreme Court reported in Sree Meenakshi Mills Ltd., Madurai v. Commissioner of Income Tax, Madras(AIR 1957 SC 49=1956SCR 69), in para. 11 of which their Lordships have observed that "the result of the authorities then is that inference from facts would be a question of fact or of law accordingly as the point for determination is one of pure fact or mixed question of law and fact." ( 5. ) In para. 12 of this judgment, their Lordships have said:-

"In Edwards (Inspector of Taxes) v. Bairstow and another(1955 28 ITR 579= 1955 3 WLR 410 HL), the point for determination was whether the transaction entered into by the assessee was an adventure in the nature of trade. The finding of