( 1. ) HEARD Shri N. C. Behal, learned counsel for the appellant on the question of admission. Also considered the grounds in I. A. No. 3216 of 1984. This order shall also govern the disposal of Misc. Appeal No. 188 of 1984 (E. S. I. Corporation v. Niranjanlal Purohit), Misc. Appeal No. 201 of 1984 (E. S. I. Corpn. v. Chhotelal), Misc. Appeal No. 205 of 1984 (E. S. I. Corpn. v. Balwantsingh), Misc. Appeal No. 206 of 1984 (E. S. I. Corpn. v. Jairam) and Misc. Appeal No. 211 of 1984 (E. S. I. Corpn. v. Mahendrakumar), as all these appeals involve similar questions on identical facts.

( 2. ) THIS appeal and the other connected appeals referred to above, preferred under section 82 (2) of the Employees State Insurance Act, 1948 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) have a common feature that the respondents in all these appeals are employees of the Vinod or the Vimal Mills, ujjain.

( 3. ) THE learned counsel for the appellants started with section 2 (8)of the Act, defining the employment injury and thereafter referred to this court section 49 and section 51 of the Act. He also referred to Regulations nos. 51, 53, 61 and 64 of the Employees State Insurance (General) Regulations, 1950 (hereinafter referred to as the Regulations), framed under section 97 of the Act. During the course of his arguments when it was brought to the notice of the learned counsel that an appeal lies essentially on substantial questions of law and no finding of fact is arrived at by the insurance Court, the learned counsel stated at the Bar that he abandons all the points raised by him and emphasised only on the question whether the Insurance Court while awarding the benefits has followed the Table, described by Rule 3 of Schedule I, In order to appreciate Shri Behals contention it is necessary to refer to the pleadings raised by the Corporation before the Insurance Court. Except the Insurance number, every averment made by the claimant-employee before the Insurance Court has not only been denied in substance by the Corporation but even a plea of limitation has also been raised. It looks strange to find the Corporation coming with such a litigative attitude. The blatant and brazen denial on the part of the corporation does not behove of a statutory body like the present appellant. It is really painful to note that the factum of injury or resultant sickness, even the first aid, all these facts have been denied, but this denial itself stands belied by the contradictory pleadings raised by the Corporation. Even while denying the factum of injury, the Corporation admits having made the partial payment of the benefits. It does not stand to reason that sustaining of injury itself is denied, then how can there be even partial payment made by the Corporation. Perusal of the written statement submitted by the Corporation does not even remotely suggest or indicate any such plea, as is now being sought to be raised before this Court in appeal under section 82 of the Act.

( 4. ) THE learned counsel moved an application, seeking to incorporate an additional ground in the memo of appeal, which relates to Regulation no. 51. By this additional ground it is claimed that Regulation No. 51 has not been complied with and it is contended that the Insurance Court had no jurisdiction to hold any person eligible for such benefit in view of the non-compliance of Regulation No. 51. This plea was apparently not raised before the Insurance Court. The set of evidence adduced on behalf of the corporation is also equally lacking so as to reach any conclusion, supporting the contention now sought to be advanced by the learned counsel. All that has been placed by way of evidence is a report submitted by the insurance Inspector. This report by itself can hardly be said to be substantial evidence, even if it is marked as an exhibit. Such a report not being a substantive piece of evidence, it was incumbent upon the prosecution to prove all those facts contained in the Inspectors report, b