( 1. ) THE plaintiff-non-applicant, Dr. Om Prakash Gupta, filed a suit in the court of District Judge, Gwalior, under Order 37 of the Code of Civil Procedure (hereinafter referred to as the Code), in which a claim of Rs. 34,000/- was made against the defendant-applicant. Within ten days from the service of the notice of the suit, under Sub-rule (3) of Rule 3 of Order 37 of the Code, the defendant entered appearance and sought leave to defend. Leave was granted to him by the trial Court on condition that he should deposit amount. The impugned order can be quoted conveniently as below : -

"ubhay PAKSHA PURVAVAT. WADDHAN VA KHARCHE KI MOUTBIR JAMANAT DENE PAR pratiwad1 KO BACHAV KARNE KA HAQ IS MAMLE KI paristhitiyon ME DENA NYAYOCHIT PAYA JATA HAI ATHAH jamanat PESH KARNE PAR YADOTTAR DT. 28-11-1983 KO PESH ho. UP ASTHITA JAN SOOCHIT HO. " Sd/- D. J. " aggrieved by this order, the defendant/petitioner has invoked the revisional jurisdiction of this Court under section 115 of the Code.

( 2. ) IT was contended by the learned counsel for the defendant/petitioner Shri R. D. Jain that the inpugned order is not a judicial order, it is also not a speaking order because no reasons have been assigned as to why the defendant should deposit the secutity amount. As the impugned order is not a reasoned order, it should be quashed, as it is not maintainable in law. Besides this, other points have also been raised, but they are not material to decide the issue.

( 3. ) SHRI K. S. Tomar, appearing for the plaintiff-non-applicant has submitted that though the trial Court has not given reasons, yet the order for furnishing security is not prejudicial to the plaintiff and it should not be interfered in revision by this Court, because it was passed by trial Court using the judicial discretion.

( 4. ) THE Court has under Order 37, rule 3 (5) of the Code granted the defendant/petitioner leave to defend the suit on the condition of his furnishing security. Sub-rule (5) of Rule 3 of order 37 of the Code reads as under :

" (5) The defendant may, at any time within ten days from the service of such summons for judgment, by affidavit or otherwise disclosing such facts as may be deemed sufficient to entitle him to defend, apply on such summons for leave to defend such suit, and leave to defend may be granted to him unconditionally or upon such terms as may appear to the Court or judge to be just. "

(Emphasis supplied)

( 5. ) THE use of word "just" is an indication that it has been entirely left to the judicial discrection of the Court. Though before the Amending Act No. 104 of 1976 of code of Civil Procedure, the Code provided for an absolute reasoned order, but the amended provision is an indication that the trial Court may not give a reasoned order. It is always undesirable and indeed impossible, to lay down hard and fast rules in matters that affect discretion. But it is necessary to understand the reason for a special procedure of this kind in order that the discretion may be properly exercised Taken by and large, the object is to see that the defendant does not unnecessarily prolong the litigation and prevent the plaintiff from obtaining an early decree by raising untenable and frivolous defences in a class of cases where speedy decisions are desirable in the interests of trade and commerce. In general, therefore, that is to see whether the defence raises a real issue and not a sham one, in the sence that if the facts alleged by the defendant are established, there would be a good, or even a plausible, defence on those facts. (See Santosh Kumar v. Mool Singh, AIR 1958 SC 321 ).

( 6. ) THE argument advanced by the learned counsel Shri R. D. Jain is obviously without any merit. It may here be stated that the provisions of Rules (2) (3) of Order 37 of the Code as stand amended by the Civil Procedure Code (Amendment) Act (10 of 1976), are materially different from those, as had originally stood before the said amendment. However, considering the provisio