( 1. ) THIS is an insurers appeal. The first respondent in this case is the owner of the affected motor vehicle who was also the claimant in respect of the damage caused to the vehicle. Indeed, respondent No. 2 was also a claimant in respect of compensation for injuries caused to his person in the course of the accident. He was the driver of the vehicle which was damaged in the accident. The third respondent is the owner of the offending vehicle against whom the award is passed.

( 2. ) THE appellants counsel, Shri Dubey, has made a short submission, relying solely on the provisions of Section 95 (2) (d) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, as it stood at the relevant date in 1977, when the accident took place. Counsel submits that the liability of the insurer by virtue of the said provision is statutorily limited to a sum of Rs. 2,000 and, as such, the Tribunal erred in law in holding the insurer jointly liable with the owner of the offending vehicle for discharging the entire liability under the award, which was made for a sum of Rs. 21,000. I have no hesitation in upholding the contention as the mandate of Clause (d) of Section 95 (2) is clear, obvious and peremptory, admitting of no exception. Shri Jain has drawn my attention to Sub-section (5), which, in my opinion, has no relevance to the issue agitated in this appeal. My attention is drawn by Shri Dubey to the insurance policy, which is on record of the trial court, to which a reference also is made in the award, for submitting that even thereunder, according to the terms of the policy, the liability of the insurer was limited by the Act. That is so. I have perused the policy, which expressly limits the insurers liability to " such amount as is necessary to meet the requirements of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939". That being the position, the objection of Shri Jain, founded on Sub-section (5), vanishes into thin air.

( 3. ) IT is also pointed out that a sum of Rs. 1,000 is awarded to respondent No. 2 against his claim for injuries to his person. However, the claim is not contested by Shri Dubey and I see no reason why the liability of the insurer as respects this amount should, in any way, be modified.

( 4. ) IN the result, this appeal succeeds and is allowed with the direction that the award stands modified as respects the insurers liability, who is required to satisfy the liability in respect of the award to respondent No. 2 in full and in part only to the extent of Rs. 2,000 as against respondent No. 1. There shall be no order as to costs in this appeal.

( 5. ) AFTER the judgment has been dictated, Shri Mittal has appeared for pleading the case of respondent No. 1. His submission is three-fold. Firstly, it is submitted that no reference can be made to the insurance policy as it has not been formally proved. I see no merit in this contention for several reasons. Firstly, because Shri Mittal himself relied on the policy to enforce the liability of the insurer to satisfy in full the claim. Secondly, because it was well within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal to accept in evidence the insurance policy, dispensing with formal proof inasmuch as Section 110c authorises the Tribunal to adopt such a procedure, which contemplates "such summary procedure" to be followed by the Tribunal " as it thinks fit". Thirdly, because Section 58 of the Evidence Act itself dispenses with formal proof in a case when a fact is admitted, and, in the instant case, as alluded, the owner himself having invoked the insurers liability under the policy, the policy must be deemed to have been admitted by the owner.

( 6. ) THE second contention of Shri Mittal is based on the provisions of Section 96 (4) of the Act and he has cited case-law. The provision is extracted below:

" (4) If the amount which an insurer becomes liable under this section to pay in respect of a liability incurred by a person insured by a policy exceeds the amount for which the insurer would, apart from the provisions of this section