( 1. ) RECENT decision of the Apex Court in B. Johnson (1985 MPRCJ 296 = 1985 MPLJ 675) as also two decisions of this Court are pressed in service by Shri Ramji sharma, appearing for the landlord respondent. Still, I see no way that goes to help him. The question that has arisen for my decision in this case restricts my vision to the jurisdictional competence of the Rent Controlling Authority (for short, the Authority)acting under Section 23-A of the M. P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (for short, the act) and the decisions cited do not shed any light on the question agitated.

( 2. ) THE focal point of challenge to the impugned order vocalised by Shri Lahoti, lies in plaintiffs statement made in the plaint which, counsel submits, disabled the authority from entertaining and deciding the case. At paras 18 and 19, clear statement of facts appears but vitally, relief is also claimed on those facts. It is plaintiffs own case that he had let out only a part of the suit premises to the tenant defendant (herein the petitioner) who, however, encroached on another part of the same building. Both parts together comprised the suit premises, in respect of which eviction was prayed. Fortunately for the plaintiff, and unfortunately for law and justice and the tenant-defendant, the suit was entertained, tried and decreed.

( 3. ) SHRI Lahoti very rightly contends that the new forum created under the special law had its jurisdiction circumscribed. The Authority is competent to entertain and decide landlords, application for eviction of the tenant only on the ground of bona fide requirement and only from the tenanted premises, and from nowhere else. Section 23-A of the Act entitled the landlord to submit an application, indeed signed and verified in a manner as if it was a plaint, wherein he has to set out one or more of the grounds enumerated in Section 23-A for an order directing the tenant "to put the landlord in possession of the accommodation". In my opinion, these are crucial expressions, to which primacy must be attached, because they carry the intent and purport of the provision. To put the landlord in "possession" of any accommodation" presupposes, according to me, "possession" of a tenanted premises, and not of any premises, otherwise occupied, in any other manner, by the tenant. Because, when a question of title is raised in any manner, the enquiry has to be detailed (and not summary) which only civil Court can undertake; not the Authority. The view I have taken finds support from the explicit legislative mandate under-scored in Section 12 (l) (o) of the Act exclusive jurisdiction is vested in only Civil Court for eviction of a tenant from any accommodation on the ground that the tenant has, without permission of the landlord, also taken possession of any other portion of the accommodation, which was not let out to the tenant.

( 4. ) NOW, few words only to refer to the case-law cited so that Shri Ramji Sharma does not feel offended. As earlier alluded, I consider it proper to do so only to do justice to labour undertaken by the counsel. In B. Johnson (supra) what is laid, unfortunately, goes against counsels contention : in para 39 the Court held, in dealing with the question of amendment, to permit withdrawal or addition of a ground for eviction, that it was open to the plaintiff landlord to choose to fit the same with the jurisdictional competence of the forum. This clearly establishes atleast one thing very clearly. Unless such a choice is made, it is not for the Court to make the choice or option for the party to take seisin of the matter. Kewalchand (1983 MPIJ 381 = 1983 MPRCJ 35) is also pressed in service but in fact of case the Court was considering the merit of a decree passed by the Civil Court and the ground for eviction taken was under Section 12 (l) (o), to which I have referred earlier. That decision, therefore, has no application to the facts of the instant case as eviction has been ordered in this case not by