( 1. ) WHEN the application for leave to defend is disposed of, what remains thereafter? The proceeding would then commence in terms of sub-section (2) of section 23-D of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act,1961, for short, the act. How the "enquiry" contemplated thereunder has to be held ? That indeed, is the short and moot question that has been agitated in this hotly contested petition. Case-law galore has been cited and arguments - very elaborate, extending over 11/2 hours are made, to which I have given my best attention and earnest consideration. Now, the decision.

( 2. ) THE revisionist is a tenant. He is not fully satisfied with the impugned order and has impugned only a part of the order. He is happy that he is granted leave to defend, but he is unhappy that the Rent Controlling Authority, for short, the authority, has given him, which Shri Mangal, appearing for the non-petitioner, submits, is "a restricted leave. ". The question, therefore, is, could the leave be restricted in the manner as is done in this case ?

( 3. ) A landlord can seek eviction of a tenant on the ground of "bona fide" requirement of the premises let out, in virtue of the provisions of Section 23-A of the act. It is true, the provision illustratively defines the term "bona fide", as appears from bare reading of clauses (a) and (b) of Section 23-A, but whether the requirement is bona fide or not has to be ascertained by the Authority on the facts pleaded and proved in each case. Indeed, for grant of leave to the tenant to defend landlords application, it is required by Section 23-C that he should "disclose such facta as would disentitle the landlord" from obtaining an order of eviction against the tenant on the ground specified in Section 23. Thus for, parties have choice and volition. Would the same situation not prevail thereafter ? Do the parties lose their independence to raise or litigate plea at the subsequent stage of the same proceeding though they are continued for a different purpose under sub-section (2) of Section 23-D ? Because I have had "occasion" to deal with the interpretation of the several provisions on several occasions, and have expressed the view that the issues of "leave" and "eviction" must be tried separately as several and distinct issues, I find no difficulty in dealing with the contentions now raised in the instant case (See, Jyoti Swarup, 1985 MPWN 655 et. el.)

( 4. ) A few facts however, may be stated to explain the genesis of this lis. In his application for "leave to defend", the revisionist tenant had disclosed "several facts" to suggest that the landlord-nonpetitioners requirement was not "bona fide". The several facts were treated by the Authority as special pleas and in its order rendered on tenants application the Authority, while giving him the leave prayed, still held that in the enquiry, which had to follow under Section 23-D (2), the tenant would not be able to plead some facts and to prove those facts. Some of the facts are (i) the landlord had been demanding enhancement of rent and on tenants refusal to pay the same, eviction proceedings being undertaken, the same must be held to be mala fide; (ii) the tenant having incurred some expenditure in repairing the premises and demanded reimbursement in respect thereof,the suit for eviction was instituted as a counter-blast and there was no bona fide requirement of the landlord to obtain possession of the premises; (iii) there was the want of notice contemplated under the lease; and (iv) the suit was premature in that the lease contemplated a renewal clause. The Authority held that the tenant was exclusively debarred from pleading all these facts in the eviction proceedings.

( 5. ) LANDLORDs counsel, Shri Mangal, has very fairly made one concession, though he has very forcefully contested the application and has supported the impugned order. His sole concession is that a decision of a Division Bench of the Delhi High Court in chatar Sain (AIR 1981