( 1. ) THERE was no prayer in writing for adjournment by the Counsel appearing for the State in the trial Court on 17-7-1980. Shri Arun Mishra, appearing for the plaintiff-petitioner in this Court, has read out to me the order passed by the trial court on 17-7-1980, which refers obviously to the oral prayer of the counsel. There is no doubt about this because the order itself speaks what the counsel spoke to the Court. It is mentioned in the order itself that counsel submitted to the Court that he had informed the department about the case being posted for defendants evidence on that date and he had sought instructions out he had not received any instructions. Trial Court was well within its jurisdiction to refuse adjournment and repel the move to arrest "further progress of the suit". Power and jurisdiction to do so was vested in the Court by Rule 3 of order 17 Civil Procedure Code and the discretion was judicially exercised. It was done to cany out the express legislative mandate of 1976 Civil Procedure Code Amendment act by which Rule 3 was amended as follows :

". . . . . the Court may, notwithstanding such default, - (a) If the parties are present, proceed to decide the suit forthwith; or (b) if the parties are, or any of them is, absent, proceed under Rule 2. "

( 2. ) STILL, in appeal. the Court below took a different view of the matter and allowed the appeal setting aside the decree passed by the trial Court. This order is impugned before me and very rightly and validly, I must say at once. The only reason which appears in the impugned order is very interesting. Because, the approach of the appellate Court is paternalistic not to the citizen, but to the State. I wonder if that should be the judicial approach. Defendant did not give any reason in the trial Court for not producing evidence and indeed no written application to do so was filed as observed at the outset. Strangely, the appellate Court has volunteered to do so. The reason given, apparently, by the appellate Court, is that State should be treated differently and Court should patronise the interest of the State and treat it liberally in granting adjournments. Why ? Because, State cannot manage its affairs quickly and it is not supposed to do so. This is wonderful: With all the machinery at its disposal, unending panorama of resources unlimited, it should not act: Indeed, it did not justify the State to be sluggish and seek preferential treatment. The appellate Court strangely encouraged it. Such judicial approach by judicial officers must be discouraged, who must treat citizens and state alike. Does law allow them to lean in favour of any ? They must seek mandate of constitution to do so. What does the Constitution disallow or allow ? The reply is unwritten in Articles 14 and 39a of the Constitution. A just legal system is constitutionally ordained and, it is the bounden duty of the judicial officers to abide by the constitutional mandate and rather ensure that State does not get an upper hand on the citizens to pre-empt any grievance of unequal or unfair treatment.

( 3. ) ON 6-5-1980 plaintiff had closed its evidence and on that date the Court fixed 28-6-1980 for the evidence of the defendant, the State of Madhya Pradesh. On that date the defendant failed to adduce any evidence and did not even make any prayer in writing for adjournment to allow it further time by showing cause why on that date itself evidence could not be produced. However, on prayer being made the trial Court made a peremptory and positive order directing the State to produce its evidence on 17-7-1980 making it positively clear that last chance was given to the State to do so. After that it was defendants headache. If it would have preferred to have judicial remedy for the headache, it should have come to this court to seek that. It failed to do so. This position is very clear. It appears, as I have said, from the order passed on 17-7-1980 itself, that the state did not even prefer to