( 1. ) THIS is. an application under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal-Procedure, 1973 (for short the Code) directed against the revisional order dated 17-7-1986 passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Neemuch in Criminal Revision No. 157 of 1984 whereby the order of attachment passed by the learned Sub-Divisional Magistrate, neemuch under Section 146 (1) of the Code has been confirmed

( 2. ) CIRCUMSTANCES giving rise to the petition these. There it one temple by name satyanarayan Temple at Baghana, Neemuch. Some agricultural lands are attached to this temple. There is dispute between the petitioner Mahant madhusudandas and one Jankidas regarding the possession of those agricultural lands.

( 3. ) ON information laid by Baghana police on 15-9-1983, the learned Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Neemuch initiated proceedings under Section 145 of the Code and passed the preliminary carder under Section 145 (1) of the Code the same day.

( 4. ) DURING the pendency of those proceedings, on 21-1-1984 moved an application for attachment of the aforesaid agricultural lands and the learned Sub-Divisional Magistrate on 21-11-1984 passed an order attaching the said property.

( 5. ) THE present petitioner preferred a revision petition. The Additional Sessions judge, Neemuch has dismissed the same. The petitioner, therefore, has approached this court invoking its inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code.

( 6. ) THE contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the learned addl. Sessions Judge erred in confirming the order passed by the learned Sub-Divisional magistrate. According to him in passing the order of attachment, the learned Sub-Divisional Magistrate failed to bear in mind the distinction between the provisions in section 145 (1) and Section 146 (1) of the Code. In support of his submission he has placed reliance on the decisions in State of M. P. vs. Chunnilal (1974 M. P. LJ. 50) and state of M. P. vs. Ramkrishna and others (1976 MP. W. N. 133 ).

( 7. ) THE contention of the learned counsel appearing for the State is that though the order passed by the teamed Sub-Divisional Magistrate does not expressly mention about any emergency the fact that such a state exists is borne out from the material on record.

( 8. ) THE point for consideration is whether interference in exercise of the inherent powers is called for in this case.

( 9. ) FROM a perusal of Section 145 (1) and Section 146 (1) of the Code which respectively provide for the preliminary order and the order of attachment it is clear that they contemplate different situation and require different material to sustain the orders they provide for. Satisfaction of the Sub-Divisional Magistrate as to the existence of a dispute likely to cause a breach of peace constitutes the foundation for the preliminary order under Section 145 (1) but unless the Magistrate considers the case to be one of emergency, order of attachment under Section 146 (1)cannot be sustained. Thus an order for attachment of property requires additional material.

( 10. ) THE provision to Section 146 (1) of the Code as to attachment ism these terms

"146. Power to attach subject of dispute and to appoint receiver.- (1) If the magistrate at any time after making the order under sub-section (1) of Section 145 considers the case to be one of emergency, or if he decides that none of the parties was then in such possession at is referred in Section 145, or if he is unable to satisfy himself as to which of them was the in such possession of the subject of dispute, he may attach the subject of dispute until a competent court has determined the rights of the parties thereto with regard to the person entitled to the possession thereof: provided that such Magistrate may withdraw the attachment at any time if he is satisfied that there is no longer any likelihood of breach of the peace with regard to the subject of dispute".

( 11. ) IN the decision in Nanurams case (l986 (l) M. P. W. N. 182) this court has held