( 1. ) UMPTEEN times counsel were warned that I shall hear this matter only on the question of jurisdictional competence of Authority because the jurisdiction of this Court to pass any order in Revision under Section 23-E is not so wide as to interfere on facts except such facts as are jurisdictional facts. I am happy that counsel heeded my advice and limited their submissions to the question of jurisdiction which arises in this matter in two ways.

( 2. ) FIRST few skeletal facts to which my attention is drawn by counsel in the course of their submissions. It is admitted that an application under Section 23-A of the M. P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961, for short, the act, was filed on 28-11-1983 by the non-petitioner for an order of eviction against the tenant. On 12-12-1983, the tenant (herein the petitioner) made a prayer under Section 23-C of the Act for leave to defend the application which was granted on 11-11-1984. Thereafter, he filed on 26-2-1984, his written statement to contest the application on merits. The admitted legal position is also that on 10-1-1985, Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control (Amendment)Ordinance, 1985, for short, the Ordinance, had come into force which was later adopted by the State Legislature and has since become a part of the Act. During the course of trial or 5-4-1985, the Rent Controlling Authority, for short, the authority which had retained seisin of the matter after promulgation of the Ordinance aforesaid, passed an order on 5-4-1985 purporting to decide the question of its jurisdictional competence not in terms of Clause 10 of the Ordinance, but on the basis of decision on the question as to whether the plaintiff, who had retired from Government service in 1968, was entitled to invoke Section 23-J which had come into effect in 1985. In the course of trial, parties adduced evidence and eventually, the Authority allowed the application and ordered eviction of the petitioner from the suit premises.

( 3. ) THE two-fold objection to the jurisdictional competence of the Authority may be considered now. Firstly, it is contended that at no point of time, in the course of pendency of the proceedings before the Authority, any order was passed by the authority to determine its own jurisdictional competence suo motu as required under clause 10 of the Ordinance aforesaid In support of this submission, reliance is placed on a decision of this Court in the case of Rambharose vs. Shashi Sharma, 1986-I-MPWN 15 = 1986 MPNCJN 25. The second contention of Shri Lahoti, who appears for the petitioner, is that in passing the impugned order on 5-4-1985 or even passing subsequently the final order of eviction, the Authority did not apply its mind to the requisite condition-precedent contemplated under law for ordering eviction under section 23-A, namely, that land-lord/non-petitioner was already in Government service when the tenant (herein the petitioner) was in occupation of the suit premises and, therefore, he was entitled to pursue proceedings for petitioners eviction before the authority in virtue of the provisions of Section 23-J of the Act.

( 4. ) IN support of his submissions, Shri Lahoti has vehemently urged that the question of jurisdictional competence was raised as early as in the application for leave to defend and the same objection was reiterated in paras 13, 14 and 19 of the written statement. He has contended that it was the bounden duty of the Authority in rendering its order on 5-4-1985 to apply its mind to the facts stated in the written statement filed on 26-2-1984. A plain reading of the order passed on 5-4-1985, counsel contends, shows that the disputed facts projected in the pleadings received no consideration at all of the authority and the latter accordingly failed to render judicial decision on the question of its jurisdictional competence whether to deal the non-petitioners application made under Section 23-A or to pass therein the final order of petitioners eviction. The au