( 1. ) THIS order will also govern the disposal of Misc. Criminal Case No. 32 of 1972 (Kailash Dubey v-State of M. P.) These are two petitions under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure for setting aside the judgment and sentences passed by me in Criminal Appeal No. 608 of 1969 (Awadesh Singh v. The State of M. P. ). decided on 27-10-1971.

( 2. ) HAVING heard the Parties at a considerable length. I have formed the opinion that these petitions must be dismissed. In my view, the petitioners have chosen a wrong forum for the redress of their grievances, if any. Their remedy lay by way of an appeal to the Supreme Court of India.

( 3. ) THREE questions arise for considerations in these petitions namely:

(1) Whether the High Court has any jurisdiction to review its judgment or sentences in exercise of its inherent powers under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure? (2) Whether the judgment and sentences passed by me in appeal were a nullity, having regard to the provisions contained in rule 1 (a) (iv ). Chapter I of the High Court Rules? (3) Whether the petitioners were not served with any notices under Section 423 (1a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and alternatively, the notices, if served, were invalid because they did not mention the sections under which they were convicted? If so, the effect of such non-service or defect in the notices. The questions must be answered against the petitioners.

( 4. ) IT is now well settled that Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure confers no new powers on the High Court. It merely safeguards all pre-existing inherent powers possessed by a High Court necessary (among other purposes) to secure the ends of justice. The section provides that those powers which the Court inherently possesses shall be preserved lest it be considered that the only powers possessed by the Court are those expressly conferred by the Code and that no inherent powers had survived the passing of the Code. (See: The State of U. P. v. Mohammad Nairn. Under Section 369, when once the Court has signed its judgment, the Court becomes functus officio except for the purpose of correcting clerical errors. The judgment of the High Court in its criminal jurisdiction is ordinarily final and it is not open to the High Court to review or alter it. In Sankatha Singh v. State of U. P. . their Lordships of the Supreme Court stated as follows:. . . . Section 369, read with Section 424 of the Code, makes it clear that the appellate Court is not to alter or review the judgment once signed, except for the purpose of correcting a clerical error. An appellate Court has, therefore, no power to review or restore an appeal which has been disposed of. Even though the High Court undoubtedly has inherent powers under Section 561-A. it cannot pass the order of re-hearing of the appeal in the exercise of such powers when Section 369,. read with Section 424 of the Code, specifically prohibits the altering or reviewing of its order by a Court. In the aforesaid case, their Lordships have reiterated this rule in these words: Inherent powers cannot be exercised to do what the Code specifically prohibits the Court from doing. Emphasis is, however, laid on the words "save as otherwise provided" appearing in Section 369 of the Code, and it is urged that the provisions of Section 369 are controlled by those contained in Section 561-A. There is no merit in contention. The words "save as otherwise provided" in Section 369 cannot have reference to Section 561-A. These words refer to the express provisions of the Code which empower the Court to alter or review its judgment in certain specified cases. It, therefore, follows that the High Court has no inherent powers to alter or review its own judgment in a criminal case once it. has been pronounced or signed. There are no doubt well recognized exceptions to the above principle, such as cases where the earlier decision was without jurisdiction or in default of appearance, withou