Back
High Court Of Madhya Pradesh
A. P. Sen and M. L. Malik, JJ.
State of M.P.
Versus
Shyam Kishore Agrawal
F. A. No. 200 of 1968 Of
Decided On : Sep 27,1974
Where the Revenue Courts took action under Rule 5-A of the Rules framed under section 202 of the C.P. Land Revenue Act, 1917, the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts is barred under section 229 (q) of the Act.
The Civil Court's interference could only be invoked if it could be shown that the Revenue Court had acted beyond their limits of authority, or had acted ultra vires, or had refused to exercise jurisdiction, or had acted mala fide or arbitrarily on in violation of the fundamental principles of natural justice or perversely. But it is always to be remembered that the Special Tribunal constituted under the Special Act, has jurisdiction to decide questions which are necessary for the purpose of giving or refusing relief under the particular statute. If certain state of facts has to exist before the Special Tribunal exercises jurisdiction, the tribunal must find that those facts exist 1969 JLJ 1=1968 RN 683 (SC) and AIR 1957 Bom. 239 (FB) relied on. [Para 7
The Civil Court could not entertain the suit when the matter lay within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Revenue Courts and when the Revenue Courts had acted within their jurisdiction, and also when their proceedings do not reveal any fraud, arbitrariness or perversity. [Para 11
(2) Tort - vicarious liability of State - public servant acting within the delegated power - Slate not liable - limit of the immunity.
Where the statute authorised doing of a certain thing, the party injured by that act has no remedy whatsoever unless the statute itself allows him a remedy. An act done under a statutory power is never unlawful or tortuous. It is only when the authority to whom statutory powers are conferred, is guilty of some irregularity or excess, that the question arises whether the State would be liable for acts of the servant purported to have been done in the exercise of statutory powers. The immunity from liability is in fact against such acts which are done in the purported exercise of the statutory powers. 1970 JLJ 112 (FB), AIR 1965 SC 1039 and 1961 JLJ 601 relied on. [Para 14
(3) Land Revenue Act, 1917 (CP) - S. 9-A (4) - Additional Deputy Commissioner and Deputy Commissioner - constitute bur one Court - Additional Deputy Commissioner could transfer the case transferred to him. [Para 16
(4) Limitation Act, 1908 - Art. 14 - order of the Board of Revenue in a case exclusively triable by Revenue Court - Article 14 applicable.
Under the provisions of section 220 of the Land Revenue Act, the Civil Court's jurisdiction was excepted on certain matters which were exclusively triable by Revenue Courts. The proceeding under section 202 of the Act was one such matter. Unless the Civil Court declared the order of the Revenue Court a nullity or beyond jurisdiction, the order was absolutely binding on the plaintiff and he could not lay his bands on the goods seized or confiscated. That being so, whether or not the plaintiff had expressly asked for the relief of setting aside the order of the Board of Revenue, the relief was implicit in the plaint allegations for the application of Article 14. 1962 JLJ 1071 and AIR 1951 Bom. 71 relied on. [Para 20
(5) Limitation Act, 1908 - Art. 29 - starting point of limitation.
Where the seizure is under legal process, till the investigation was in progress the plaintiff could say that the property seized was liable to be returned to him and the possession of the Court was possession on his behalf. But sooner the investigation was over and the order of confiscation was made, it would be a wrongful seizure in the eyes of the plaintiff. The suit should then have been brought within one year from the date of the final order of confiscation. [Para 21
M.L.Malik, J.
( 1. ) Shyam Kishore Agrawal (the respondent in the present appeal) filed a suit in the Court of the Additional District Judge, Mandla, for compensation for wrongful conversion of his goods. The suit was registered as Civil Suit No. 2-B of 1958. It was earlier dismissed on a preliminary finding that the Civil Courts jurisdiction to entertain it was barred under the provisions of section 220 (q) of the C. P. Land Revenue Act. The finding was challenged in appeal by Shyam Kishore Agrawal and this Court by its order dated the 5th October, 1962, set it aside, directing the Additional District Judge to frame all the issues of fact and law that arise in the case, and then decide upon the question of jurisdiction after recording evidence. The case was remitted to the trial Court with the following observations:
"In our opinion, the proper course for the trial Court to follow is to first frame all the issues of facts and law that arise in the case and then to determine if and how far the trial of these issues is barred by ascertaining the limits of the jurisdiction of the Revenue Authorities, examining their powers under section 202 of the Act and then determining if and how far they have acted within their jurisdiction."
( 2. ) The Additional District Judge proceeded to record evidence and ultimately found that the Revenue Courts had assumed jurisdiction on no legal evidence whatsoever on the breaches of rules complained of and that the seizure and confiscation of the plaintiffs logs of timber by the Revenue Authorities was unlawful. Consequently he gave a decree for Rs. 2,32000/- in favour of the plaintiff. Aggrieved by the judgment, the defendant (State of Madhya Pradesh) has come up in appeal.
( 3. ) The appeal was heard on 22-4-1971, and the question that cropped up was whether a claim for damages could lie against the State when seizure and confiscation was done in the exercise of, or purported exercise of statutory powers. The Court thought it proper to invite findings on these issues of law. The Court retained seisen of the appeal and remitted certain issues for findings of the District Court. The findings that have been received, are against the plaintiff. The learned Additional District Judge found that the seizure and confiscation was validly made under the sanction of the lawful authority and, therefore, the State was absolutely immune from the liability. There is thus an apparent conflict between the findings earlier recorded by the District Court and the findings now transmitted to this Court. On these findings, the inevitable result was that the plaintiffs suit deserved to be dismissed.
( 4. ) The plaintiff had filed the suit on the following averments;
"(i) That he was the sole proprietor of the following, amongst others, Jar Kharidi villages in Mandla, Tahsil and District mandla, viz., Khursipar, Mohgaon, Patpara, Munsa- rai, Rehta Mohania and Amvar;
(ii) That on 8-3-1951 the Deputy Commissioner, Mandla, granted him permission to extract Sal trees from the aforesaid villages subject to the condition that he would extract the trees from 1 /20th of the total area in each village, subject to a minimum of 10 acres, and also observe the rules framed under section 202 of the C. P. Land Revenue Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act);
(iii) That in pursuance of the aforesaid permission, he cut 8663 mature Sal trees of and above in girth, in March, 1951 and that the said timber was then worth Rs. 2,30,000/-;
(iv) That he had entered into a contract with one Kulbir Johar who had agreed to take the timber after it had been felled; that he was also entitled to saw them at the site and that the property in the goods would pass to him on payment of the price;
(v) That on the coming into force of the Madhya Pradesh Abolition of Proprietary Rights Act on or about 31-3-51, the forest in the aforesaid Jar Kharidi villages vested in the State and that the District Authorities thereafter prohibited the entry of the pl
An indispensable Tool for Legal Professionals, Endorsed by Various High Court and Judicial Officers
Please visit our Training & Support
Center or Contact Us for assistance
Scan Me!
India’s Legal research and Law Firm App, Download now!
For Daily Legal Updates, Join us on :
Back to top
