( 1. ) THIS is a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution filed against an order passed by the Industrial Court, Indore.

( 2. ) THE facts giving rise to this petition are that the petitioner was in the employment of the non-applicant No. 1 Corporation and was serving as a driver running a passenger bus. An enquiry was ordered against him by a charge sheet dated the 23rd September 1965 on the allegation that he did not stop the bus when a signal fr that purpose was given by the Traffic Inspector. However, we are not concerned in this petition with the merits of the charges. After enquiry, the petitioner was found guilty of misconduct and an order for his dismissal was passed on 2nd December 1965. The petitioner then made an approach under section 31 (3) of the Madhya Pradesh Industrial Relations act, 1960 (hereinafter called the Act) by a letter dated the 22nd December 1965, and as the non-applicant No. 1 refused to consider the matter the petitioner filed an application under sections 61 and 62 of the Act before the Labour court, Indore. After the written statement was filed by the non-applicant no. 1, the Labour Judge framed issue No. 2 as a preliminary issue and decided it in favour of the petitioner holding that the domestic enquiry conducted by the Inquiry Officer of the non-applicant No. 1 was not proper. Consequently the learned Labour Judge directed the non-applicant No. 1 to lead evidence to establish the charges levelled against the petitioner. Against this order of the labour Judge, the non-applicant No. 1 filed a petition before the Industrial court, Indore. The learned Judge of the Industrial Court, purporting to exercise jurisdiction under section 67 of the Act, set aside the order of the Labour judge and held that the enquiry conducted by the non-applicant No. 1 was proper. It is against this order of the Industrial Court that the present petition under Article 227 of the Constitution has been filed.

( 3. ) SHRI J. D. Patel, learned counsel for the petitioner, contended that section 67 of the Act is a provision conferring powers of superintendence on the industrial Court but these powers do not confer on the Industrial Court the power to interfere on merits with an order passed by the Labour Court and to hold that the domestic enquiry was proper. He contended that section 66 conferred revisional powers on the Industrial Court, and in view of language of section 66 the revisional jurisdiction of the Industrial Court is more or less analogous to that of this Court under section 115 Civil Procedure Code and, therefore, the learned Judge of the Industrial Court could not have exercised jurisdiction under section 66 to set aside the order passed by the Labour Judge. According to the learned counsel, it could not be said that the Industrial Court exercising jurisdiction under section 67 had any wider jurisdiction. He also contended that the scheme of the legislation was to give finality to the orders of the Labour Court and, therefore, there is no provision of any appeal but it is only a revision which is provided for, and consequently the order passed by the industrial Court is without jurisdiction and deserves to be set aside.

( 4. ) SHRI R. K. Vijaywargiya, learned counsel for the non-applicant No. 1 contended that the jurisdiction of the Industrial Court under section 67 of the act is analogous to the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution and, therefore, the jurisdiction under section 67 was much wider than that under section 66 of the Act. He also contended that the question about the propriety of the domestic enquiry was itself a jurisdictional fact which conferred jurisdiction of the Labour Court to enquire into the merits of the charge-sheet, and that being so the Industrial Court, exercising jurisdiction under section 67, could go into facts to come to a conclusion. He referred at length to the various circumstances that were considered by the Labour Judge in order to co