The computation of the period for initiating the recall process under Section 47(2) of the M.P. Municipalities Act, 1961 is determined from the date of election of the President as notified under Section 45 of the Act.

Viney Mittal, J.

1. The petitioner is elected President of Gram Panchayat, Pipalravan, District Dewas. He has challenged the order dated September 20, 2006 passed by the Collector, Dewas-respondent No. 3, whereby an application filed by the 3/4th of the elected Councillors for recall of the petitioner, as President, has been forwarded to the State Government under Section 47(2) of the M.P. Municipalities Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as 'Act') for taking further appropriate action.

2. The facts as depicted in the petition show that the petitioner was directly elected as President of Nagar Panchayat, Pipalravan, in an election held on June 16,2004. The said election was notified on June 24, 2004. According to the petitioner, first meeting of the Municipal Council was held on July 15, 2004 in terms of Section 55 of the Act.

3. A proposal to recall the petitioner as President of the Municipal Council was initiated by 3/4th of the Municipal Councillors and presented to the Collector, Dewas on June 26, 2006. The said application filed by the said Councillors, was duly entertained by the Collector and thereafter, in terms of Section 47 of the Act, the said application was forwarded to the State Government for further appropriate action.

4. It is in these circumstances, that the petitioner is before this Court making a grievance that the initiation of the process for recall of the petitioner was wholly contrary to the mandatory provisions of the Act and even the order passed by the Collector was not in accordance with law and therefore, the entire process was liable to be set aside.

5. It has been specifically claimed in the petition that since the first meeting of the Municipal Council was held on July 15, 2004 in terms of Section 55 of the Act, therefore, the initiation of the process to recall the petitioner as President of the Municipal Council on June 26, 2006 was within the period of two years of the date of first meeting and therefore, a period of two years having not elapsed from the date of entering of the office by the petitioner, the initiation of the said process was contrary to the provisions of Section 47 of the Act and on such defective application, the Collector could not have initiated the process and forwarded the said application to the State Government for taking further action.

6. The claim of the petitioner has been contested by respondent Nos. 1 to 3. A reply to the petition has been filed. In the reply, the respondents have specifically pleaded that a period of two years had already elapsed from the dale of entering of the office of the petitioner, which period was to be computed from the date of issuance of the notification, which had been issued on June 24, 2004. The respondents support the aforesaid plea by relying upon a Full Bench Judgment in the case of State of Madhya Pradesh and Anr. v. Mahendra Kumar Saraf and Ors.

7. I have heard Shri Piyush Mathur, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner and Shri Anand Pathak, learned Dy. Government Counsel appearing for the respondents and with their assistance have also gone through the record of the case.

8. Shri Piyush Mathur, learned Counsel for the petitioner has referred to Section 36 of the Act and has contended that every Municipality unless sooner dissolved, shall continue for five years from the date appointed for its first meeting and no longer. My attention has also been drawn to Sub-section (4) of Section 36 to contend that subject to the provisions of the Act, the term of the President and every Councillors was to be coterminous with the term of the Council. Learned Counsel thus also relies upon Article 243U of Constitution of India to contend that every Municipality, unless sooner dissolved under any law for the time being in force, shall continue for five years from the date appointed for its first meeting and no longer.

9. On that basis, it has been contended by the learned Counsel for the petitioner that since the first meeting of the Munic