S.C. Pandey, J.

1. This is a reference under Section 5 of the Court Fees Act, 1870 (henceforth 'the Act'). The Taxing Officer was of the opinion that the appellant was liable to pay court fees at the rate of Rs. 1,430/- on the valuation of Rs. 12,170/- and not at the rate of Rs. 1,260/- as would be leviable after commencement of Amendment Act No. 12 of 1997, dated 1-4-1997. This Amendment Act of 1997 has modified the Article 1-A of Schedule I to the Act, reducing the amount of court fees payable on valuation of Rs. 12,170/- to Rs. 1,260/-. The appellants would be liable to pay Rs. 1,430/- on the same amount if the amended Article 1-A of Schedule I aforesaid was not applied to the case at hand. The order passed in this reference shall also govern the question of payment of court fees in the connected First Appeal Nos. 464/98, 465/98 and 467/98, as well as the appeals wherever the question of payment of court fees answered by this reference is involved.

2. Ordinarily, the view of the Taxing Officer would be final in a given case. However, looking to the general importance of the case, the matter has been referred to under Section 5 of the Act.

3. I have heard Shri VS. Chaudhary, learned counsel for the appellants and Shri Ravish Agrawal, Advocate, as Amicus Curiae. Nobody else appeared to help this Court on behalf of the Bar or the State Government.

4. Both the learned counsel argued that the Taxing Officer is not correct in requiring the appellants to pay more court fees when the relevant schedule of the Act stood amended requiring the appellants to pay less court fees on the date of filing the appeal, i.e. 21st of September, 1998. It was argued that the amendment became operative from the date it came into force and it would apply to all these appeals which were filed subsequent to the amendment, irrespective of the fact, what court fees was paid initially on the plaint. In other words, the amendment was retrospective in the sense that it applied to all the suits filed before the commencement of the Act.

5. Having heard the counsel, and after considering the matter in all its broadest perspective, I am of the opinion that the opinion of the Taxing Officer has to be accepted as against the contentions of the learned counsel, who opposed the acceptance of the reference, for the following reasons.

6. The Taxing Officer has rightly referred to the decision of Nagpur High Court in the case of Arjuna Govinda v. Amrita Keshiba and Ors., reported in AIR 1956 Nag 281 for the proposition that right of appeal is a substantive right as distinguished from a mere procedural right. It inheres in a party at the time of the filing of initial proceedings or the plaint in a suit. It continues till the civil suit is finally disposed of exhausting all rights initially vested in a party at the time of filing of the suit or the proceedings. This inherent right can be taken away by making an express provision in the amending Act. If such a provision is made expressly or it is implied then operation of the amending Act would be retrospective, affecting the vested right of the parties in all pending action. In absence of an express or implied provision, the procedural right may be taken away with the retrospective effect, but not a substantive right. The proposition follows from the rule of interpretation that no party has a vested right to a particular procedure. However, it is equally well established that same cannot be said a substantive right. If it is a vested right then the Legislature can take it away by saying in so many words or by clear intendment. This proposition was accepted by a Full Bench of Nagpur High Court in Radhakisan Laxminarayan Toshnival v. Shridhar Ramchandra Alshi and Ors., reported in AIR 1950 Nag 177. It is of no use to multiply the cases on this point because Five-Judge Bench of Supreme Court in the case of Garikapati Veeraya v. N. Subbiah Choudhry and Ors. AIR 1957 SC 540, by majority has applied the above principle. In tha