The main legal point established in the judgment is that the scope and exercise of jurisdiction under Section 100, CPC is limited to the substantial question of law, and the existence of a substantial question of law is essential for the exercise of jurisdiction.

Sunil Kumar Sinha, J.

1. This is the plaintiffs second appeal filed under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The plaintiff lost in both the Courts. This appeal arises out of judgment and decree dated 27-2-2006 passed by IInd Addl. District Judge (F.T.C.), Surajpur, Distt. Sarguja (CG) in Civil Appeal No. 5-A/2005, arising out of judgment and decree dated 2-9-2003 passed in Civil Suit No. 86-A/2002 by the Civil Judge, Class-II, Surajpur, Distt. Sarguja (CG).

2. The plaintiff filed a suit for declaration, partition and permanent injunction in relation to the agricultural lands described in Schedules A and B of the plaint. Schedule A relates to Village Akhorakala. Schedule B relates to Village Kalyanpur. The plaint allegations are that the lands of Schedule A were the self-acquired property of his father namely Shiv Ratan Jaiswal. Shiv Ratan had 3 sons namely Nandlal (plaintiff), Bandhu (defendant No. 1) and Santoshi Ram (defendant No. 2). Another brother of Shiv Ratan Jaiswal was Nav Ratan Jaiswal, whose daughter is Smt. Sonu, defendant No. 3. The plaint allegations are that the properties of Schedule B of the plaint were acquired by Nav Ratan Jaiswal. It is further alleged that when Nav Ratan died the properties of Schedule B were succeeded by his daughter Smt. Sonu (defendant No. 3). Sonu is shown to be handicapped. The plaintiffs case is that on account of death of Nav Ratan, the question of maintenance of Sonu arose and it was decided among the family members that defendant No. 1 will go to Village Kalyanpur and will look after the maintenance of Sonu and he will also manage the properties of Schedule B and in this manner, he will have no right or interest in the properties of Schedule A at Akhorakala. The cause of action arose when defendant No. 1, also claimed his right and ownership in the properties of Schedule A of the plaint. The claim of the plaintiff is that he and defendant No. 2 be declared the joint owners of the properties of Village Akhorkala, and in case, the defendant No. 1 is also held to be a joint owner in the properties of Village Akhorakala to the extent of 1/3 share, then the plaintiff and defendant No. 2 be also held to be the joint owners of properties of Village Kalyanpur to the extent of 1/3 share each in the said property.

3. The defendant Nos. 1 and 2 filed their written statement denying the contentions of the plaintiff. It was pleaded by them that since defendant No. 1 is son of Shiv Ratan Jaiswal and the property of Schedule A were admittedly acquired by Shiv Ratan Jaiswal, therefore, he will have 1/3 share in the said property. So far as properties of Schedule B are concerned, his name has been mutated in those properties alongwith the name of Smt. Sonu, defendant No. 3 because he is looking after the defendant No. 3 and he has not accepted that property in lieu of partition in the family as has been alleged by the plaintiff.

4. The learned Trial Judge framed various issues and after recording evidence of the parties, dismissed the suit of the plaintiff holding that the plaintiff as well as defendant Nos. 1 and 2 are joint owners of the properties of Schedule A of the plaint to the extent of l/3rd share of each in it. It was also held that the properties of Schedule B of the plaint were not the properties of ownership of plaintiff or defendant Nos. 1 and 2.

5. Against the aforesaid judgment and decree passed by the Trial Court, the plaintiff filed an appeal before the Lower Appellate Court. The Lower Appellate Court also dismissed the appeal confirming the judgment and decree passed by the Trial Court.

6. Learned Counsel for appellant argues that the Trial Court as well as the First Appellate Court erred in law in not holding that in the earlier partition, the properties of Schedule A of the plaint were given to the ownership of plaintiff and defendant No. 2. He also argues that the Courts below erred in law in not holding that defendant No. 1 has surrendered his rights on the propertie