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1992 Supreme(MP) 133
II (1992) ACC 152
V Gyani, S Jha
Arshad Hussain And Akhlas Hussain
vs
The Regional Transport Authority ...
Decided on : 6 March, 1992
Applications for grant of permit made under provisions of the old Act of 1939 did not lapse with coming into force of the new Act, 1988, and the petitioners were entitled to a right of hearing before grant of such permit.
Headnote:
MOTOR VEHICLES ACT - PERMIT - COUNTER SIGNATURE - APPLICATION MADE UNDER OLD ACT - SURVIVAL - RIGHT OF HEARING - NATURAL JUSTICE - Section 63, 217 - General Clauses Act, Section 6 - M.V. Act 1939 - M.V. Act 1988 - Held, applications for grant of permit made under provisions of the old Act of 1939 had lapsed with coming into force of the new Act, 1988, which does not provide for any such right of hearing, which is not available to the objectors under the new Act.
Fact of the Case:
The petitioners, holders of stage carriage permits, challenged the grant of countersigned permits to the respondents under the new Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, arguing that their applications made under the old Act of 1939 had lapsed and that they were not given an opportunity of being heard before the grant of such permits.
Finding of the Court:
The court held that the applications made by the respondents for grant of countersigned permits under the old Act did not lapse with the coming into force of the new M.V. Act as erroneously held by the R.T.A. Ujjain. The petitioners were entitled to a right of hearing in support of objections preferred by them.
Issues: 1. Whether applications for grant of permit made under provisions of the old Act of 1939 had lapsed with coming into force of the new Act, 1988? 2. Whether the petitioners were entitled to a right of hearing before grant of such permit?
Ratio Decidendi: 1. The court relied on the Supreme Court judgment in Gurucharansingh v. Yeshwantsingh (AIR 1992 page 180) to hold that applications for grant of permit preferred under the old Act are saved on correct interpretation of Section 217 of the new Act read with Section 6 of the General Clauses Act. 2. The court held that the right of hearing is that of the individual objector and more consideration of the objection either suo moto or at the instance of some one else, cannot be equated with the opportunity of hearing to be afforded or extended to a person who is going to be adversely affected by an action or order of the authority.
Final Decision: The court allowed both petitions, quashed the impugned orders, and held that the petitioners were entitled to a right of hearing in support of their objections to grant of countersigned permits to the respondents.
V.D. Gyani, J.
1. Both these petitions are closely connected. They raise and involve a common question of law. In fact arguments advanced are common to both these petitions. Therefore they are being decided by common order.
2. The petitioners are holders of stage carriage permits, plying their carriages on Harda-Indore (Via Nemavar, Khategaon, Kannod Bijawad-Chapda with a total distance of 156 kms.) routes making two single trips daily as per timings shown by them.
3. Respondents Jagdevisingh and M/s R.J. Fouzdar are also Bus operators, who have been granted permits to operate their Buses between Hoshangabad-Indore covering the above route, subject counter signatures by R.T. As Indore and Ujjain within whose jurisdiction the above route lies. The respondents applied for counter signatures of their respective permits under Section 63 of the M.V. Act 1939 on 18.8.88, 3.8.88. These applications were published in the State Government Gazette on 18.8.88 and objections were invited to the granted of counter signed permits. Accordingly the petitioners duly submitted their objections before the R.T.A. Ujjain raising various objections.
4. These objections were taken up for hearing on 23.6.90 but adjourned to 7.7.90, when some other objectors raised a point contending that applications for counter signatures as made by the respondents on 18.8.88 and 3.8.88 under the provisions of old M. V. Act of 1939. Lapsed with coming into force of New M. V. Act on 1.7.89 and no longer survived for counter signatures. The point was argued at length before the R.T.A. Ujjain on 31.8.90. The case was reserved for order for which no date was fixed. Eventually on 21.11.90 the R.T.A. passed an order filed as Ann. 'A' to M.P. No. 1899/91 and Ann. 'B' to M.P. No. 874/91. By this order dt. 21.11.90 the respondent R.T.A. Ujjain, following a judgment of this Court in M.P. No. 293/89 decided on 12.12.89, held that the applications for grant of permit made under the old Act of 1939, did not survive, on coming into force of the new M.V. Act for 1988, which came into force on 1.7.89 and were not maintainable as such. It is the petitioners case, that they were not heard, not afforded any opportunity of being heard by the R.T.A. Ujjain, before passing the aforesaid order on 21.11.90, which is grossly violative of principles on natural justice.
5. As is evident from record, the matter was again taken up for hearing by R.T. A. on 24.11.90 when the respondents seeking counter signatures brought it to his notice that they had already made fresh application 29.6.90 and 9.8.90 under the provisions of the new Act of 1988, which should be taken up for consideration on merits. The petitioners it may be noted, had not notice of these applications made by respondents, R.T.A. Ujjain on 11.1.1991 passed order counter signing the permits (filed as Ann. 'C to MP.No. 1899/91) and Ex. D.I to M.P. No. 874/91 without affording any opportunity of hearing to the petitioners who had their objections to the grant of counter signed permits. The petitioners have denounced this order dt. 11.1.91 as grossly violative of the principles of natural justice.
6. The petitioner in M.P. No. 1899/90 had challenged the order Ann. 'C in revision before S.T.A.T. but it was dismissed as barred by time vide dt. 29.5.91 (Ann. E) passed by the S.T. A.T. It is only here in this regard of filing of a revision petition before the S .T. A.T. that this MP. No. 1899/91 differs from M.P. No. 874/91, otherwise the basic facts are common to both these petitions.
7. Shri Chafekar learned Counsel appearing with Shri Agarwal for the petitioners has made two fold submissions. It was contended that on a plain reading of Section 217 of M. V. Act 1988 and Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, it could not be said that applications made under provisions of the repealed Act 1939 had lapsed with coming into force of the new Act. It was also contended that elementary rules of natural justice have been breached by the R.T.A. in p
