An application for amendment of the plaint under Order 6, Rule 17 of the CPC cannot be entertained after the closure of the case for judgment and before the pronouncement of judgment.

V.S. Kokje, J.

1. Heard Shri N.K. Patni, for the applicant and Shri R.C. Maheshwari for the non-applicant.

2. This revision application challenges the order dated 10-8-1991 passed by the Xth Additional Judge to the Court of District Judge, Indore allowing an amendment in the plaint. The main contention of Shri Patni, learned counsel for the applicant is that the suit was closed for judgment at the time the plaintiff moved an application for amendment. According to Shri Patni when once the case was closed for judgment, no further application could be moved in the case. He relied heavily upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Arjunsingh v. Mohindrakumar and Ors., AIR 1964 SC 993. Shri R.C. Maheshwari learned counsel for the non-applicant tried to distinguish the decision of the Supreme Court in Arjunsingh's case (supra) by contending that, that case applied only to an application under Order 9, Rule 7 of the Code of Civil Procedure (for short the 'Code') being filed after the case was closed for judgment. According to him there is a difference in the provisions of Order 9 and Order 6 of the Code. He further contended that Order 6, Rule 17 of the Code permitted an amendment application at any stage of the suit and date of decision was also a stage of the suit. He tried to draw a comparison between Order 9 and other provisions of the Code and stated that amendment applications have been allowed by the Court after a preliminary decree was passed. He also raised a question as to whether an application for compromise under Order 23, Rule 1 of the Code could also not be entertainable after the case is closed for judgment. He relied on rulings reported in AIR 1974 AP 201, AIR 1976 Del. 56, 1989 MPLJ 750 = 1989 JLJ 359 and AIR 1969 SC 1267. He contended that rules of procedure are handmaid of justice and cannot be allowed to defeat justice.

3. Having heard the learned counsel and having perused the decision of the Supreme Court in Arjunsingh's case (supra), I have come to the conclusion that the trial Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the application after the closure of the case for judgment. In para 19 of the judgment in Arjunsingh's case (supra) while considering as to whether after the closure of the hearing there is any stage of proceedings the Supreme Court observed as follows:--

"Mr. Pathak, however, strenuously contended that a case of the sort now on hand where a defendant appeared after the conclusion of the hearing but before the pronouncing of the judgment had not been provided for. We consider that the suggestion that there is such a stage is, on the scheme of the Court, wholly unrealistic. In the present context, when once the hearing start, the Court contemplated only two stages in the trial of the suit; 1) where the hearing adjourned or 2) where the hearing is completed. Where the hearing is completed the parties have no further rights or privilages in the matter and it is only for the convenience of that Court that Order XX, Rule 1 permits judgment to be delivered after an interval after the hearing is completed......

.. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..

There is thus no hiatus between the two stages of reservation of judgment and pronouncing the judgment so as to make it necessary for the Court to afford to the party the remedy of getting orders passed on the lines of Order IX, Rule 7". In the face of the aforesaid remarks the contention that the ruling only applied to Order 9 and had no application to Order 6 is devoid of any substance. When the Court has categorically pronounced that there is no hiatus between two stages of reservation of judgment and pronouncing of the judgment, it is clear that though the judgment is deferred, there is no stage in between, at which an application under Order 6, Rule 17 of the Code could be filed. As soon as the judgment is pronounced the proceedings come to an end and no stage of the proceedings remains at which an application for amendment could be moved. The ruling is much applicable t