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1992 Supreme(MP) 160

1992 (0) MPLJ 764
K.L. Issrani, J.
Rameshwar Prasad
vs
Municipal Corporation
Decided on : 16 March, 1992

The Civil Court lacks jurisdiction to determine the status of property as evacuee property or to question the legality of actions taken by the Custodian General or Custodian under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1954 and the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950.

Headnote:

EVACUEE PROPERTY - DISPLACED PERSONS (COMPENSATION AND REHABILITATION) ACT, 1954 - SECTIONS 7, 8, 12, 14, 16, 20, 22, 23, 24, 27, 36, 46, 49, 50 - ADMINISTRATION OF EVACUEE PROPERTY ACT, 1950 - SECTIONS 7, 8, 16, 24, 27, 28 - JURISDICTION OF CIVIL COURT - BARRED - SUMMARY

Fact of the Case:

The Municipal Corporation, Sagar, filed a suit for ejectment against the appellant, claiming that the appellant was a tenant in the suit premises at a rate of Rs. 5/- per month and had failed to pay arrears of rent. The appellant claimed adverse possession and denied the existence of a tenancy agreement.

Finding of the Court:

The trial court and the lower appellate court held that the respondent Corporation was the owner of the suit premises, which was earlier an evacuee property purchased by the Corporation in an auction from the Central Government under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1954. The appellant was found to be a licensee, not a tenant, and the lease was validly terminated. The appellant was ordered to vacate the premises and pay a license fee of Rs. 5/- per month until he vacated.

Issues: 1. Whether there was evidence to prove that the suit property was previously an evacuee property? 2. Whether the Civil Court had jurisdiction to go into the said question?

Ratio Decidendi: 1. The sale deed and witness testimony established that the suit property was an evacuee property acquired by the respondent Corporation under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1954. 2. Section 36 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1954 bars the jurisdiction of Civil Courts to entertain suits or proceedings in respect of matters which the Central Government or any Officer or authority appointed under the Act is empowered to determine.

Final Decision: The appeal was dismissed, upholding the judgments of the lower courts. The appellant's claim of adverse possession was rejected, and the Corporation's ownership of the property was affirmed.

JUDGMENT

K.L. Issrani, J.

1. The present appeal arises out of the judgment and decree dated 25-9-1984, passed by Shri S. K. Tiwari, Additional Judge to the Court of District Judge, Sagar, in Civil Appeal No. 41-A of 1984 arising out of the judgment and decree dated 23-12-1983, passed by the Second Civil Judge, Class II, Sagar, in Civil Suit No. 72-A of 1974.

2. The Municipal Corporation, Sagar, had filed a Civil Suit for ejectment against the appellant on the ground that the appellant was tenant in the suit premises at the rate of Rs. 5/- per month. The appellant has failed to pay arrears of rent. The premises were also in a dilapidated condition. The suit property was an evacuee property belonging to an evacuee and the said property was purchased by the respondent Corporation in an auction from the Central Government under the provisions of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1954 (hereinafter called the 1954 Act). In the alternative, it was submitted that in case it is found that the appellant was not a tenant, the suit for ejectment should be decreed on the basis of title.

3. The defence of the appellant/defendant was that he was a tenant but in adverse possession. There was no privity of contract of tenancy between him and the Corporation.

4. The trial Court held that the respondent Corporation is the owner of the suit premises. It was earlier an evacuee property belonging to the Central Government. The appellant was not a tenant but a licensee. But it was held that the lease of the appellant has been validly terminated and the house is in good condition. It was further held that the suit premises cannot be repaired unless it is vacated by the appellant. The appellant was, therefore, ordered to vacate the premises with a direction to pay the licence fee to the respondent at the rate of Rs. 5/- per month till he vacates. Thus the suit was decreed.

5. Aggrieved by the said decree of the trial Court, the appellant filed an appeal before the lower appellate Court and the lower appellate Court upheld the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court.

6. This Court, while admitting the appeal, framed the following two substantial questions of law : -

"(i) Whether there was no evidence produced in the case to prove that the suit property had been previously an evacuee property?

(ii) Whether the Civil Court had jurisdiction to go into the said question?"

7. The submission of the learned counsel for the appellant is that (i) there is no notification placed on record declaring the property as an evacuee property; (ii) since no privity of contract between the parties was proved, the suit should have been dismissed; (iii) there is no basis for holding the appellant a licensee and (iv) there is no evidence of ownership of the property of the respondent or its predecessors.

8. Learned counsel for the respondent supports the judgments of the Courts below and submits that the findings arrived by the Courts below are concurrent findings of fact and do not call for any interference by this Court. He further submits that the appellant has failed to specifically plead and prove his adverse possession. The absence of the evidence of the terms of lease will give rise to the fact of presumption of the appellant being a licensee only. According to him though the appellant has denied the property to be the evacuee property but has not led any evidence to that effect. The Central Government or the Rehabilitation Department is not made a party to the suit. Therefore, the plea of the appellant that the suit property was not an evacuee property is not tenable against the oral and documentary evidence placed on record to this effect by the respondent.

9. So far as question No. (i) is concerned as to whether the property was earlier an evacuee property or not, the plaintiff has placed on record the sale-deed Ex.P-1 and has examined T. R. khanna (P.W.1) from the Rehabilitation Department, who was examined on commission. He identified and pro















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