In order to sustain a charge of dowry death under Section 304B IPC, the prosecution must prove that the death of the woman was caused by burns or bodily injury, or that it occurred otherwise than under normal circumstances, and that the woman was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband for dowry.

V.S. Kokje, J.

1. This is an application under Section 397 of the Code of Criminal Procedure preferred by the accused persons against framing of charge under Section 498A and Section 304B of the Indian Penal Code against them.

2. According to the prosecution information about the crime was received through a letter addressed to the Hon'ble the Prime Minister of. India by one Shankarlal Dubey resident of 638, Gol Bazar, Jabalpur and on investigation it was found that the daughter of the complainant/Shankarlal Dubey named Neelima alias Nilu was married to accused Captain Sudeep Pandey the son of the other two accused persons on 24-2-1988. Even after receiving dowry of about Rs.l,50,000/-incash and kind, the accused persons were not satisfied and, therefore, used to torture Neelima since 25-2-1988 and ultimately, accused/Capt. Sudeep Pandey gave a blow on abdomen to Neelima while she was admitted to a Military Hospital as a result of which she died on 30-1 -1989.

3. After investigation the challan was filed and the case being triable by court of session was committed to it. After hearing both the parties, the sessions court has framed a charge under Sections 498A and 304B of the Indian Penal Code. The present revision has been filed against the order of framing charge dated 31-5-1991.

4. It was contended on behalf of the applicants that the charge is without foundation and the material on record is not sufficient to sustain a charge under Sections 498A and 304B of the Indian Penal Code. The learned counsel relied on decisions reported in 1989 (3) Crimes 645 (SC) and 1991 (1) Crimes 377 (Note). The learned counsel for the State on the other hand submitted that when the sessions court has come to a conclusion that on the material placed before it a prima facie case of commission of offence under the aforesaid sections is made out, this court cannot interfere lightly with that finding. Relying on 1986 Cri.LJ. 1245 (SC), 1989 (1) SCC 715 and 1991 (1) SCC 371, it was contended by the learned counsel appearing for the State that in the circumstances of the case there was no scope for interference and the accused persons must be asked to stand trial.

5. The scope of interference in a revision with an order framing charge is no doubt very narrow. In State of U. P. v. Man Mohan and Ors., 1986 Crl.L.J. 1245 (SC), it was held that where the magistrate had formed the opinion that there were grounds to presume that the accused had committed the offence and that the prosecution was not false, frivolous or vexatious or one which was by way of abuse of the process of law, the High Court could not quash the charge in exercise of the revisional and reference powers.

6. In State of Bihar v. Ramesh Singh, (1977) 4 SCC 39 the Supreme Court considering the scope of Section 277 and Section 228 of the Code of Criminal Procedure observed as follows :-

"Reading the two provisions together in juxtaposition, as they have got to be, it would be clear that at the beginning and the initial stage of the trial the truth, veracity and effect of the evidence which the prosecutor proposes to adduce are not to be meticulously judged. Nor is any weight to be attached to the probable defence of the accused. It is not obligatory for the judge at that stage of the trial to consider in any detail and weigh in a sensitive balance whether the facts, if proved, would be incompatible with the innocence of the accused or not. The standard of test and judgment which is to be finally applied before recording a finding regarding the guilt or otherwise of the' accused is not exactly to be applied at the stage of deciding the matter under Section 227 or Section 228 of the Code. At that stage the court is not to see whether there is sufficient ground for conviction of the accused or whether the trial is sure to end in his conviction. Strong suspicion against the accused, if the matter remains in the region of suspicion, cannot take the place of proof of his guilt at the conclusion of