1994 (0) MPLJ 783
R. Lahoti, B. Verma, K. Agrawal
Ravishankar And Anr.
vs
Viith Additional District Judge
Decided On : 31 January, 1994
INJUNCTION - ORDER 39, RULE 4, CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE - SCOPE, APPLICABILITY AND AMBIT - CHANGE IN CIRCUMSTANCES - UNDUE HARDSHIP - JURISDICTION OF COURT - APPLICATION UNDER ORDER 39, RULE 4 - POWER OF COURT TO DISCHARGE, VARY OR SET ASIDE INJUNCTION - INTERPRETATION OF SECOND PROVISO TO RULE 4 - APPLICATION OF PRINCIPLES OF RES JUDICATA AND CONSTRUCTIVE RES JUDICATA - DISTINCTION BETWEEN INTERLOCUTORY ORDERS AND FINAL ORDERS - EFFECT OF APPELLATE COURT'S ORDER OF INJUNCTION - INHERENT POWER OF COURT UNDER SECTION 151, CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE - ORDER OF REMAND - SCOPE AND EFFECT - APPLICATION OF ORDER 39, RULE 4 TO ORDERS PASSED BY APPELLATE COURT.
Fact of the Case:
Plaintiffs filed a suit for permanent injunction against defendants to protect their possession over the property and restrain them from raising any construction thereon. The trial court rejected the application for ad interim injunction. On appeal, the appellate court allowed the appeal and directed the parties to maintain status quo and apply for demarcation of land. The defendants moved an application under Order 39, Rule 4, Civil Procedure Code, alleging that the plaintiffs' title documents were fabricated and seeking to set aside the interim order maintaining status quo. The trial court discharged the ad interim injunction.
Finding of the Court:
The court held that the trial court was justified in exercising its jurisdiction under Order 39, Rule 4, Civil Procedure Code, as the defendants could not have detected the falsity and fabrication of the plaintiffs' documents of title by exercise of due diligence. The court also held that an application under Order 39, Rule 4, Civil Procedure Code, can appropriately be dealt with by the trial court even though the order of injunction sought to be discharged, varied or set aside be one passed by the appellate court. The court further held that the appellate court's order of remand implied a reversal of the decision of the lower court and reopened the whole case for determination afresh, except in regard to matters decided by the order of remand.
Issues: 1. Whether the trial court had jurisdiction to entertain the application under Order 39, Rule 4, Civil Procedure Code, filed by the defendants. 2. Whether the appellate court's order of injunction could be discharged, varied or set aside by the trial court under Order 39, Rule 4, Civil Procedure Code.
Ratio Decidendi: 1. The court held that the trial court had jurisdiction to entertain the application under Order 39, Rule 4, Civil Procedure Code, as the defendants could not have detected the falsity and fabrication of the plaintiffs' documents of title by exercise of due diligence. The court relied on the principle that a change in circumstances or undue hardship to a party can justify the exercise of jurisdiction under Order 39, Rule 4, Civil Procedure Code. 2. The court held that an application under Order 39, Rule 4, Civil Procedure Code, can appropriately be dealt with by the trial court even though the order of injunction sought to be discharged, varied or set aside be one passed by the appellate court. The court reasoned that the appellate court's order of injunction was passed for the purpose of the suit and to terminate with the decision of the suit, and that the trial court had the power to finally dispose of the application for injunction on merits and on all points arising for decision.
Final Decision: The court dismissed the petition filed by the plaintiffs under Article 227 of the Constitution.
Key Points: - (!) - (!) - (!) - (!) - (!) - (!) - (!) - (!) - (!) - (!)
1. On the question of scope, applicability and ambit of Order 39, Rule 4, Civil Procedure Code, two learned Judges of this Court (B. C. Varma, J. and K. M. Agarwal, J.) having differed in their opinions, the matter has been placed before me for resolving the difference.
2. The plaintiff-petitioners have filed the present suit before the Court of Civil Judge Class I, Bhopal based on their title and seeking permanent injunction against the defendant-respondents Nos. 3 and 4 for protecting their possession over the property and restraining the defendant-respondents from raising any construction thereon. According to the plaintiffs, the suit property was purchased by them under registered deed of sale dated 12-11-1948 from one Sikandar Mohammad Khan. Sikandar Mohammad Khan had acquired title under an Inayatnama (gift deed) dated 17-3-1947 executed by late Nawab Hanidullah Khan, the then ruler of Bhopal State.
3. The plaintiffs had also sought for an ad interim injunction protecting their possession over the suit land and restraining the defendant-respondents from raising any construction thereon.
4. The suit and the application under Order 39, Rules 1 and 2, Civil Procedure Code filed by the plaintiffs were contested by the defendant-respondents submitting that the suit land formed part of survey No. 90/1 area 1.40 acres of Dharampuri village which was given to the Capital Project Authority by the State Government and the defendants were constructing VI.P. guest house thereon.
5. The trial Court by its order dated 5-7-1989 rejected the application for grant of ad interim injunction as it was convinced that the plaintiffs had no prima facie case, the balance of convenience did not lie in their favour and they were the defendants and not the plaintiffs who would suffer irreparable injury by the interlocutory relief if allowed to the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs preferred an appeal to the District Court which was registered as Misc. Civil Appeal No. 54/89 and decided by the order dated 24-7-1989 (Annexure P/2). The appeal was allowed, followed by an order of remand. Vide para 13 of its order, the learned District Judge expressed an opinion that the matter in controversy could not have been satisfactorily decided unless and until there was a demarcation conducted and demarcation report brought on record so as to fix the identity of the suit land by reference to the survey number. The Court observed :
"It was, therefore, necessary to get it demarcated in the presence of the appellants according to Section 129 of the M.P.L.R. Code. How, without demarcation, one can confirmly say that the respondent No. 2 was placed in the possession of land bearing Khasra No. 90/1 area 1.48 acre only and not on the appellants plots which are parts of Khasra No. 21/3 ? How, without demarcation, one can say that the suit land is the one allotted to the respondent No. 2 ?"
How the appeal was disposed of, it would be useful to reproduce and read from the operative part of the order :
"Accordingly, the appeal preferred by the appellants is allowed. The impugned order dated 5-7-1989 is set aside. The respondents are directed to maintain status quo in respect of all the work in progress at the site towards construction of State Guest House and to apply for demarcation of land before the authority competent to do so. On receipt of the demarcation report, the lower Court may be approached by the parties for appropriate order in that light."
By way of abundant caution, it may be stated here itself that the appellate Court has not recorded any finding of its own touching the merits of the case as might thereafter have bound the trial Court.
6. On the matter being set at large before the trial Court, two important events happened which may now be noticed as they form the core of controversy arising for decision in this petition. On 29-8-1989, the defendants moved an application (Annexure R/10) under Order 26, Rule 9, Civil Procedure Code inviting attention of the trial C
Login now and unlock free premium legal research
Login to SupremeToday AI and access free legal analysis, AI highlights, and smart tools.
Login
now!
India’s Legal research and Law Firm App, Download now!
Copyright © 2023 Vikas Info Solution Pvt Ltd. All Rights Reserved.