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T.S. Doabia, J.
Narayanlal Harkishanlal
vs
Nathua Kunja And Ors.
Decided On : 30 July, 1994
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW - QUASI-JUDICIAL ORDER - ESSENTIALS - REASONS FOR ORDER - NECESSITY - Madhya Pradesh Samaj Ke Kamjor Vargon Ke Krishi Bhumi Dharakon Ka Udhar Dene Walon Ke Bhumi Hadapane Sambandhi Kuchakron Se Paritran Tatha Mukti Adhiniyam, 1976 (Madhya Pradesh Act 1 of 1977).
Fact of the Case:
A vendee filed a petition challenging the orders passed by the Sub-Divisional Officer and the Collector, Guna, setting aside a sale deed executed in his favor under the Madhya Pradesh Samaj Ke Kamjor Vargon Ke Krishi Bhumi Dharakon Ka Udhar Dene Walon Ke Bhumi Hadapane Sambandhi Kuchakron Se Paritran Tatha Mukti Adhiniyam, 1976 (Madhya Pradesh Act 1 of 1977).
Finding of the Court:
The court held that the order passed by the appellate authority did not fulfill the test of a quasi-judicial order as it did not disclose the process of reasoning and lacked sufficient reasons.
Issues: Whether the order passed by the appellate authority was a quasi-judicial order and whether it fulfilled the requirements of a quasi-judicial order.
Ratio Decidendi: The court relied on the principles laid down in Bhagat Raja v. Union of India, AIR 1967 SC 1606, M. P. Industries Ltd. v. Union of India, AIR 1966 SC 671, State of Punjab v. Bakhtawar Singh, AIR 1972 SC 2083, and Siemens Engg. and Mfg. Co. v. Union of India, AIR 1976 SC 1785, which emphasized the need for reasons in quasi-judicial orders and the importance of a speaking order.
Final Decision: The court quashed the order passed by the appellate authority and remanded the matter to the Collector to pass a fresh order in accordance with law, addressing the question of whether the review was competent if raised before him.
T.S. Doabia, J.
1. This is a petition filed by a vendee who purchased a piece of land measuring 3.187 Hectares through registered sale-deed duly registered on 22-6-1974.
2. Soon after this purchase the State Legislature enacted Madhya Pradesh Samaj Ke Kamjor Vargon Ke Krishi Bhumi Dharakon Ka Udhar Dene Walon Ke Bhumi Hadapane Sambandhi Kuchakron Se Paritran Tatha Mukti Adhiniyam, 1976 (for short the Adhiniyam, 1976). The respondents 1 to 4 resorted to the provisions of this Act. They filed an application for setting aside the sale-deed executed by them in favour of the petitioner. The Sub-Divisional Officer, Guna after hearing the parties dismissed the application on 22-10-1982. Respondents Nos. 1 to 4 sought a review of the order dated 22-10-1982. This review petition was opposed. The Sub-Divisional Officer, however, reviewed his own fearlier order dated 22-10-1982. It came to a conclusion that the sale-deed dated 22-6-1974 was void.
3. Against the above order, the petitioner filed an appeal before the Collector, Guna. The appeal was dismissed. He directed issuance of a warrant for delivery of possession in favour of respondents Nos. 1 to 4.
4. In the present petition, the petitioner prays that the orders passed by the respondents Nos. 5 and 6 be quashed.
5. I have gone through the record. The appellate authority dealt with the question of review only. Nothing has been said on the merits of the controversy. A short reference made to the sale does not fulfil the test of quasi judicial order which is supposed to disclose process of reasoning.
6. This requirement was laid down in Bhagat Raja v. Union of India, AIR 1967 SC 1606, in following terms :-
"The decisions of tribunals in India are subject to the supervisory powers of the High Courts under Article 227 of the Constitution and of appellate powers of this Court under Article 136.* It goes without saying that both the High Court and this Court are placed under a great disadvantage if no reasons are given and the revision is dismissed curtly by the use of the single word "rejected" or, "dismissed". In such a case, this Court can probably only exercise its appellate jurisdiction satisfactorily by examining the entire records of the case and after giving a hearing come to its conclusion on the merits of the appeal. This will certainly be a very unsatisfactory method of dealing with the appeal. Ordinarily, in a case like this, if the State Government gives sufficient reasons for accepting the application of one party and rejecting that of the others, as it must and the Central Government adopts the reasoning of the State Government, this Court may proceed to examine whether the reasons given are sufficient for the purpose of upholding the decision. But, when the reasons given in the order of the State Government are scrappy or nebulous and the Central Government makes no attempt to clarify the same, this Court, in appeal may have to examine the case de novo without anybody being the wiser for the review by the Central Government. If the State Government gives a number of reasons some of which are good and some are not, and the Central Government merely endorses the order of the State Government without specifying those reasons which according to it are sufficient to uphold the order of the State Government, this Court, in appeal may find it difficult to ascertain which are the grounds which weighed with the Central Government in upholding the order of the State Government. In such circumstances, what is known as a "speaking order" is called for."
Similar view was expressed in M. P. Industries Ltd. v. Union of India, AIR 1966 SC 671. It was observed :
"It is said that this principle is not uniformly followed by appellate Courts, for appeals and revisions are dismissed by appellate and revisional Courts in limine without giving any reasons. There is an essential distinction between a Court and an administrative tribunal. A Judge is trained to look at things objectively, uninfluenced
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