Where a specific time is mentioned in an insurance policy, the policy is not effective until that time, even if the date of the policy is prior to the time of the accident.

R.D. Shukla, J.

1. The appeal is directed against the judgment and order dated June 22, 1987 of the Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation passed in Case No. 1207 Gha/Ksha/84 whereby a compensation of Rs. 19,200/- has been directed to be paid by the Insurance Company (appellant here). This appeal has been filed by the Insurance Company disclaiming the responsibility of payment.

2. The brief history of the case is that Motiram was working in a truck No MPN 5666. The same was owned by respondent No. 3 here. Gulabsingh was working in the truck. The truck met with an accident on May 21, 1982. Gulab Singh, who was an employee in the truck, died immediately. He was receiving a pay of Rs. 350/- per month from the owner of the truck. The information about the accident was given by the owner of the truck on June 27, 1982. Thereafter these claimants i.e. respondent Nos. 1 and 2 who are the parents of Gulabsingh, filed an application for payment of compensation. The same was resisted by respondent No. 3 and the Insurance Company.

3. The contention of the learned Counsel for Insurance Company before the Commissioner was that there was no privity of contract between respondent No. 3 Sardulsingh and the Insurance Company, The Insurance of the employee was done on May 21, 1982 at about 11.15 a.m. while the accident occurred prior to it i.e. about 6.00 a.m. and, therefore, they are not liable to make good the loss or pay the compensation. The owner Sardulsingh did not appear before the Commissioner and remained ex-parte. However, the claimants in the case pleaded that the responsibility of payment of compensation lies on the Insurance Company as the policy would be deemed to be effective from the mid night of 20th and 21st of May, 1982.

4. Learned Commissioner has assessed the compensation to Rs. 19,200/- and took a view that the policy would be effective from the beginning of the date May 21, 1982 which began immediately after 12. O'clock i.e. on the intervening night of 20th and 21 May, 1982, and as such has made Insurance Company liable for making the payment of compensation. This appeal has been filed by the Insurance Company.

5. The contention of the learned Counsel for the appellant is that no doubt the date begins immediately after 12 O'clock in the night and if no time is mentioned in the Policy the same would be made effective from the beginning of that date. But in this case the timing is mentioned and therefore, the Insurance Company, is not responsible.

As against it learned Counsel for respondent No. 3 has submitted that he applied prior to May 21, 1982. The transfer was made effective on May 21, 1982 and, therefore, the Insurance company would be liable for making the payment of the compensation.

6. The contention of claimant-respondents Nos. 1 & 2 is that in other case arising out the same accident where one Bhau, the driver of the truck has filed an application for compensation, the Insurance Company was made liable vide judgment dated April 17, 1985 passed in M.A. No. 1/85 and, therefore a conflicting view in the matter ought not to be taken.

7. Though it is true that under the proviso to Section 30 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, the appeal lies only where a substantial question of law is involved in the appeal. This proviso reads as follows :-

"Provided that no appeal shall lie against may order unless a substantial question of law is involved in the appeal and in the case of an order other than an order such as is referred to in Clause (b), unless the amount in dispute in the appeal is not less than three hundred rupees:

Provided further that no appeal shall lie in any case in which the parties have agreed to abide by the decision of the Commissioner, or in which the order of the Commissioner gives effect to an agreement come to between the parties."

Now, therefore it will have to be seen as to whether any substantial question of law arises in this case.

8. As contended by the learned Counsel for the appellant the question