1995 Supreme(MP) 881
S.C. Pandey
Ramnidhi S/O Ram Sundar And Anr.
vs
Rashi Raman Mishra And Anr.
Decided on : 12 October, 1995
A plaintiff in a suit for specific performance of an agreement to sell immovable property can claim a permanent injunction restraining the defendants from interfering with his possession, but cannot claim a temporary injunction unless he can establish a prima facie case for such relief.
Headnote:
SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE - PART-PERFORMANCE - DOCTRINE OF PART-PERFORMANCE - APPLICABILITY - SUIT FOR SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE - RELIEF OF PERMANENT INJUNCTION - MAINTAINABILITY - TRANSFER OF PROPERTY ACT, 1882 - SECTION 53A - SPECIFIC RELIEF ACT, 1963 - SECTION 22.
Fact of the Case:
Plaintiff filed a suit for specific performance of an agreement to sell immovable property and also sought a permanent injunction restraining the defendants from interfering with his possession. The trial court granted a temporary injunction in favor of the plaintiff. The defendants appealed, arguing that the plaintiff could not claim both permanent and temporary injunctions, and that the doctrine of part-performance under Section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act could not be used as a sword to file a suit for specific performance.
Finding of the Court:
The court held that the plaintiff could claim a permanent injunction in a suit for specific performance under Section 22 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, as it was an additional relief to which he was entitled. However, the court found that the plaintiff had failed to establish a prima facie case for the grant of a temporary injunction, as the evidence on record did not conclusively establish that he was in possession of the property.
Issues: 1. Whether a plaintiff can claim both permanent and temporary injunctions in a suit for specific performance of an agreement to sell immovable property? 2. Whether the doctrine of part-performance under Section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act can be used as a sword to file a suit for specific performance?
Ratio Decidendi: 1. Section 22 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 allows a plaintiff in a suit for specific performance to claim any other relief to which he is entitled, including a permanent injunction, provided that such relief is specifically claimed in the plaint. 2. The doctrine of part-performance under Section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act can only be used as a shield to defend a suit for possession filed against a person who has partly performed a contract of sale, and cannot be used as a sword to file a suit for specific performance.
Final Decision: The court allowed the appeal, set aside the temporary injunction granted by the trial court, and remanded the case for trial on merits.
S.C. Pandey, J.
1. This is an appeal filed by defendants 1 and 2 against the order dated 17-3-1994 passed by Smt. Aradhana Choubey, third Additional Judge to the Court of District Judge, Rewa in Civil Suit No. 4-A/94. This appeal has been filed under Section 104, read with Order 43, Rule l(r) of Code of Civil Procedure.
2. Undisputed facts of this case are that the appellant No. 1 owned Khasra No. 348, area 0.54 acres, Khasra No. 367, area 0.05 acres, Khasra No. 389, area 0.07 acres, Khasra No. 374, area 0.08 acres and Khasra No. 361, area 0.01 acres situate in village Sonvarsha, Tehsil Sirmaour, Distt. Rewa. The total area of aforesaid land comes to 0.80 acres of land.
3. The respondent No. 1 filed Civil Suit No. 4-A of 1994 for specific performance of agreement dated 4-4-1993. He claimed that pursuant to the aforesaid agreement with appellant No. 1 he had paid Rs. 36,300/- to appellant and was ready and willing to pay the balance of amount Rs. 3,700/-. Thus according to respondent No. 1 the sale price of the entire land was Rs. 40,000/-. In his pleadings the, respondent No. 1 also claimed that the possession of suit land was delivered to him in pursuance of the agreement to sell and from 4-4-1993 he was in continuous possession of the land. It was further stated in the plaint that appellant No. 1 had executed a registered sale-deed dated 20-10-1993 in respect of the land in dispute and sold it to appellant. No. 2. The respondent No. 1 made a prayer that this registered sale-deed dated 20-10-1993 be declared null and void because the appellant No. 2 had got the sale-deed executed in his favour with full knowledge of previous agreement. The respondent No. 1 also claimed to be in possession of the lands in dispute and, therefore, claimed a further relief of permanent injunction against the appellants 1 and 2 who were defendants Nos. 1 and 2 respectively in the suit. The respondent No. 2 the State of Madhya Pradesh is a proforma party to the suit.
4. In order to appreciate the controversy in the suit a few more facts are necessary. It was staled in the plaint that the appellant No. 1 received Rs. 20,000/- on 15-1-1993 on the basis of an oral agreement to sell the aforesaid land. The agreed price was determined at Rs. 40,000/-. The appellant No. 1 gave receipt dated 15-1-1993 whereby he accepted that he had received Rs. 20,000/-. On 31-3-1993 a sum of Rs. 8,000/- was advanced to appellant No. 1 towards the sale price. This transaction is evidenced by a receipt cum promissory note dated 31-1-1993. The respondent No. 1 stated that a further sum of Rs. 8,300/- was advanced to appellant No. 1. Thus the total sum received by the appellant amounted to Rs. 36,300/-. On 4-4-1993 the appellant No. 1 executed an agreement of sale in favour of respondent No. 1 and agreed to get a proper and registered sale-deed executed in receipt of balance of Rs. 3,700/-. However, it was agreed in writing that the respondent No. 1 shall be delivered the possession of land in dispute. Accordingly the respondent No. 1 was placed in possession on 4-4-1993.
5. During the pendency of civil suit, the respondent No. 1 filed an application under Order 39, Rules 1 and 2 of Code of Civil Procedure claiming that appellants were disturbing his possession and, therefore, they be restrained personally or vicariously through their agents from interfering with his possession. This application of respondent No. 1 was supported by affidavits of local persons alleging that respondent No. 1 was in cultivating possession of the land in dispute since 4-4-1993 and continued to be so on the date of the suit.
6. The appellants denied that the respondent No. 1 was ever placed in possession. They also filed affidavits in support of their case that they were in possession. Thus the application for injunction was seriously opposed by the appellants.
7. The trial Court has granted temporary injunction in favour of the respondent No. 1 holding inter alia, that all the three consideration