T.S. Doabia, J.

1. The brief facts for the purposes of this petition be noticed as under.

2. A civil suit bearing No. 96-A/1988 was dismissed in default. The counsel pleaded no instructions on 6th of April, 1994. Later on, an application was preferred for getting the suit restored. This application was dismissed by the trial Court on 1st of October, 1994. Against the above order, an appeal was preferred. This appeal stands dismissed on 7th of July, 1995. The order passed by the trial Court seeking restoration has been confirmed. While doing so, some remarks have also been made against the counsel.

3. In this petition, two grievances have been made :

(i) that, the remarks which have been made against the counsel should be expunged; and

(ii) that, the order by which the appeal was dismissed be also set aside.

4. There can be no dispute with the proposition that uncalled for remarks are not to be made in judicial proceedings. The judicial propriety require that only that much matter should be dealt with which is absolutely necessary for the disposal of the case.

5. The judicial view is that observations which are not necessary for the proper disposal of the case should not be made part of the judicial record. The decision given by the Supreme Court in the early 1960's be noticed in this regard. This decision is reported as The State of Uttar Pradesh v. Mohammad Naim, AIR 1964 SC703. It was held asunder:

"....If there is one principle of cardinal importance in the administration of justice, it is this: the proper freedom and independence of Judges and Magistrates must be maintained and they must be allowed to perform their functions freely and fearlessly and without undue interference by anybody, even by this court. At the same time it is equally necessary that in expressing their opinions Judges and Magistrates must be guided by considerations of justice, fair-play and restraint. It is not infrequent that sweeping generalisations defeat the very purpose for which they are made. It has been judicially recognised that in the matter of making disparaging remarks against persons or authorities whose conduct comes into consideration before courts of law in cases to be decided by them, it is relevant to consider (a) whether the party whose conduct is in question is before the court or has an opportunity of explaining or defending himself; (b) whether there is evidence on record bearing on that conduct justifying the remarks; and (c) whether it is necessary for the decision of the case, as an integral part thereof, to animadvert on that conduct. It has also been recognised that judicial pronouncements must be judicial in nature, and should not normally depart from sobriety, moderation and reserve.

6. Again, there can be no dispute with the proposition that strong language is not to be used while dealing with the conduct of the parties or their witnesses. Disparaging strictures should not be passed as these are likely to cause considerable damage to the person against whom these remarks are made. This aspect was noticed by the Supreme Court in the case of State of M. P. and Ors. v. Nandlal Jaiswal and Ors., 1987 MPLJ 250 = AIR 1987 SC 251. In para 42 it was observed as under :

"We may observe in conclusion that Judges should not use the strong and carping language while criticising the conduct of parties or their witnesses. They must act with sobriety, moderation and restraint. They must have the humility to recognise that they are not infallible and any harsh and disparaging strictures passed by them against any party may be mistaken and unjustified and if so, they may do considerable harm and mischief and result in injustice....."

7. Again, similar view has been expressed by the Supreme Court in A M. Mathur v. Pramod Kumar Gupta, AIR 1990 SC 1737. In para 13, it was observed as under :

"Judicial restraint and discipline are as necessary to the orderly administration of justice as they are to the effectiveness of the army. The duty of restrain