Shiv Dayal, J.

1. This appeal arises from a judgment and decree of the Additional District Judge, Chhindwara, awarding Rs. 9,000/- as damages to the Plaintiffs. Cross objections have been filed by the Plaintiffs for enhancing the amount of damages.

2. Respondent No. 1, Mrs. Chhotibai, is the widow, and Respondents 2 to 6 are the daughters of deceased Laxmiprasad, who was employed as Line Mazdoor in the Datla West Colliery belonging to the Appellant Company. He was suffering from acute anemia. He was admitted to the Barkuhi hospital which is managed by the Appellant Company. He died on or about June 2, 1962 in suspicious circumstances. The post-mortem examination revealed that he died of poisoning. Dr. Grewal (Respondent No. 7) is the Chief Medical Officer of that hospital.

3. The Plaintiffs' case was that Laxmiprasad died due to utter negligence of the Barkuhi hospital authorities. Garib Khan (P.W. 1) who was an indoor patient in the hospital stated that on the morning of June 2, 1962, Waghmare, an employee of the hospital, administered some medicines to some patients after taking which Laxmiprasad died. He and Premchand felt tingling sensation in hands and feet. Ramtahal also complained some sensation in hands and feet and had burning in the throat. Premchand fell from his cot and died. Laxmiprasad also died Ramtahal (P.W. 2) corroborated him. Dr. Grewal admitted that symptoms disclosed that the death of Laxmiprasad was due to poisoning. An autopsy was performed by Dr. K.P. Sengupta who found that death was due to ingestion of toxic material and poisoning. There was a faint suggestion from the Appellant that since Laxmiprasad had taken tea in the morning, there was some possibility that poisoning was due to it. But this was rightly rejected by the learned trial Judge as baseless.

4. The trial Court found that death of Laxmiprasad was due to negligence of the hospital staff. It awarded Rs. 9000/-as damages to his heirs.

5. It is first contended for the Appellant that the suit was barred by time as it was instituted on August 27, 1963 while the death of Laxmiprasad occurred on June 2, 1962. Article 21 of the Limitation Act, 1908 applies. This objection was not taken in the written statement nor in the memorandum of appeal in the Court. However, it being a question of law, we permitted the Appellant to raise that question inspite of the Respondents' opposition.

6. It is true that the suit was instituted after the expiry of one year from the date of Laxmiprasad's death, but on the date of the suit, all the five daughters of the deceased were minors, being between 6 to 17 years. Thus Section 7 of the Limitation Act is attracted.

7. Learned Counsel for the Appellant contends that Section 7 has no application inasmuch as Mrs. Cbhotibai (Respondent No. 1) could alone bring the suit on behalf of all the legal representatives of the deceased. Reliance is placed on Section 2 of the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855 which reads thus:

Provided always that not more than one action or suit shall be brought for, and in respect of the same subject matter of complaint.

The argument is that since only one suit is permissible and, such a suit could be brought by Mrs. Chhotibai, the Plaintiffs were not entitled to the benefit of extension of time under Section 7 of the Limitation Act. Mr. Sen relied on Johnson v. The Madras Railway Company I.L.R. 28 Mad. 479, In our opinion, this contention is not tenable. The main Section 7 of the Limitation Act has two parts. We will reproduce them separately as follows:

Where one of several persons jointly entitled to institute a suit or make an application for the execution of a decree is under any such disability, and (a) a discharge can be given without the concurrence of such person, time will run against them all;

but, (b) Where no such discharge can be given, time will not run as against any of them until one of them becomes capable of giving such discharge without the concurrence of the others or until the disabil