The limitation prescribed under section 468 of the Criminal Procedure Code is for offences for which cognizance is taken, not for the offences finally proved.

Chandresh Bhushan, J.

1. Aggrieved by the order dated 5-10-01 of the learned Sessions Judge, Shivpuri, allowing a revision, against the petitioner, from an order passed by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Shivpuri taking cognizance against the non- applicant No. 1 of offences punishable under sections 323 and 294 of Indian Penal Code, this revision petition has been preferred by the petitioner.

2. The facts in brief are that a private complaint was filed by the petitioner against non-applicant No. 1, in the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Shivpuri, alleging that the non-applicant No. 1 had uttered obscene words while hurling obscene abuses on him and had also beaten him on two occasions. After enquiry, under section 202, the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate passed an order dated 30-3-2001, taking cognizance of offences punishable under sections 323 and 294 of Indian Penal Code against the non-applicant No. 1. Against that order, the non-petitioner No. 1 had preferred a revision before the learned Sessions Judge Shivpuri which was allowed by the impugned order on the ground that the cognizance was barred under section 468 of Criminal Procedure Code because the complainant and his witness both have stated that the incidents were more than 2 years old.

3. It was contended on behalf of the petitioner that the offences alleged by him in his complaint included those punishable under sections 419, 420, and 506 (Part-II) of Indian Penal Code and the period of limitation under section 468 of Criminal Procedure Code in respect of those offences had not expired by that time.

4. After hearing the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner, I am of the view that the contention put forth by him was totally misconceived one and this revision-petition must fail. The decision of Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of State of Himachal Pradesh vs. Tara Dutt, AIR 2000 SC 297 relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner does not lend any support to his contention. In that case besides some minor offences, which were barred by limitation provided under section 468 of Criminal Procedure Code, charge was also framed for an offence punishable under section 468 of Indian Penal Code and for which no limitation was prescribed. Therefore, in that case, the Court had taken cognizance of an offence punishable under section 468 of Indian Penal Code as well as some minor offences and because no limitation was prescribed for such an offence, the case was held to be not barred by limitation under section 468 of Criminal Procedure Code.

5. In the present case, the Court has not taken cognizance of any effence punishable under sections 419, 420, 421 or 506 (Part-II) of Indian Penal Code. Mere allegation of commission of certain offences in the private complaint was certainly different from taking cognizance of those offences.

6. In the said case of State of Himachal Pradesh (supra), the conviction of the accused of offences punishable under sections 417 and 465 was upheld by the Hon'ble Apex Court, in view of the provisions of sub-section (3) of section 468 of Criminal Procedure Code. This sub-section (3) of section 468 of Criminal Procedure Code clearly lays down an exception to the provisions of limitation given under sub-section (2) of the same section. It provides that where more than one offences are tried together then the period of limitation for all shall be such as is for the offence punishable with most severe or say maximum punishment. Here in the present case, the cognizance was specifically taken for offences punishable under sections 294 and 323 of Indian Penal Code. Mere mention of certain other sections or offences in the complaint could not be considered as a trial, jointly for those offences and the two offences for which cognizance was taken.

7. The limitation prescribed was for taking cognizance and not for the offences finally proved. This observation by Hon'ble Apex Court could not be interpreted as meaning that the l