1998 Supreme(MP) 855
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
R.S. Garg, J.
Sapan Banerji
Vs.
Smt. Shanti Devi Jaiswal
C.R. No. 2089 of 1997 (J)
Decided On: 03.11.1998
For Appellant/Petitioner/Plaintiff:Mr. Sanjay Dwivedi, Advocate
For Respondents/Defendant:Mr. R.P. Khare, Advocate
Ignorance of law by counsel cannot be a ground for condonation of delay, but the court may exercise its discretionary powers to condone the delay if the party has taken all necessary steps to defend the suit and the defence is not moonshine, absurd, or useless.
Headnote:
ACCOMMODATION CONTROL ACT - LEAVE TO DEFEND - SECTION 23-C, 5 LIMITATION ACT - DELAY IN FILING APPLICATION FOR LEAVE TO DEFEND - CONDONATION OF DELAY - IGNORANCE OF LAW BY COUNSEL - PARTY NOT TO SUFFER FOR COUNSEL'S LAPSES - REASONABLE AND ARGUABLE DEFENCE - LEAVE TO DEFEND GRANTED.
Fact of the Case:
Tenant sought to challenge the order rejecting her application for leave to defend in an eviction suit. The application was rejected due to delay in filing and the tenant's counsel's failure to file an application under Section 23-C of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act within the prescribed time limit.
Finding of the Court:
The court found that the tenant had engaged a counsel and had done her best to take necessary steps to defend the suit. However, the counsel failed to file the application for leave to defend within the prescribed time limit. The court also noted that the Rent Controlling Authority (RCA) had suggested the tenant's son to file an application under Section 23-C, but the counsel did not take any action.
Issues: Whether the delay in filing the application for leave to defend should be condoned.
Ratio Decidendi: The court held that the delay in filing the application for leave to defend should be condoned. The court reasoned that the tenant had engaged a counsel and had done her best to take necessary steps to defend the suit. The court also noted that the RCA had suggested the tenant's son to file an application under Section 23-C, but the counsel did not take any action. The court further held that the tenant's defence was not moonshine, absurd, or useless and that leave to defend is a rule if the defence is worth consideration.
Final Decision: The court allowed the revision petition, set aside the orders rejecting the application for leave to defend and the final order of eviction, and directed the tenant to file her written statement within three weeks from the date of appearance before the RCA.
R.S. Garg, J.
1. By this petition under Section 23-E of M.P. Accommodation Control Act, the petitioner seeks to challenge the correctness, validity and propriety of the Order dated 21.8.97 and while throwing the challenge to the final order seeks to challenge the correctness of the Order dated 28.11.96 by which the tenant's application for grant of leave to defend was rejected as a consequence of rejection of application filed under Section 5 Limitation Act.
2. Brief facts necessary for disposal of the present petition are that on 27.6.96 the landlady moved an application before the Rent Controlling Authority (RCA) seeking eviction of Smt. Shanti Devi since deceased and now being represented by the present applicant. The RCA directed that notice be issued and matter be listed for hearing on 19.7.96. On 19.7.96, the counsel appeared for the present applicant and prayed for time for filing replay. It appears that on 19.7.96 application for leave to defend was not filed nor the counsel was aware of the fact that an application seeking leave to defend was required to be filed. On 12.8.96, the parties again appeared and the matter was adjourned to 24.8.96. On 24.4.96 some application was filed by the non-applicant but none was present for the present applicant. The matter was ordered to be taken up on 28.6.96 and it was to be fixed for reply on 3.9.96. The case was not taken up on 28.6.96 but was taken up for consideration on 3.9.96. On the said date, the tenant moved an application under Section 23-C of M.P. Accommodation Control Act seeking leave to defend with an application under Section 5 Limitation Act projecting the cause for condonation of delay. The application was adjourned and ultimately after taking reply of the parties and hearing them, by order dated 28.11.96 the application seeking leave to defend was rejected. Thereafter the matter proceeded and order for eviction was passed against the present applicant who was substituted on record as the original tenant Smt. Shantidevi Banerji had expired. At this stage, it would be necessary to see paragraph 6 of the reply to the application filed under Section 5 Limitation Act, In paragraph 6 the landlord has stated that on 12.8.96 and 24.8.96 the Court (RCA) suggested the son of the non-applicant to immediately file an application under Section 23-C of M.P. Accommodation Control Act. This allegation would mean that either the counsel appearing for the deceased/tenant had no knowledge of law or the deceased was never advised by the counsel to move an application under Section 23-C to seek leave to defend. True it is that ignorance of law is no ground for condonation of delay, but at the same time where the Court is required to exercise its discretionary powers, it cannot lose sight of the fact that when a party engages a lawyer, it engages him presuming that the lawyer knows the legal provisions and the counsel engaged by the party would help and assist the party in his cause and case. It would be unfortunate that a lawyer engaged by the party does not advise properly and the party is required to suffer. It is expected of a lawyer that immediately after his egnagement, he would look into the provisions of law and would take necessary steps. If a lawyer in whom the party reposes confidence fails in his duty and does not take proper steps, then the fault cannot be found with the party. In such a situation, it cannot be said that the party was negligent or it did not take proper steps in accordance with law. The party after having engaged a lawyer would certainly feel content that his interest would be protected by the counsel who in the eyes of the party is an able and law knowing person. The party cannot be permitted to suffer because of the lapses on part of the counsel. The Court is required to see whether the party was negligent and whether the party did not take steps which it is required to take well within limitation. It is trite law that for the lapses on part of a cou