A decree passed by a court without pecuniary jurisdiction cannot be attacked on that ground unless the conditions mentioned in Section 21(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure are fulfilled, namely, that the objection was taken at the earliest possible opportunity and that there was a consequent failure of justice.

S.C. Pandey, J.

1. This is defendant's second appeal against the judgment and decree dated 29.7.1989, passed in Civil Appeal No. 63-A. of 1988 confirming the decree passed by the trial Court.

2. The relevant facts necessary for the determination of this appeal are as follows :-

The respondent filed a Civil Suit No. 84-A of 1984 in the Court of Civil Judge, Class-I, against the appellant. This suit was for specific performance of the agreement dated 11.3.1994 whereby the appellants agreed to convey a building site of 15' x 40' abutting Khurai-Bina Raod to the respondent. The consideration for the sale of the plot was Rs. 19,000/-. Subsequently, the respondent applied for amendment of his plaint claiming that he was entitled to claim Rs. 2000/- by way of damages for removal of a shutter from the plot by the appellants and also claimed that a decree for demolition of roof on suit plot put by the appellants. The value of second relief was not disclosed. It appears that the trial Court allowed amendment in the plaint and the plaint was accordingly amended. The respondent did not pay any court-fee on the additional reliefs claimed by him. The suit proceeded as such and a decree for specific performance alone was granted. The same was confirmed in the first appeal. The lower appellant Court has rejected the argument of the appellants that the trial Court did not have any pecuniary jurisdiction to try the suit after the amendment in the plaint as the valuation of suit for the purposes of pecuniary jurisdiction went beyond its pecuniary jurisdiction of Rs. 20,000/- The reasoning given by the lower appellate Court is that since the respondent did not pay any court-fee on the additional reliefs claimed by him, the respondent had impliedly abandoned the reliefs claimed by him and this fact was further proved by the fact that no issue was framed by trial Court on this point. After examining the merits of the case, the lower appellate Court affirmed the decree of the trial Court.

3. This appeal was admitted by this Court on the following substantial questions of law by order sheet dated 12.2.90 :-

i. Whether Civil Judge, Class-I Khurai had the jurisdiction to try the suit ?

ii. Whether the same Court Civil Judge, Class-I could have allowed the amendment by incorporating the relief in the plaint regarding shutter which was claimed by the plaintiff as belonged to him ?

iii. Whether the judgment and decree passed by the Court below are according to law ?

4. The learned counsel for the appellant, Shri Abhay Sapre, has not challenged the decree passed by the lower appellate Court on merits but has confirmed his argument to jurisdictional aspects of the matter. The learned counsel for the appellant urged that in the State of Madhya Pradesh as per Sec. 6(1) (a) of Madhya Pradesh Civil Courts Act, 1958, a Civil Judge Class-I could try a suit valued upto Rs. 20,000/-. The moment the valuation executed to Rs. 20,000/- the Court had no pacuniary jurisdiction to try the suit. The learned counsel submitted the trial Court had no jurisdiction to grant any amendment as it was obvious that by adding a claim valued at Rs. 21, 000/- its pecuniary jurisdiction was exceeded. The trial Court should have returned the plaint alongwith the amendment application as its power to grant amendment were limited to the extent of its own pecuniary jurisdiction. The learned counsel for the appellant relied upon a decision of a Division Bench of erstwhile Nagpur High Court whose precedents are binding on this Court because it is the successor Court to Nagpur High Court. The Division Bench case is Lalji Ranchhoddas v. Narrottam Ranchhoddas A.I.R. 1953 Nag 273. The learned counsel for the appellants urged that the trial Court tried the suit beyond its pecuniary jurisdiction and, therefore, its decree was null and void. The learned counsel for the appellants argued that the lower appellate Court could not have conferred jurisdiction on trial Court merely because the court-fee