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1996 Supreme(MP) 534
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
S.C. Pandey, J.
Mohd. Mahmood Hussain
Vs.
Asad Ulla Usmani
S.A. No. 455 of 1995 (J)
Decided On: 25.06.1996
For Appellant/Petitioner/Plaintiff:Mr. Alok Aradhe, Advocate
For Respondents/Defendant:Mr. A Usmani, Advocate
The interpretation of 'business' in Section 12(1)(f) of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961, includes the practice of a profession, allowing for eviction on the ground of bonafide requirement for an advocate's office.
Headnote:
M.P. ACCOMMODATION CONTROL ACT, 1961 - SECTION 12(1)(A), 12(1)(F), 12(1)(H) - EVICTION OF TENANT - GROUNDS - INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION.
Fact of the Case:
The respondent, claiming ownership of the suit-shop, filed a suit for eviction of the appellant-tenant on grounds under Sections 12(1)(a), 12(1)(f), and 12(1)(h) of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 ('the Act'). The trial court granted a decree only under Section 12(1)(a), while the lower appellate court upheld the decree under Section 12(1)(a) and additionally granted decrees under Sections 12(1)(f) and 12(1)(h). The appellant challenged the lower appellate court's decision, and the High Court admitted the appeal on substantial questions of law.
Finding of the Court:
The High Court held that the word 'business' in Section 12(1)(f) of the Act includes the practice of a profession, following precedents set by the Supreme Court and a previous decision of the High Court. The court also framed additional substantial questions of law to address the effect of striking out the appellant's defense under Section 13(6) of the Act and the court's entitlement to re-examine the evidence in light of the error made by the lower appellate court.
Issues: 1. Whether the word 'business' in Section 12(1)(f) of the Act includes the practice of a profession, allowing for eviction on the ground of bonafide requirement for an advocate's office. 2. Whether the court below rightly treated the appellant ex parte for the reason that the defense of the appellant was struck off. 3. Whether the court is entitled to re-examine the evidence afresh in view of the error aforesaid made by the lower appellate Court.
Ratio Decidendi: 1. The court interpreted the word 'business' in Section 12(1)(f) of the Act to include the practice of a profession, relying on Supreme Court and High Court precedents. This interpretation allowed for eviction on the ground of bonafide requirement for an advocate's office. 2. The court held that striking out the defense under Section 13(6) of the Act does not render the defendant ex parte but limits their participation in the proceedings. The defendant retains the right to cross-examine the plaintiff's witnesses and address arguments, but cannot lead evidence or present a positive defense. 3. The court found that the lower appellate court erred in treating the appellant as ex parte and, therefore, re-examined the evidence to determine whether the grounds for eviction were established.
Final Decision: The High Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the eviction decree under Section 12(1)(a) and 12(1)(f) of the Act. However, it reversed the lower appellate court's finding under Section 12(1)(h) due to insufficient pleading and proof of the respondent's requirement for substantial repairs, additions, and alterations.
S.C. Pandey, J.
1. This is an appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure against the judgment and decree dated 11.7.1995, in Civil Appeal No. 6-A of 1995, passed by IXth Additional Judge to the Court of District Judge. Jabalpur, arising out of judgment and decree dated 4.1.1995, passed by Xth Civil Judge Class-II. Jabalpur in Civil Suit No. 54-A of 1994.
2. The essential facts necessary for determination of the appeal are as follows-
The respondent instituted a Civil Suit No. 54-A of 1994 against the appellant for ejectment form the suit shop on the grounds mentioned in Section 12 (1) (a), 12 (1) (f) and 12 (1) (h) of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (Hence forth 'the Act) The respondent claimed that he was the owner and the landlord of the suit-shop and the appellant was his tenant. The suit-shop, which formed the part of larger construction is numbered as 849, 850 and 850/1 by the Municipal Corporation. Jabalpur. This construction bears new number as 693 and situate as Badi Ukli. Jabalpur. The respondent stated in his plaint that appellant occupied one of the shops in the ground floor as a tenant and carried on the business of making rubber stamps. Thus, the suit-shop was let out for non-residential purposes. The rent of the suit shop was alleged to be Rs. 125/- per month. It was the case of the respondent that he became the owner and landlord of the suit-shop by operation of law as he had purchased the suit-shop by a registered sale-deed dated 18.8. 1990. It was alleged that the appellant was liable to be ejected under section 12 (1) (a) of 'the Act' as he had neither tendered nor paid the rent within two months of service of notice of demand dated 21.8.1990 for the period 15.8.1990 to 14.11.1991. The respondent also sought eviction under section 12 (1) (f) of the Act' on the ground that the suit-shop was bonafide required for starling the office of his son who was carrying on the profession of an advocate. It was staled by the respondent in his plaint that he had no alternative accommodation of his own. The respondent further sought a decree under Section 12(1) (h) of the Act It was claimed that the respondent required the suit-shop bonafide for substantial repairs, additions and alterations: and for this purpose the respondent wanted vacant possession as the aforesaid repairs, additions and alterations could not be carried out without getting the house vacated.
3. The appellant interalia pleaded that the respondent was neither the owner nor the landlord of the suit premises as claimed by him. The appellant claimed that he had not paid any rent to him and, therefore, relationship of landlord and tenant between respondent and the appellant was never established. It was submitted that the son of the appellant had entered into a contract of sale dated 19.10.1989 with the previous landlord who in part performance of the contract received Rs. 40,000/- from the son of the appellant. The contract of sale was in respect of the suit -shop. The previous landlord instead of executing a registered sale-deed in favour of the son of the appellant sold the suit-shop to the respondent. Therefore, a suit for specific performance of contract was tiled against the previous landlord and it was registered as Civil Suit No. 78-A of 1990. The appellant also look the plea that an accommodation measuring 50' x 50' was still available with the respondent and it was sufficient for fulfilling the requirement of the respondent. The appellant denied that respondent needed the suit-shop for additions and alterations as alleged in the plaint.
4. The trial Court decreed the claim of the respondent only on the ground of Section 12(1) (a) of 'the Act'. It declined to grant decree under Section 12(1) (f) of the Act' as it held that the respondent had an alternative accommodation of 50' x 50' apart from the suit-shop and it was sufficient for the need of the son of respondent for opening his office of an advocate. The trial Court held
