Dr. T.N. Singh, J.

1. Against two orders passed on 28th November 1984 and 29th April 1986 by Labour Court No. 1, Gwalior, this writ petition is preferred by the employer.

2. The first order (Annexure-P/21 is an ex parte award which was passed in favour of the first respondent (hereinafter refered to as 'the respondent') on 28th November 1984 allowing his claim for reinstatement and back wages, upon holding his retrenchment illegal and void. By the second order, Annexure-P/1, rendered on 29th April 1986, the application of the employer to set aside the award has been rejected upon holding that no sufficient cause was either pleaded or proved for non-participation in the hearing of the dispute which had been referred for adjudication.

3. We propose first to deal with the petitioner's contention pressed in respect of the second order. Although two decisions are cited at the Bar in support of the challenge to the order dated 29th April 1986, we have no doubt that the decisions do not support the petitioner in any way. The decision in the case of Grindlays Bank has been considered by their Lordships subsequently in Satnam Verma and the view expressed earlier was buttressed. In our opinion, there can be no dispute today about the settled law that an application lies before the Labour Court for setting aside an ex parte award. However, it is also settled law that in disposing of such application, the Labour Court shall be well within its jurisdiction to reject the same if the applicant fails to make out sufficient cause for his default. In Grindlays Bank (supra), it has been categorically held that even after an ex parte award is published in the Official Gazette, an application to set aside the same would lie to the Labour Court and on sufficient cause being shown for his default the award could be set aside. In Satnam Verma (supra), it was contended before their Lordships that the High Court and the Tribunal had rightly held that on merit no case was made out for setting aside the ex parte award as no sufficient cause for doing so was shown, the contention did not prevail and it was held that the Labour Court was in error in rejecting the request promptly made for setting aside the award; or, in other words, no reasonable opportunity was granted to the applicant/petitioner to show sufficient cause for his default in as much as the Tribunal was "overwhelmed by its erroneous approach that it had no jurisdiction to entertain the application".

4. In the instant case, the position is entirely different. We have looked at Annexure-P/9 which is petitioner's application made on 11th February 1985 for setting aside the ex parte award. We have read the application very carefully and we have no reason to differ from the view taken by the Labour Court in the impugned order that "sufficient cause" was not even pleaded by the petitioner in the said application. The application comprised of three short paragraphs and only one sentence in a single paragraph contains averment that may be regarded as an attempt to show cause for default. It runs thus: "PRAKARAN SUCHANA BHI DWITIYA PAKSHA NIYOKTA KO SAMUCHIT RUP SE NAHIN HUI HAIN" In the course of hearing on the application, no effort was made by the applicant/employer to improve his position by leading evidence in support of either the facts stated of improper service or other fact or greater substance to sustain the prayer made in the application for setting aside the ex parte award, In the impugned order, the Labour Court has made a detailed discussion of the contention pressed before it in reaching the finding on available material that even the alleged "improper service" had not been established because notices had been served by registered post and acknowledgment receipts in respect thereof were placed on record. The other finding of Labour Court which is also unassailable is that the employer/applicant had failed to adduce any evidence to show cause why despite service the employer could not