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2011 Supreme(MP) 693

2012 (I) MPWN 23
A.K. Shrivastava, J.
Rajkamal
v.
Smt. Prabha Grover
Second Appeal No. 86 of 1994 (J);
Decided on : 6.9.2011.

Headnote:Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (M.P.) -- S. 12 (1) (a) – decree for eviction -- notice sent by registered AD on tenanted premises proper as tenant did not plead that said address was not proper. 1983 JLJ 287 distinguished. [Para 15]

        LFkku fu;a=.k vf/kfu;e] 1961 ¼e-iz-½ & /kkjk 12 ¼1½ ¼d½ & csn[kyh ds fy, fMdzh & HkkMs+nkjh ifjlj ij jlhnh jftLVªh )kjk Hksth xbZ lwpuk mfpr D;ksafd HkkMs+nkj us ;g vfHkopu ugha fd;k fd mDr irk mfpr ugha Fkk A 1983 ts ,y ts 287 izHksfnr A

       ¼iSjk 15

JUDGMENT

1. The judgement passed in this second appeal shall also govern the disposal of the connected Second Appeal No. 245/1994 (Smt. Prabha Grover v. Shri Raj Kamal, Neel Kamal and Ashish Kamal), since both the appeals have arisen from the common impugned judgment and decree.

2. This is tenants second appeal who has lost from both the Courts below.

3. The facts necessary for disposal of this appeal lie in narrow compass. Suffice it is to say that more than 24 years ago on 17.8.1987 a suit on the relationship of landlord and tenant was filed by the plaintiff for eviction on the ground envisaged under section 12 (1 ) (a) and (d) of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (for brevity "Act). During the pendency of the suit and after expiry of one year from the date of purchase of the suit property, the plaintiff sought eviction also on the added ground of bond fide requirement to reside in the suit premises envisaged under section 12 (1) (e) of the Act.

4. The original defendant was Tilak Raj Bakshi, who had died during the pendency of this appeal and his legal representatives have been brought on record.

5. The defendant denied the plaint averments by filing written statement. During the pendency of the suit, since there were defaults in depositing the monthly rent, the learned trial Court struck off the defence of the defendant and that order attained finality. The learned trial Court decreed the suit only on the ground under section 12 (1) (a) and (e) but dismissed the suit on the ground under section 12 (1) (d) of the Act.

6. The defendant filed first appeal before the appellate Court which has been partly allowed as learned First Appellate Court did not find the ground under section 12 (1) (e) of the Act to be proved and dismissed the suit of the plaintiff on that ground, however, affirmed the judgment and decreed of eviction and arrears of rent passed by learned Trial Court under section 12 (1) (a) of the Act.

7. In this manner this second appeal has been filed by tenant and connected Second Appeal No. 245/1994 (Smt. Prabha Grover v. Shri Raj Kamal & Anr.) has been filed by landlord.

8. This second appeal of tenant was admitted on 29.2.1996 on the following substantial question of law:-

"Whether the Court-below rightly passed a decree u/S. 12(1)(a) of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961, when as per section 12 notice of demand was not served upon the appellant?"

9. The connected second appeal No. 245/1994 was admitted on 4.7.1995 on the following substantial question of law:-

"Whether, in a case where a suit has already been filed for eviction on any of the grounds mentioned in section 12 of M.P.A.C. Act and in the plaint it is also mentioned that he will make proper amendment with regard to bonafide need after expiry of one year from the date of its purchase and if the period of one year elapses during the pendency of such suit and the landlord by amending the plaint take a new ground under Clause E of M.P.A.C. Act and can be passed on that ground."

Regarding substantial question of law framed in tenant's appeal No.86/1994.

10. The contention of Shri Pranay Venna, learned counsel is that the demand notice which was sent to the appellant was returned with an endorsement that premises is found locked. Learned counsel has invited my attention to address mentioned on the notice and submitted that suit has not been filed by mentioning the said address of appellant in the plaint but an altogether different address has been shown in the plaint and therefore firstly he submits that because the demand notice was not served upon the appellant which was mandatory before passing a decree under section 12 (1) (a) of the Act and secondly the suit has been filed mentioning altogether different address of the defendant and therefore no decree under this ground can be passed. In support of his contention, learned counsel has placed reliance on a Single Bench decision of this Court Babulal and others v. Mahendra Swarup Sexena, 1983 JLJ 287.

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