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2012 Supreme(MP) 110
2012(III) MPWN 77
M.C. Garg, J.
Mohanlal v. State of M.P.
Miscellaneous Criminal Case No.663 of 2011 (I);
Decided on 13.2.2012.*
Petitioner in person; A.S. Chandhiok, Additional Solicitor General for State.
Headnote:(1) Copyright Act, 1957 (Amended) Act, 1994 -- Ss.63 and 63B -- complaint under -- criminal case instituted against accused before JMFC -- complainant and accused arrived at compromise -- application filed under sections 320 and 320(2) of CrPC for recording compromise -- the same rejected -- nature of offence under section 420 of IPC is compoundable -- offence under Copyright Act and Trade Mark Act not covered under section 320 of CrPC -- merely on this basis compromise application cannot be rejected -- proceedings quashed subject to pay Rs.5,000/- as cost. 2008 Cr.LJ 2237 and ¼2011½10 SCC 705 followed. [Paras 8 to 11
(2) Criminal P.C., 1973 -- S.320 -- applicability of -- complaint under sections 63 and 63B of Copyright (Amended) Act, 1994 -- criminal case instituted against accused -- nature of offence is compoundable under section 420 of IPC -- compromise between complainant and accused -- provisions of section 320 of CrPC attracted. [Paras 10 & 11
¼1½ && izfrfyI;f/kdkj vf/kfu;e] 1957 ¼la‘kksf/kr½ vf/kfu;e] 1994 && /kkjk 63 rFkk 63 [k && mica/kksa ds v/khu ifjokn && vfHk;qDrx.k ds fo#) tqfMf‘k;y eftLVªsV gqvk && le>kSrk vfHkfyf[kr djus ds fy, naM izfdz;k lafgrk dh /kkjk 320 rFkk 320¼2½ ds v/khu vkosnu izLrqr fd;k x;k && og [kkfjt fd;k x;k && Hkk-na-la- dh /kkjk 420 ds v/khu vijk/k izd`fr le>kSrk ;ksX; gS && izfrfyI;f/kdkj vf/kfu;e rFkk O;kikj fpg~u vf/kfu;e ds varxZr vijk/k na-iz-la- dh /kkjk 320 ds v/khu lekfo"V ugha && ek= blh vk/kkj ij vkosnu [kkfjt ugha fd;k tk ldrk && dk;Zokgh :-5]000@& [kpsZ ds Hkqxrku ds v/;;/khu vikLr dh xbZA 2005 fdz-,y ts 2237 rFkk ¼2011½ 10 ,l lh lh 705 vuqlfjrA ¼iSjk 8 ls 11
¼2½ naM izfdz;k lafgrk] 1973 && /kkjk 320 dk ykxw gksuk && izfrfyI;f/kdkj ¼la‘kksf/kr½ vf/kfu;e] 1994 dh /kkjk 63 rFkk 63[k ds v/khu fookn && vfHk;qDrx.k ds fo#) vkijkf/kd ekeyk lafLFkr && Hkka-na-la- dh /kkjk 420 ds v/khu vijk/k le>kSrk ;ksX; izd`fr dk gS && ifjoknh rFkk vfHk;qDrx.k ds e/; le>kSrk && na-iz-la- dh /kkjk 320 ds mica/k vkdf"kZr gksrs gSA ¼iSjk 10 rFkk 11
1. This is petition filed by the petitioners, who are accused in Criminal Case No.35113/08 pending in the Court of Judicial Magistrate First Class, Indore instituted on a complaint filed by the respondent No.2 (Sunil Grover) under sections 63 and 63B of the Copyright, 1957 (amended 1994) Act (for short ‘the Act’).
2. In fact on the basis of the complaint lodged by the respondent No.2, an FIR was registered in this case being FIR No.258/08. On that basis challan was filed by the prosecution, i.e., by the respondent No.1.
3. Charges are also levelled against petitioner on 6.8.2010. Thereafter a compromise was arrived at between the complainant and the petitioners. Petitioners have filed an application under sections 320 and 320(2) of the CrPC for permission for compromise and to record the compromise arrived at between the parties. However, said application was dismissed by the Court below on the ground that as per Code of Criminal Procedure, offences disclosed were compoundable.
4. Petitioners have approached this Court by filing this petition under section 428, CrPC. They have also placed on record an original Memorandum of Understanding, which has been arrived at between the parties for settling their dispute which is taken on record as Ex.C-1.
5. Counsel appearing for both the parties including that of complainant, submit that in terms of aforesaid Memorandum of Understanding, the dispute raised by the complainant against the petitioners stands settled and they do not wish the petitioners to be further prosecuted and have no objection if the complaint and the FIR registered against them are quashed by this Court by exercising power under section 482, CrPC.
6. Besides, the original Memorandum of Undertaking, a Resolution has also been placed on record to the fact that respondent No.2 Sunil Grover is entitled to take all necessary steps for compromising the dispute arose with the petitioner.
7. The affidavits have also been filed on record by the two petitioners as well as complainant supporting the averments made in the original Memorandum of Undertaking regarding compromise entered into between the parties.
8. Petitioners have also submitted that in view of the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court as reported in Jagdish Chanana and others v. State of Haryana and another [2008 Cri.LJ 2237], once parties have entered into a settlement and the dispute is purely of personal in nature arising out of the commercial transaction, the public policy requires that such a dispute has to be brought to an end by taking compromise on record. They also rely upon the paragraph 2 of the judgment, which reads as under :
“The appeal is directed against the order dated 24th July, 2006, rejecting the prayer for quashing of FIR No.83, dated 12th March, 2005, P.S. City Sonepat registered under sections 419, 420, 465, 468, 469, 471, 472, 474 read with section 34 of the IPC. During the pendency of these proceedings in this Court, Criminal Miscellaneous Petition No.42/2008 has been filed putting on record a compromise deed dated 30th April, 2007. The fact that a compromise has indeed been recorded is admitted by all sides and in terms of the compromise the disputes which are purely personal in nature and arise out of commercial transactions, have been settled in terms of the compromise with one of the terms of the compromise being that proceedings pending in Court may be withdrawn or compromised or quashed, as the case may be. In the light of the compromise, it is unlikely that the prosecution will succeed in the matter. We also see that the dispute is a purely personal one and no public policy is involved in the transactions that had been entered into between the parties. To continue with the proceedings, therefore, would be a futile exercise. We accordingly, allow the appeal and quash FIR No.83, dated 12th March, 2005, P.S. City Sonepat and all consequent proceedings.”
9. In similar case where parties entered into a settlement in Trade Mark matter
