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2011 Supreme(MP) 369
2011 jk fu 406 2011 RN 406
¼mPp U;k;ky;½ (HIGH COURT)
U;k- ,-ds- JhokLro
A.K. Shrivastava, J.
j‘khn [kka rFkk ,d vU; fo- e-iz- jkT; rFkk vU;
Rashid Khan and another
v.
State of M.P. and others
izFke vihy dzekad 179 lu~ 1996 ¼bUnkSj½( vij ftyk U;k;k/kh‘k] tkojk] ftyk jryke }kjk flfoy okn dzekad 83,@92 esa ikfjr fu.kZ; ,oa fMdzh ds fo:)( fu.khZr fnukad 7-5-2011A
First Appeal No. 179 of 1996 (Indore), against judgment and decree passed by Additional District Judge, Jaora, District Ratlam in Civil Suit No. 83A/92,
Decided on: 7.5.2011
vfer vxzoky jksfgr eaxy lfgr vihykFkhZx.k dh vksj ls( ;‘kiky jkBkSj] iSuy odhy izR;FkhZx.k@jkT; dh vksj lsA
Advocate Appeared:
Amit Agarwal with Rohit Mangal for appellants,
Yashpal Rathore, Panel Lawyer for respondents/State.
Headnote:¼1½ Hkw&jktLo lafgrk] 1959 ¼e-iz-½ && /kkjk 248 && dk ykxw gksuk && uxjikfydk {ks= esa fLFkr Hkwfe && mica/k ykxw gksaxsA
fo}ku dkmUlsy }kjk ;g izLrqr fd;k x;k fd ;fn Hkwfe uxjikfydk ds lkehI; esa gS] e-iz- Hkw&jktLo lafgrk] 1959 dh /kkjk 248 ds mica/k vkdf"kZr ugha gksrs gSa rFkk bl laca/k esa bl U;k;ky; dh [kaM U;k;ihB ds fu.kZ; dks vk/kkfjr fd;k gS] 1980 jk fu 460¾1980 ts ,y ts 581A ¼iSjk 6½
vfHkfu/kkZfjr % vihykFkhZx.k ds fo}ku dkmUlsy dk rdZ fd pwafd Hkwfe uxjikfydk {ks= esa gSa] lafgrk dh /kkjk 248 ds mica/k ykxw u gksus ls lacaf/kr gS] laiw.kZ rdZ bl U;k;ky; dh [kaM U;k;ihB }kjk 1980 jk fu 460] 1981 ts ,y ts 581 esa vf/kdfFkr vH;qfDr ij vk/kkfjr gS ftls 1999 jk fu 328 ¼mPpre U;k-½ esa myV fn;k gSA blfy,] ;g rdZ Lohdkj ugha fd;k tk ldrk fd uxj ikfydk {ks= esa lafgrk dh /kkjk 248 ds mica/k vkdf"kZr ugha gksrs gSA 1999 jk fu 328 ¼mPpre U;k-½ vuqlfjrA ¼iSjk 10½
¼2½ flfoy izfdz;k lafgrk] 1908 && vk- 41 fu- 27 && lk{; vf/kfu;e] 1872 && /kkjk 77 && vfrfjDr lk{; && izek.k i= dh QksVks izfr && ;g uxjikfydk ds jftLVj dh izfof"V ls rS;kj fd;k x;k && ;g u rks izkFkfed vkSj u gh f}rhf;d lk{; gS && ,slh lk{; eatwj djus ds fy, vkosnu Lohdkj ugha fd;k tk ldrk && lk{; vf/kfu;e dh /kkjk 77 ds v/khu uxjikfydk ds jftLVj dh izekf.kr izfrfyfi tks yksd nLrkost gS izLrqr dh tkuk pkfg, Fkh && tc izkFkfed lk{; miyC/k gS && f}rhf;d lk{; vxzkg~; gSA , vkb vkj 2010 ,l lh 965 vuqlfjrA ¼iSjk 11½
¼3½ flfoy izfdz;k lafgrk] 1908 && /kkjk 9 && fodz; i= ds vk/kkj ij gd dh ?kks"k.kk rFkk O;kns‘k ds fy, flfoy okn && dzsrk viuk gd lkfcr djus ds fy, rFkk vkxs mlds fodzsrk dk gd Hkh lkfcr djus ds fy, vkc) gSA 1967 jk fu 507 ¼mPp U;k-½ voyafcrA ¼iSjk 12½
¼4½ Hkw&jktLo lafgrk] 1959 ¼e-iz-½ && /kkjk 248 ¼1½ rFkk 248 ¼3½ && fofufnZ"V vuqrks"k vf/kfu;e] 1963 && /kkjk 34 && csn[kyh rFkk tqekZuk vf/kjksi.k dk vkns‘k && gd dh ?kks"k.kk rFkk O;kns‘k dks vk{ksfir ugha fd;k rFkk bls vikLr fd, tkus dh lgk;rk ugha pkgh xbZ && okn fofufnZ"V vuqrks"k vf/kfu;e dh /kkjk 34 }kjk vk/kkfjr gSA
vfHkfu/kkZfjr % ;fn dksbZ jktLo dk;Zokfg;ksa esa oknhx.k dks csn[ky djus dk vkns‘k ikfjr fd;k x;k gS] oknhx.k }kjk tc rd mls vk{ksfir ugha fd;k tkrk rFkk vikLr fd, tkus dh lgk;rk ugha pkgh tkrh] okn fofufnZ"V vuqrks"k vf/kfu;e dh /kkjk 34 ds v/khu vk/kkfjr gSA , vkb vkj 1971 ,l lh 761 vuqlfjrA ¼iSjk 13½
¼5½ flfoy izfdz;k lafgrk] 1908 && vk- 6 fu- 17 && la‘kks/ku vkosnu && vius vk/kkj ds Åij izfrdwy dCtk ds vfHkopu dk mik; fudkyuk pkgk x;k && ;g izR;FkhZx.k dks izfrdwy :i ls izHkkfor djsxk rFkk laiw.kZ ekeyk iqu% [kksyuk gksxk && vkosnu dHkh iwfrZ ds fy, && ,slk vkosnu eatwj ugha fd;k tk ldrkA ¼iSjk 14½
(1) Land Revenue Code, 1959 (M.P.) -- S. 248 -- applicability of -- land situated in Municipal area -- provisions will be applicable.
It has been put forth by learned counsel that if the land is in the vicinity of the Municipality, the provisions of section 248 of the M.P. Land Revenue Code, 1959 are not attracted and in this regard he has placed reliance on the Division Bench decision of this Court, 1980 RN 460 =1980 JLJ 581. [Para6
Held: The contention of learned counsel for the appellants that since the land is in the Municipal area, the provisions of section 248 of the Code are not applicable is concerned, the entire argument is based on the pivot of the dictum laid down by the Division Bench of this Court in 1980 RN 460 = 1980 JLJ 581 which has been reversed in 1999 RN 328 (SC). Hence, this contention cannot be accepted that in the Municipal area the provisions of section 248 of the Code are not attracted. 1999 RN 328 (SC) followed. [Para 10
(2) Civil P.C., 1908 -- O. 41, R. 27 -- Evidence Act, 1872 -- S. 77 -- additional evidence -- photocopy of certificate -- it was prepared from entry in register of Municipality -- it is neither primary nor secondary evidence -- application for allowing such evidence cannot be accepted -- certified copy of Municipal register which is public document ought to have been filed under section 77 of Evidence Act -- when primary evidence is available -- secondary evidence is inadmissible. AIR 2010 SC 965 followed. [Para 11
(3) Civil P.C., 1908 -- S. 9 -- civil suit for declaration of title and injunction on basis of sale deed -- purchaser is bound to prove his title and further to prove title of his vendor also. 1967 RN 507 (HC) relied on. [Paras 12
(4) Land Revenue Code, 1959 (M.P.) -- S. 248 (1) and 248 (3) -- Specific Relief Act, 1963 -- S. 34 -- order of eviction and imposition of fine -- civil suit for declaration of title and injunction -- order of revenue proceedings not challenged and no relief sought for its quashment -- suit is hit by section 34 of Specific Relief Act.
Held: If in some revenue proceedings an order has been passed to evict the plaintiffs, unless and until the same is challenged by the plaintiffs and relief is sought for its quashment, the suit is hit under section 34 of Specific Relief Act. AIR 1971 SC 761 followed. [Para 13
(5) Civil P.C., 1908 -- O. 6 R. 17 -- amendment application -- plea of adverse possession sought to be shifted over their stand -- it will prejudice respondents and entire case will be reopened -- application to fill up lacuna -- such application cannot be allowed. [Para 14
1. This is plaintiffs' first appeal since their suit for declaration and injunction has been dismissed by learned trial Court.
2. The facts necessary for the disposal of this appeal lie in narrow compass. Suffice it to say that a suit for declaration and injunction in respect of a house, the description whereof has been mentioned in the plaint and which is the subject matter of the suit, has been filed by the plaintiffs against the defendants/ respondents on the averments that they have purchased the suit property from Mohammad Sabir on 27.7.1990 and 16.2.1990 by two registered sale deeds Exhibits P-l and P-2 and entered into possession of the suit property. Further the case of the plaintiffs is that their vendor purchased the suit property from Qamal Abbas Khan who was the surviving heir of Musharraf Jahan Begum, the owner of the suit property vide registered sale deed dated 2.12.1986 and thus, they are the owner of the suit property, but, the respondents/defendants are trying to interfere into their possession. It is the further case of plaintiffs that Sub-Divisional Officer/Additional District Magistrate vide order dated 5.10.1991 in Case No. 10A/68/1991-92 by holding that the suit property is government property, has directed to evict the plaintiffs and hence, the present suit has been filed.
3. The plaint averments were refuted by the defendants by filing written statement. Their stand is that the suit property is owned by the government and has been recorded in the revenue record as Nazul land, therefore, not only the plaintiffs but their predecessors were also not the title holder of the suit property and, therefore, status of the plaintiffs is that of a tress-passer only and rightly the order has been passed by the Sub-Divisional Officer directing them to evict the suit premises.
4. Learned Trial Court on the basis of the averments made in the plaint and denial in the written statement framed necessary issues and after holding the evidence of the parties dismissed the suit.
5. In this manner this appeal has been filed by the plaintiffs.
6. It has been put forth by learned counsel for the appellants that suit property was owned by Musharraf Jahan Begum whose heir sold the property to the vendor of the plaintiffs and thus, the title of the plaintiffs has been proved. Learned counsel submits that plaintiffs have not only proved their sale deeds but have also proved the sale deed of their vendor, hence, they are the title holder of the suit property, this has been emphatically proved. It has also been put forth by learned counsel that if the land is in the vicinity of the Municipality, the provisions of section 248 of the M.P. Land Revenue Code, 1959 (hereinafter referred to as "the Code") are not attracted and in this regard he has placed reliance on the Division Bench decisions of this Court Sind Mahajan Exchange Ltd. Lashkar v. State of M.P. and another, 1980 JLJ 581 = 1980 RN 460.
7. Two applications; IA No. 4268/1996 under Order VI Rule 17 CPC and IA No. 4222/1996 under Order XLI Rule 27 CPC are also filed before this Court. Learned counsel for the appellants has addressed on these two applications also and has submitted that by allowing these two applications the case be remanded back to learned Trial Court.
8. On the other hand, Shri Yashpal Rathore, learned counsel appearing for the respondents/State argued in support of the impugned judgment.
9. Having heard learned counsel for the parties, I am of the view that this appeal deserves to be dismissed.
10. So far as the contention of learned counsel for the appellants that since the land is in the Municipal area, the provisions of section 248 of the Code are not applicable is concerned, the entire argument is based on the pivot of the dictum laid down by the Division Bench of this Court Sind Mahajan (supra) which has been reversed by the Supreme Court State of M.P. and another v. Sind Mahajan Exchange Ltd. 1999 RN 328. Hence, this contention cannot be accepted that
