The Court can examine the sufficiency of reasons for supersession of a Municipal Committee under Section 57(2) of the C. P. and Berar Municipalities Act, 1922.

Hidayatullah C.J. & Choudhuri, J.

1. This is a Letters Patent Appeal from an order of Bhutt J. in Miscellaneous Petition No 552 of 1956 decided on 21st February 1957.

2. By an order under Section 57 (2) of the C. P. and Berar Municipalities Act, 1922, the State Government superseded the Kareli Municipality for a period of two years. Certain charges were framed and a notice was sent to the Municipal Committee to show cause why it should not be superseded. The Municipal Committee sent a detailed reply, but the State Government did not accept the explanation furnished and superseded the Municipality.

3. The present petition was filed by the Municipal Committee through its President for getting the said order quashed. When Bhutt J. declined to interfere the present appeal was filed. In doing so, Bhutt J. followed a decision of the Nagpur High Court in Ramchandra Rai vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, M P. 80 of 1950, decided on 10th August 1951. That decision was given on when on an earlier occasion also the Kareli Municipality was superseded.

4. Mangalmurti and Mudholkar JJ, in the cited case laid down the law in the following words:-

In the present case the complaint made by the applicant is that in dissolving the Municipal Committee under Section 57 (1) of the C. P. Municipalities Act of 1922, the State Government acted mala fide as there were in fact no grounds upon which the Municipal Committee could be properly dissolved The action of the State Government is wholly administrative and though in taking it they had to satisfy themselves about the necessity of doing so, we do not think it appropriate to go behind the satisfaction of the State Government even though the satisfaction had to be, as the applicant's learned counsel contends, objective and not merely subjective. The reason for our placing this limitation up-(sic) ourselves is that it will lead to untold (sic)convenience and confusion if administrative decisions are subjected to review by Courts of law as a matter of routine. In eases where, for instance, the action is mala fide or arbitrary or without jurisdiction or in utter violation of the principles of law or natural justice, we may have to review the action. We do not however think that the present case is of a kind in which we ought to review the action taken by the State Government. Here, before dissolving the Committee, charges were framed and communicated to that body. Their explanation was called for and considered and it was after that that the order of dissolution was passed. We, therefore, decline to consider the sufficiency or adequacy of the material upon which the charges were regarded as proved. The application must, therefore, fail. This statement of the law by the Division Bench is questioned before us. The law requires a reasonable opportunity of showing cause to the Municipality against the proposed action. The short question is whether the requirements of the law are satisfied by taking the explanation of the Municipality. If the standard is that much only, there can hardly ever be any interference by Courts. There is room for argument that by the words of the Act an objective standard is imposed. Not only is the State Government required to give an opportunity to show cause, but also it is required to record its reasons before superseding the Municipality. There is considerable force in the argument, and we think that the point was not adequately considered on the earlier occasion. Prima facie, the opinion prevailing may need a restatement even if it be found to be correct. We are accordingly of the opinion that the case be heard by a Full Bench, and we recommend accordingly.

OPINION OF THE FULL BEACH

5. This appeal is against an order of Bhutt J, in Miscellaneous Petition No, 552 of 1956, decided on 21st February 1957. It was referred to this Full Bench, but at the suggestion of counsel and with the concurrence of the learned Judges who made the reference, the decision of the Full Bench has been confin