This is an appeal by the plaintiff whose suit for a declaration of his title to a certain land described in the plaint, for a declaration that it is unnecessary to demolish a wall erected on the land with the permission of the Municipal Committee, and for the further declaration that a resolution passed by the Dewas State Cabinet on 27th January 1948, holding that the land belonged to the State and directing the plaintiff to demolish the wall was ultra vires, has been dismissed by the Courts below.

The suit was dismissed on the ground that it was not filed within six months from the date of the accrual of the cause of action as required by section 17 of the Dewas Municipality Act, 1941. That section reads as follows:

S. 17 (1)-No suit shall be instituted against a committee or against any member, officer or servant of a Municipality or any person acting under the direction of the Government or the President for anything done or purporting to be done under this Act until the expiration of two months next after notice in writing stating the cause of action, the name and place of abode of the intending plaintiff and the relief which he claims, has been delivered or left at the Municipal Office, and in case of any such person as aforesaid, delivered to him or left at his office or usual place of abode.

(2) Every such suit shall be dismissed unless it is instituted within six months from the date of the accrual of the alleged cause of action and service of such notice as aforesaid is admitted or proved.

The plaintiff's suit was filed on 7th December 1949. He alleged that the cause of action arose on 27th January 1948, that is the date on which the Dewas State Cabinet passed a resolution asserting the ownership of the State to the land and directing the plaintiff to remove the wall constructed on the land. There can be no doubt that if section 17 of the Act is applicable to the plaintiff's suit then it is barred by time. But Mr. Chaphekar learned counsel for the appellant, contended that section 17 (2) had no applicability to a suit for a declaration of title to property. It was argued that section 17 of the Act was intended to afford protection to officials against personal responsibility for official acts and that the object of that provision was to give an official the opportunity to reconsider his position with regard to the claim and to make amends or settle the claim if he was so advised, and that this principle could not be applied to a suit whose object was to obtain a declaration of title to property. Reliance was placed on Chunder Sikhur Bundopadhya v. Obhoy Churn Bagchi I L R 6 Cal. 8, President of the Taluk Board, Sivaganga v. Narayan I L K 16 Mad. 317 and Govinda Pillai v. The Taluk Board, Kumbakonam I L R 32 Mad. 371.

In my opinion, the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant that the provisions of section 17 of the De-was Municipalities Act, 1941, do not apply to a suit for a declaration of title to property must be given effect to. It will be seen that under section 17 notice is necessary in the case of a suit "for anything done or purporting to be done under the Act" by the Municipal Committee or any member, officer or any servant of the Municipal Committee. Now, the plaintiff no doubt stated that the cause of action arose on 27th January 1949, when the De-was State Cabinet passed a resolution asserting the ownership of the State to the land in question, and the suit was a equal to this resolution. But the bare assertion of the State of a claim to a property cannot be considered to be "an act done or purporting to be done under the Act" by any member, officer or servant of the Municipality or by any person acting under the direction of the Government or the President. The resolution passed by the De-was State Cabinet merely contained an expression of belief that the land belonged to the State. It is not an act done. A mere assertion of title to a property is not doing an act or purporting to do an act