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1971 Supreme(MP) 77

IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH (GWALIOR BENCH)
A.P. SEN AND K.K. DUBE, JJ.
Khumansingh Sandersingh
Vs.
Dhansingh and others
Revision(sic) Misc. Petition No. 80 of 1969
Decided On: 29.04.1971

Advocates Appeared:
For Appellant/Petitioner/Plaintiff: G.P. Patankar and V.K. Sapre
For Respondents/Defendant:H.G. Mishra and P.L. Dube, Govt. Advocate

Headnote:(1) Zamindari Abolition Act, 1951 (MB) - Ss.2 (c) & 4 (2) - Khudkosht - when saved from vesting-part of a Khasra number recorded as Alawa Jot, that is, not under personal cultivation-that part is not Khudkasht and vests in the State.

       Under section 4 (2) of the Act the saving is of rights is in respect of Khudkasht land, so recorded in annual village papers before the date of vesting, the words "so recorded" imply that the land must not only be Khudkasht, within the meaning of section 2 (c) but must also be 'so recorded' immediately before the date of vesting within the meaning of the section.

       The expression 'Khudkasht' only means that part of the land which was under personal cultivation. Where part of the Khasra number was recorded Alawa Jot, i.e., not under personal cultivation during the years 2006, 2007 and 2008, it could not be recorded as Khudkasht. [Para 6

       There is no warrant for the submission that when a part of the land bearing a particular Khasra number was under cultivation, the entire land taken as a unit has to be, under law, treated as under cultivation. Under the Gwalior Quanoon Mal, the revenue authorities had the authority to bifercate the land to specify which part of it should be recorded as Khudkasht and which part as Padri Jadeed. 1967 RN 109 overruled. [Paras 8 & 9

       (2) Words and phrases - Padri Jadeed-meaning of.

       Under section 2 (6) of the Quanoon Mal, Gwalior State, padri Jadeed means land which remained uncultivated for more than three years. [Para 8

       (3) Revenue Law - Khudkasht -distinction between M.P. and M.B. Abolition Acts.

       On comparison of the provisions of the two Acts it will be clear that while under the M. P. Abolition of Proprietary Rights Act, 1950, the record is the basis, under the Madhya Bharat Zamindari Abolition Act, 1951, the emphasis is laid on personal cultivation. 1962 RN 487 (SC) referred to. [Para 5

       (4) Land Revenue and Tenancy Act, 1950 (MB) - S.39 - powers of suo motu revision - no bar of limitation – delay - when powers may not be exercised - orders of lower Court nullity - powers should be exercised.

       The suo motu powers of revision are untrammelled by any condition of limitation, 1964 RN 282 relied on. [Para 10

       The revisional powers should be exercised within a reasonable time when the occupant is likely to spend money on construction work. AIR 1969 SC 1297 discussed. [Para 10

       Where the order of the Tahsildar was a nullity, in as much as he corrected the entries beyond the period of limitation prescribed in section 51 of the Act, the Board was justified in setting aside the order in suo motu revision. 1963 RN 16 approved. [Para 12

ORDER

A.P. Sen, J.

This is an application of Khumansingh, Ex-Zamindar of village Mahu, under Article 226 of the Constitution, for a direction to quash and order of the Board of Revenue, Madhya Pradesh, dated 20th March 1969, whereby it set aside an order of the Tahsildar, Pargana Basoda, dated 28th December l960, passed under Section 51 of the Madhya Bharat Land Revenue and Tenancy Act, 1950, in exercise of its(sic) suo motu powers of revision, on the ground that the Tahsildar had no jurisdiction to pass the order, as the application for correction of the entries was barred by limitation.

The facts have been stated by the Board of Revenue in great detail and we do not, think it necessary to repeat them here.

The decision of the Board of Revenue has been assailed before us on the following grounds:

(i) Under the definition of the term "Khudkasht" in Section 2(c) of the Madhya Bharat Zamindari Abolition Act, it does not envisage that there should be Cultivation of the whole field taken as an unit. Even if the field is partly under cultivation, the whole of it will retain its character as "khudkasht" Land of the ex-proprietor. A part of it even if uncultivated could not be resumed by the Government.

(ii) On a true construction of the provisions of Section 4(2) of the Madhya Bharat Zamindari Abolition Act, 1951, it would be clear that emphasis was laid on the words "so recorded" in the annual village papers before the date of vesting, and inasmuch as the entire Khasra No. 1230 was recorded as "Khudkasht" in the Khasra for Samvat 2007, the whole land was saved to the Petitioner under that section. There is no difference in the scheme of the Madhya Bharat Zamindari Abolition Act, 1951 and the Madhya Pradesh Abolition of Proprietary Rights Act, 1950 and therefore, Khasra No. 1230 must be treated to be the Khudkasht of the Petitioner within the meaning of Section 4(2) of the Act, following the view in Bindrawan v. M.P. State 1967 Revenue Nirnaya 109

(iii) The Board of Revenue had no jurisdiction to invoke its suo motu revisional powers under Section 51 of the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code, 1959, which, according to the view expressed in Mst. Asaf Jahan Begum v. Mst. Bashir Begum 1964 MPLJ 156: 1964 RN 89, had no application to the pending proceedings. The Code came into force on 2nd October 1959, when the proceedings under Section 51 of the Madhya Bharat Land Revenue and Tenancy Act, 1950 were pending. The Board of Revenue could, therefore, if at all, exercise its revisional jurisdiction under Section 39 of the Act. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court in State of Gujarat v. Patel Raghav Natha and others AIR 1969 SC 1297 while interpreting Section 211 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code, 1879, which was in pari materia with Section 39 of the Madhya Bharat Land Revenue and Tenancy Act, 1950, stated that such powers had to be exercised within a reasonable time. The Board of Revenue, therefore, could not have, after a lapse of 10 years, set aside the Tahsildar's order.

(iv) Even otherwise, a change of view of law is not a ground for exercising suo motu powers of revision. The Tahsildar, by his order dated 28-12-1960, had allowed correction of the entries as prayed for under Section 51 of the Madhya Bharat Land Revenue and Tenancy Act, 1950, following the prevailing view of the Board of Revenue, Madhya Bharat, in Sukhlal v. Gyanbai 4. 1954 RN 34 and Harpal v. Mst. Radha 1954 RN 341 merely because it later changed its view, on a new construction of Section 51 of the Madhya Bharat Land Revenue and Tenancy Act, 1950. Such a change in view, would not, ipso facto, make the order of the Tahsildar a nullity nor furnish the Board of Revenue a ground for setting it aside in revision suo motu.

We are of the view that there is no merit in these contentions.

The schemes under the Madhya Pradesh Abolition of Proprietary Rights Act, 1950 and under the Madhya Bharat Zamindari Abolition Act, 1951, were entirely different. For the sake of convenience we reproduce be




















































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