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1972 Supreme(MP) 135

IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH (GWALIOR BENCH)
S.M.N. RAINA, N.C. DWIVEDI, JJ.
Sital Kumar Hemrajani
Vs.
J.B. Mangharam & Co. and another
M.P. No. 216 of 1970
Decided On: 31.10.1972

Advocates appeared:
For Appellant/Petitioner/Plaintiff: H.N. Upadhya
For Respondents/Defendant: P.L. Dube

Headnote:(1) Industrial Relations Act, 1960 (M.P.)-S. 2 (13)-employee-meaning of-Welfare Officer-is an employee-word 'technical'-has not a restricted meaning.

       A Labour Welfare Officer cannot be said to be employed mainly in managerial capacity within the meaning of paragraph (iii) of sub-clause (b) of clause (13) of section 2 of the Act and is as such not excluded under the definition. He is in a sense a technical worker and since his wages did not exceed Rs. 500/-per mensem he was an employee as defined in section 2 (13) of the Act. [Para 10

       The word 'technical' occuring in section 2 (13) of the Act cannot be restricted so as to apply only to persons doing some technical work of the Factory itself. The work of Welfare Officer is also of a highly technical nature inasmuch as he has to advise the management on various intricate problems for maintaining a proper relationship between the management and the labour. AIR 1961 Assam 30 relied on. (1967) II LLJ 355 distinguished. [Para 11

       (2) Master & Servant-probation-when becomes permanent-probation for six months-permanent status not acquired after expiry of the period. A probationer does not automatically acquire the status of a permanent member of a service on the expiry of the probationary period unless the Rules under which he is appointed expressly provide for such a result. AIR 1962 SC 1711 relied on.

       An employee appointed on probation for six months continues as a probationer even after the period of six months if at the end of the period his services are neither terminated nor he is confirmed. In the instant case the period of probation was expressly extended for a further period of six months and therefore, it is obvious that the petitioner continued to remain on probation. AIR 1964 SC 806 relied on. [Paras 14 & 15

       (3) Industrial Employment Standing Orders Rules, 1963 (M.P.)-Standing Order 2 (J)-probationer-when becomes permanent employee-service must be 'satisfactory'-'satisfactory' should be to the satisfaction of the employer-this is a question of fact.

       It is clear from the definition of 'permanent employee' given in Standing Order 2 (1) that a persons acquired the status of a permanent employee on completing six months satisfactory service in a clear vacancy. The question, therefore, for consideration is whether the petitioner had completed six months satisfactory service. The expression 'satisfactory service' has not been defined in the standing orders but looking to the context in which this expression is used it is obvious that it means service to the satisfaction of the employer. Whether an employee has acquired the status of a permanent employee is a question of fact. [Para 16

       (4) Constitution of India-Arts. 226 & 227-finding of fact-cannot be challenged.

       The High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Arts. 226 & 227 of the Constitution is not competent to set aside a finding of fact recorded by the Industrial Tribunal. AIR 1957 SC 264 relied on. [Para 17

       (5) Industrial Disputes Act, 1960 (M.P.)-S.66-scope of the revisional powers of the Industrial Court.

       The language of section 66 of the Act being similar to that of section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the scope of interference in revision under the two sections is almost identical. Under proviso (c) to sub-section (1) of section 66 of the Act it is open to the Industrial Court to interfere where the Labour Court acts illegally or with material irregularity in the exercise of its jurisdiction.

       Where the Labour Court acts arbitrarily in contravention of the settled principles of law or the rules of procedure resulting in gross miscarriage of justice it acts illegally or with material irregularity in the exercise of its jurisdiction within the meaning of proviso (c) to sub-section (1) of section 66 of the Act. Such an error certainly pertains to jurisdiction and can be rectified in exercise of the revisional powers. AIR 1965 SC 553 referred to. [Para 19

       (6) Factories Rules, 1962 (M. P.)-R. 89- Welfare Officer-nature of his duty.

       No doubt it is part of duty of the Labour Welfare Officer to take measures to promote well-being of the workers in the factories but this does not mean that he could be rude, impolite and discourtious to the management in the discharge of his duties. He has a difficult and delicate role to play but all the same he is an employee of the management and must behave in an extremely polite and courtious manner so as to maintain discipline. [Para 24

ORDER

S.M.N. Raina, J.

This is a petition under articles 226 and 227 of the constitution of India.

The petitioner was appointed by the respondent No. 1 as welfare officer in the Factory belonging to the respondent No. 1 at Gwalior on probation for a period of six months vide letter dated 8-5-1962 (Annexure 1). The petitioner joined his duties on 6-6-1962 in pursuance of the said letter. By letter dated 6-12-1962 the period of probation of the petitioner was extended for a further period of six months with effect from 6-12-62 vide Annexure A 2. Before the expiry of the period of probation the appointment of the petitioner was terminated with effect from 28-2-1963 vide Annexure A. 3. This order of termination was subsequently cancelled by the respondent No. 1 on a representation made by the petitioner as he was under E.S.I. medical treatment at that time vide Annexure A. 5. Respondent No. 1, however, suspended the petitioner for misconduct and called upon him to submit his explanation vide letter dated 9-3-1963 (Annexure A. 6.). Subsequently respondent No. 1 called upon the petitioner to show cause why he should not be dismissed vide letter dated 14-3-1963 (Annexure A. 7). In the meantime Standard Standing orders under the Madhya Pradesh Industrial Employment standing Order Rules 1963 came into force with effect from 22-3-1963 and became applicable to the Factory of respondent No. 1.

Respondent No. 1 by letter dated 28-3-1963 sought prior concurrence of the State Government as required by Rule 91 of the Madhya Pradesh Factory Rules for terminating the services of the petitioner. The State Government however, by letter dated 27-5-1963 directed that the services of the petitioner may be continued vide annexure A. 8. The petitioner was, therefore, directed by the respondent No, 1--vide letter dated 6 6-1963 --to continue as welfare officer, vide Annexure A. 11. The petitioner continued to act as welfare officer till 11-6-1963 when his services were terminated by telegram annexure A. 12. The telegram stated that the concurrence of the State Government to terminate his services has been obtained. The petitioner, thereafter submitted an approach notice under section 31 of the Madhya Pradesh Industrial Relations Act (herinafter referred to as 'the Act') to the respondent No.1 vide Annexure A. 13, and thereafter submitted an application before the Labour Court Gwalior under section 31 (3) read with section 61 of the Act vide Annexure A. 16. The Labour Court held that the services were wrongly terminated and, therefore, set aside the order of termination and directed the respondent No. 1 to pay the applicant full back wages (Annexure A. 18). The respondent No. 1 thereupon filed a revision petition before the Industrial Court which was allowed and the application of the petitioner was dismissed, vide Annexure A. 19. Being aggrieved thereby the petitioner has filed this petition praying that the order of the Industrial Court may be quashed and the order of the Labour Court may be restored.

The petition has been opposed by the respondent No.1 and it has been submitted in the return filed by it that the order of termination was perfectly legal and could not be challenged by the petitioner.

The first point for consideration in this petition is whether the petitioner was an employee within the meaning of Clause (13) of section 2 of the Act. Clause (13) reads as under:

(13) 'Employee' means any person employed in an industry to do any skilled, unskilled, manual, supervisory, technical or clerical work for hire or reward, whether the terms of employment be express or implied and includes--

(a) a person employed by a contractor to do any work for him in the execution of a contract with an employer within the meaning of sub-clause (e) of clause 14; and

(b) an apprentice other than an apprentice under sub-clause (v); but does not include any person--

(i) who is subject to the Army Act, 1950 (XLVI of 1950) or the Air Force Act, 1950 (XLV of 1950) or the Navy













































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