IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
G.P. SINGH, J.S. VERMA & M.D. BHATT, JJ.
Gulab Chand
Vs.
State of M.P.
M.P. No. 1144 of 1981
Decided On: 19.11.1981
Section 2 (f) of the Ordinance makes it clear that for an offence to be a specified offence within the definition it is not enough that it should be an offence mentioned in the Schedule and that it is further necessary that the offence should form part or arise out of or be connected with the commission of dacoity. This is the effect of the words "being an offence forming part or arising out of, or connected with, the commission of dacoity" as used in section 2 (f).
So the act or acts constituting as offence mentioned in the Schedule must have a nexus with the commission of dacoity and this nexus must exist at the time when the act or acts are committed for constituting the offence a specified offence.
The word 'or' cannot be read before the words "being an offence " [Para 9]
(2) Words and phrases-word 'being'-denotes a state or condition existent at the time when the conclusion of law or fact has to he ascertained. [Para 9]
(3) Constitution of India-Art. 348-use and status of Hindi version of a statute in Madhya Pradesh.
Hindi is the official language in Madhya Pradesh for use in Bills, Acts and Ordinances. The English version is a translation of the Ordinance promulgated in Hindi and is published under Article 384 of the Constitution. As an Act or Ordinance in Madhya Pradesh is passed or promulgated in Hindi, the Hindi version can be used for explaining any ambiguity in the English text published under Article 348. 1957 JLJ 431 relied on. [Para 9]
(4) Dakaiti Prabhavit Kshetra Adhyadesh, 1981 (MP)-Ss. 2 (b), 2 (f) & 2 (g)-specified offence-is to be understood in the sense defined in section 2(f)-'decoity' should be understood in the sense defined in the Penal Code.
The expression 'specified offence' as used in section 2 (b) must also be understood in the same sense in which it is defined in section 2 (f). Reading them together it becomes clear that a person committing any offence mentioned in the Schedule will not fall within the definition of dacoit unless it is an offence under section 395 or forming part or arising out of or connected with the commission of dacoity.
Section 2 (g) of the Ordinance specifically requires us to refer to the definition in the Criminal Procedure Code and the Indian Penal Code in interpreting words not defined in the Ordinance but defined in the said Codes. It is true that section 2 (g) is subject to any contrary context, but we do not find in section 2 (f) or in the object of the Ordinance any indication that the definition of "dacoity" as contained in the Penal Code should not be used for understanding that word as used in section 2 (f). That word has to be understood in the sense as defined in section 391 of the Penal Code. Harnarain v. State of M.P. M. Cr. C No. 1334 of 1981 decided on 1-10-1981 overruled on this point. [Para 11]
(5) Dakaiti Prabhavit Kshetra Adhyadesh, 1981 (M P)-S. 2 (f)-offence of dacoity committed out side the dacoity affected area-offence in relation to a dacoity affected area may be committed in the affected area-the dacoity may or may not be committed in the dacoity affected area.
The words "in relation to a dacoity-affected area" as used in the definition in section 2 (f) though not very clear appear to be intended to fix the situs of "an offence specified in the Schedule" and not of the offence of dacoity of which it has to form part or arise out of or be connected with to become a specified offence.
If an offence specified in the Schedule is committed within a dacoity affected area it will amount to a specified offence if it is connected with an offence of dacoity which mayor may' not be committed within a dacoity affected area. [Para 12]
(6) Dakaiti Prabhavit Kshetra Adhyadesh, 1981 (MP)-Ss. 2 (f) & 11- Penal Code, 1860-S. 390, Illustration (d)-abduction and confinement at Delhi under threat of death-abductors asking to pay ransom to a person in Datia to the petitioner-petitioner participating in settling the amount of ransom-this amounts to specified offence.
[Para 13]
(7) Dakaiti Prabhavit Kshetra Adhyadesh, 1981 (MP)-S.5 (2)-ban on grant of bail-when applies.
If after the investigation is complete, there is no prima facie proof in support of the accusation of commission of dacoity or a specified offence against the person arrested, be cannot again be properly described to be a dacoit as defined in the Ordinance. In all such cases, the ban on the grant of bail to a dacoit under section 5 (2) of the Ordinance will not apply. Putting it differently a person arrested for dacoity or a specified. offence under the Ordinance can apply for bail in spite of section 5 (2) at the stage immediately after his arrest on the ground that there was no reasonable suspicion of his being concerned in such offence; at the stage after twenty-four hours of his arrest and during investigation on the ground that there are no grounds that the accusation or information against him is well founded; and at the stage after the investigation is complete on the ground that there is no sufficient evidence or prima facie proof against him in support of the accusation. We may add that bail has also to be granted, as pointed out later in this judgment, when the investigation is not complete within 120 days from the date of arrest under the proviso to section 5 (2). [Para 14]
(8) Dakaiti Prabhavit Kshetra Adhyadesh, 1981 (MP)-S 5 (2), proviso- Cr. P.C.-S. 167-distinction between section 5 (2) is confined only to investigating stage.
The proviso to Section 5 (2) of the Ordinance is similar to proviso (a) to section 167 of the Code of Criminal Procedure subject to this that the proviso in section 5 authorises the detention for a total period of 120 days whereas the proviso to section 167 (2) of the Code authorises detention for a total period of 90 days or 60 days as the case may be. The stage with which the proviso to section 5 (2) of the Ordinance is concerned is the stage before the filing of the challan. [Para 17]
G.P. Singh, C.J.
1. The Petitioner by this Petition under Article 226 of the Constitution seeks issuance of a writ of habeas corpus for his release.
2. The police of Sakarpur police-station, Delhi, registered crime No. 165/81 for offences under sections 385, 365, 342, 344, and 364 of the Indian Penal Code against the petitioner. By order dated 7th July 1981 the petitioner who is a resident of Datia was granted anticipatory bail in the sum of Rs. 15,000 by the Additional Sessions Judge, Sahadara, Delhi. By the same order the petitioner was directed to appear before the police at Datia on 10th July 1981. When the petitioner appeared as directed before the police at Datia, be was arrested and released on the basis of the order of the Additional Sessions Judge, Delhi. The petitioner was again arrested on the same date, i.e. 10th July 1981, for an offence under section 11 of the Madhya Pradesh Dakaiti Prabhavit Kshetra Adhyadesh, 1981 (hereinafter called the Ordinance) in connection with crime No. 215/81 registered in Kotwali Datia.
3. The petitioner was also formally arrested some time after 10th July 1981 by Gwalior police for an offence under section 365 I P C. registered as crime No 122/80. The Gwalior Police produced the petitioner before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Gwalior, on 28th July 1981. The petitioner was directed to be released on bail of Rs. 5,000.
4. It will thus appear that the petitioner has been directed to be released on bail for offences registered in Delhi and Gwalior and he continues to be under detention because of his arrest under section 11 of the Ordinance. The petitioner moved for bail in the Gwalior Bench of the High Court for this offence also but the application was rejected by Navkar, J., on 10th September 1911. The petitioner in this petition contends that his arrest for the offence under section 11 is wholly illegal for on the material before the police there could pot exist any reasonable suspicion for the commission of the said offence 6r grounds for believing that the accusation or information against him is well founded to warrant his arrest and detention under sections 41 and 167 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 and the petitioner's arrest and detention are in violation of his fundamental right under Article 21 of the Constitution. It is the correctness of this contention which we have to examine in this petition.
5. The facts stated in the return justifying the arrest of the petitioner under section 11 of the Ordinance, briefly stated, are as follows : One Brij Mohan of Delhi was adducted by Raju Bhatnagar and his associates at Delhi on 12th April 1981. Brijmohan was kept in a house at Delhi under wrongful confinement from 12th April 1981 to 30th May 1981 by Raju and his four associates who armed with Revolvers, Stengun and Handgranades constantly kept a watch on him and threatened to cause his death in case his parents did not pay rupees two lacs as ransom for his release. Brijmohan was forced to write a number of letters to his parents en 'reating them to fulfill the demand of the abductors. Brijmohan's father Laxmi Narain was asked to pay a sum of rupees two lacs as ransom to the petitioner at Datia. On 2nd May 1981 Laxmi Narain, his another son Moolchand and one Ratanchand came to Datia They met the petitioner and one Lilly who is an associate of the petitioner. They showed the letter written by Brijmohan. The petitioner told them to pay rupees two lacs for release of Brijmohan and he also said that in case the money was not paid, Raju will kill Brijmohan. Laxmi Narain tried to persuade the petitioner and Lilly to reduce the amount and then he came back to Delhi. Laxminarayan again went to Datia on 25th May 1981 with Ratanchand. He paid Rs. 80,000 in cash and gave gold ornaments of the value of rupees one lac to the petitioner. After the ransom was received by the petitioner, Laxmi Narain was told by the petitioner and Lilly that Brijmohan would reach his home in 2 or 4 days. Bri
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