R.C. Shrivastava, J.

The suit, out of which this second appeal has arisen, was instituted by the respondents against the appellant for possession of an accommodation and recovery of arrears of rent in respect thereof. Ejectment was claimed on the grounds specified in clauses (a),(b) and (i) of section 12(1) of the M. P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961. The suit was resisted by the appellant on several grounds. The trial Court upheld the plaint allegations that the respondents were the appellant's landlords, they having purchased the premises from his previous landlord Gyanchand and were entitled to recover rent from him. The grounds on which ejectment was claimed were, however, negathed by it. Accordingly, the trial Court dismissed the claim for ejectment but, by stating that the respondents were entitled to get the entire rent deposited by the appellant in Court, impliedly decreed the claim for recovery of rent. Being aggrieved by the dismissal of their claim for ejectment, the respondents preferred first appeal before the Third Additional District Judge, Gwalior. In that appeal, the appellant filed a cross-objection contending, among other things, that he was not proved to be a tenant of the respondents. The first appellate Court confirmed the finding that the appellant was tenant of the respondents. The grounds on which ejectment was claimed were also upheld by it. Finally, the appeal was allowed. The claim for ejectment was decreed and the amount of rent deposited by the appellant in Court was permitted to be withdrawn by the respondents. The cross-objection was dismissed. Being aggrieved thereby, the defendant preferred this second appeal, which was admitted only on the following substantial questions of law.

(i) Whether, by not considering some points raised by the present appellant in his cross-objection in the lower appellate Court, that Court has committed an error of law ?

(ii) Whether the lower Court's rinding as to the existence of relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties is vitiated for want of proof of Gyanchand's title to the accommodation in question ?

Question No. (i) :- The points which were raised in the cross-objection are stated in the latter part of paragraph No. 5 of the lower appellate Court's judgment. Some of them were decided by that Court and, then, in paragraph No. 27 of its judgment, that Court stated that the parties did not press any other point and, therefore, no other point was considered. In that context, the following observations made by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the case of Gouri Shankar v. M/s. Hindustan Trust (Pvt.) Ltd. and others AIR 1972 SC 2091 are note-worthy.

It may be pointed out that raising grounds in the Memorandum of Appeal is not sufficient to show whether a particular point was actually argued or pressed before the Court. If the Court expressly says that only certain points have been argued and no other point has been argued the statement in the judgment has prima facie to be accepted as correct. It was open to the present respondent to file a proper affidavit preferably of his counsel who had argued the case along with the Memorandum of Appeal that such a point had been raised but the Court recording the concession had done so either wrongly or under some misapprehension. No such affidavit was filed with the Memorandum of Appeal and therefore we find no force in the submission of Mr. Chagla that the question of notice had been raised at the time of arguments before the Rent Control Tribunal.

The same principles would be applicable in the case of a memorandum of cross-objection also filed under Order 41, Rule 22. That is to say, raising grounds in the memorandum of cross-objection is not sufficient to show that a particular point was actually argued or pressed before the Court at the time of hearing. If the Court expressly says that only certain points have been argued and no other point has been argued, the statement in the judgment has prima