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1982 Supreme(MP) 172

IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
H.G. Mishra, J.
Bhurelal and others
Vs.
Kailashchand and others
C. Rem. No. 339 of 1980
Decided On: 06.03.1982

Advocates Appeared:
For Appellant/Petitioner/Plaintiff: H.S. Obrao
For Respondents/Defendant: S.R. Joshi

Headnote:Public Trust Act, 1951 (MP) - S.32 - prohibition under-does not apply to grant of interim relief.

       The legislative prohibition enacted appears to be restricted in its operation, inasmuch as what is barred by the aforesaid provision is hearing or decision of the suit. Accordingly, the prohibition so enacted cannot be construed as to preclude Courts from entertaining and adjudicating upon applications for interim reliefs. [Para 7]

       There appears to be no legal impediment for applying the aforesaid principles and bold that even after ordering stay of trial of a suit under section 32 the Court retains jurisdiction to grant first aid by way of temporary injunction or appointment of receiver, on a case being made out for the purpose. [Para 8]

       

ORDER

H.G. Mishra, J.

1. This revision is directed against the order dated 29-1-1980 whereby the trial Judge has ordered stay of trial of the suit under section 32 of the Madhya Pradesh Public Trust Act, 1951, and has a so stayed consideration of the application for issuance of a temporary injunction and or appointment of receiver.

2. No exhaustive statement of facts is necessary for the decision of this revision. Suffice it to state that the revision-applicants-herein have brought the suit for declaration of title and issuance of a permanent injunction against the defendant-non applicants on cause of action laid in detail in the plaint. In the suit the applicants submitted two applications (1) for issuance of a temporary injunction for restraining the defendant-non-applicants 2 to 5 from paying rent to defendant-non-applicant No. 1 and (2) for appointment of receiver for collection of the rent of the property in dispute. This application was opposed by the defendant No. 1 inter alia on the ground that the Court has no jurisdiction to proceed with the suit in view of the bar enacted by S. 32 of the Madhya Pradesh Public Trust Act, 1951 (for short, the Act) and for the same reason the Court has no jurisdiction to pass any order on any application for grant of temporary injunction and or appointment of receiver.

3. The trial Court by the impugned order directed stay of the suit holding that the suit is for and on behalf of a public trust. Accordingly S. 32 of the Act precludes hearing and decision of the suit as also stay of hearing of the application for grant of temporary injunction and or appointment of receiver. The present revision is directed against that part of the order which concerns itself with stay of hearing of the application for grant of the aforesaid interim reliefs.

4. In this revision it was contended by Shri Harbans Singh Oberao, learned counsel for the plaintiff applicants that the impugned order manifests a clear case of illegal exercise of jurisdiction vested in the Court, that S. 32 of the Act does not put a bar to hearing of applications for interim reliefs, as claimed by the applicants and that S. 32 only bars hearing or decision of the suit and cannot be construed to bar consideration of an application under O. 39, rules 1 and 2 and S. 151 and or under O. 40, R.1, CPC.

5. Shri S. R. Joshi, learned counsel for the defendant-non-applicant No. 1 argued in support of the impugned order. None appeared for non-applicants 2 to 5.

6. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties, I have come to the conclusion that this revision deserves to be allowed.

7. Section 32(1) of the Act, which is relevant to the situation, reads as under:

S 32 -Bar to hear or decide suits --(1) No suit to enforce a right on behalf of a public trust which has not been registered under this Act, shall be heard or decided in any Court.

(Emphasis supplied)

The Legislative prohibition so enacted appears to be restricted in its operation, inasmuch as what is barred by the aforesaid provision is hearing or decision of the suit. Accordingly, the prohibition so enacted cannot be construed as to preclude Courts from entertaining and adjudicating upon applications for interim reliefs. In order to hold so, further restriction will have to be imported in the section to the effect that the Courts will be precluded even from proceeding to grant interim reliefs when a stay is ordered under the section. The provisions placed in S. 32 appear to enact, with regard to stay matter, a statute in pari materia with S 10, CPC, section 10, omitting its Explanation, which is not relevant for the present purposes, reads as under :

S. 10. Stay of suit--No Court shall proceed with the trial of any suit in which the matter in issue is also directly and substantially in issue in a previously instituted suit between the same parties, or between parties under whom they or any of them claim litigating under the same title where such suit is pending in the same or any other Court










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