Bajpai, J.

1. The principle of lis pendens as contemplated by section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act owes its origin to the maxim of Roman Law "rem de que controversia prohib mur in acrum decicare." This means that where the subject in dispute owing to contest in between parties passes into the custody of the Court, parties are under an obligation not to withdraw it from the protection of the Court and that is why it was provided that the property involved in a suit cannot be transferred or otherwise dealt with by any party so as to affect the rights of any other party thereto under any decree or order which may be made therein. The consequence, thus, was that a transferee pendente lite remains bound by the ultimate decision of the lis, But these provisions were not meant for enabling a party who had no right, title or interest to snatch away the property from the hands of a purchaser pendente lite on the basis of an admission made by the codefendant-transferor subsequent to the date of transfer stating that he had no right title or interest and that the plaintiff was the owner. The reason is that it would be in equitable to allow a person who has parted with his interest in the property in favour of the other to divest the right of the other claiming under him by any statement which he may choose to make subsequently. The claim of the plaintiff-appellant in the present case to secure a decree on the basis of the admission made by defendant No.1 in an application for compromise has been rejected and his suit claiming declaration of his ownership and permanent injunction has been further dismissed because he failed to establish any such right, title or interest.

2. Before this Court also, the plaintiff-appellant claimed a decree not only on merits of his claim but also on the basis of a compromise admitting his claim entered by defendant No.1 after he had already sold the suit land to defendant No.2.

3. The case of the appellant-plaintiff on merits was that prior to abloom of the Jagirdari or Zamindari rights in the local area which took place in 1951, he had acquired those rights and had been in actual possession of the suit land as a tenant. It was further asserted that he had been in possession throughout upto the date of suit and defendant-respondent No. 1 Jalima or his father Haria had no right, title or interest in the suit land, nor they had been in possession at any time. However, at the stage of evidence the plaintiff himself had to admit that he happened to occupy the suit land as an encroacher and was not inducted as a tenant by the Zamindar. As regards evidence the fact of continuous actual physical possession since 1951 and onwards, the plaintiff relied on his self-serving testimony and similar oral testimony of a few villagers. It would be significant to mention that there is no mention of even the possession of the present appellant-plaintiff on the suit holding or any part thereof in the annual papers either prior to 1951 or afterwards. Throughout for the last more then 15 or 16 years upto the date of suit the suit land has been recorded initial1y in the name of Haria, the father of respondent defendant No. 1 Jalima as a tenant, and after the death of Haria, the same has been mutated and recorded in the name of Jalima, his son. Haria and Jalima have been thus shown as tenants and holders in actual possession of the suit land. The Courts below have, therefore, accepted the version of respondent-defendant No.2 and his witnesses because the same found support from the statutory revenue records which were prepared and maintained long before the present dispute came into existence. Thus, the finding by the Courts below that the plaintiff was not in actual physical possession of the suit land at any time since the abolition of Zamindari rights upto the date of suit is a finding on a pure question of fact and cannot be said to be perverse or arbitrary in any manner. It is based on sufficient material on record