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HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
K.K. Dube & H.G. Mishra, JJ.
Sunderlal
v.
Harprasad & another
S.A. No. 204 of 1969
Decided on : 24-4-1979
The power of the Court to take cognizance of subsequent events after the lis has been brought to the Court, can be exercised in cases where it has fundamental impact on the right to the relief, provided that (a) in doing so, the Court is not called upon to reject the right but to mould the relief or the manner of moulding the relief; and (b) if there is no inhibition in the enactment on which the proceeding is based, by it's scheme or otherwise and (c) provided further that the event is diligently brought into the notice of the Court. In order to exercise the power it is not necessary that subsequent event should be always an admitted fact. The Courts can even in cases where the parties are at dispute as to its existence allow amendment for taking its cognizance or permit filing of additional pleading for the purpose. [Para 4
The position of law may be shortly stated thus:-
(i) If a subsequent event is diligently brought to the notice of the Courts, it may be taken notice of by the Courts, provided that (a) thereby the Courts are not asked to reject the right but only to mould the relief or the manner of granting the relief and (b) taking of cognizance and giving effect to subsequent happening is not inhibited by the Act, by its scheme or otherwise, on which the proceeding is based.
(ii) If the subsequent event having fundamental impact on the right to relief is admitted, it may be given effect to.
(iii) If such subsequent happening having fundamental impact on the right to relief, although brought diligently to the notice of the Court, is disputed the Courts may allow amendment of pleading or permit filing of additional pleading for the purpose. [Para 9
(2) Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (MP) – S.12 (1) - Civil P.C., 1908 - O. 7, R. 7, O. 6, R. 17, O. 41, R. 7, O. 41, R. 33 & S. 107-decree for eviction passed-in appeal subsequent events can be taken cognizance of - position in respect of various clauses of the Act.
(3) Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (M.P.) - S.12 (1) - nature of different clauses-which of the clauses requires prior existance of events – Civil P.C., 1908 - O.6, R. 17.
Passing of the decree or the dismissal of the suit for eviction governed by the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 does not vest t he successful party with any substantive right. No immunity from further challenge by filing appeal is conferred on the decree for eviction, if passed. On filing of appeal finality of the decree appealed against is destroyed. The matter becomes sub-Judice. We cannot read any new restriction into t he provisions of Civil Procedure Code and M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 to the effect that the power to take cognizance of subsequent events is not exercisable in appeal against the decree for ejectment. To do so will be rendering the remedy of appeal illusory and will be negation of powers expressly conferred by Order 7, rule 7 read with Order 6, rule 17, section 107, Order 41, rule 27 and Order 41, rule 33, Code of Civil Procedure on difference between the case of appeals. [Para 8
The preamble of section 12 (1), does not, in terms require that the grounds specified in clauses (a) to (p) should exist prior to the filing of the suit for eviction. We cannot read such a requirement into the language employed in all of its 'clauses'. It is only the pre-existence of the facts constituting grounds like (a), (b), (d) or (o) that has been made, by there language, postulate of the law. It is a well settled principle of interpretation of statutes that by process of construction the Courts cannot add/or read anything more into any provision of a statute. [Para 14
If the landlord wants to introduce in the plaint by amendment, any ground other than those falling under section 12 (1)(a), (c) (d) and (o), becoming available after institutional of the suit, the inclusion thereof is not inhibited by the Act, either by its scheme or otherwise. Even where the landlord omits inadvertently to base the suit on a pre-exiting ground falling in clauses (a), (c), (d) or (o) of the section 12 (1), there is no prohibition in law against their introduction by amendment of the plaint. Amendments generally relate back. After the amendment, the suit which was for ejectment continues to be one for ejectment, though based on additional ground so introduced. [Para 16
Of course, the Courts should be cautious in the matter of taking cognizance of updated events and should not permit the parties to make it an easy handle to get the trial re-opened by merely alleging that some subsequent event has taken place since judgment was rendered by the lower Court, [Para 20
Mishra, J. - l The following question has been referred to us for opinion:
"Whether an appellate Court can take cognizance of subsequent events happening after a decree has been passed by the lower Court in favour of the plaintiff landlord under section 12 (1) (e) of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961?"
2. A Single Bench constituted by one of us (Mishra, J.) which referred the above question, was confronted with two conflicting decisions of this Court on the aforesaid point. In Vishambharnath v. Mst. Ramdevi Civil Second Appeal No. 209 of 1970 (Gwalior) Decided on 22-12-1976, view taken is to the effect that events happening after passing of a decree in favour of the landlord, even if true, cannot be taken cognizance of by an appellate Court. Reliance has been placed on Rameshwar and other v. Jotram and others AIR 1976 SC 49. On the other hand, a contrary view has been taken in Ramlal v. Vinod Cotton Mills Ltd. Civil Second Appeal No. 175 of 1978 Indore to the effect that events happening after passing of the decree can be taken cognizance of during the pendency of the suit even at second appellate stage, on the basis of cases reported in Pasupuleti Venkateshwarlu v. Motor arid General Trader AIR 1975 SC 1409 and Bhaiyalal v. Chhotalal Tiwari 1971 MPLJ SN 104.
3. The law on the impact of subsequent events has been laid down exhaustively by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in para 9 in Rameshwar's case (supra) as under:-
"The impact of subsequent happenings may now be spelt out. First, its bearing on the right of action; second, on the nature of the relief and third, on its impotence to create or destroy substantive, rights Where the nature of the relief, as originally sought, has become obsolete or unserviceable or a new form of relief will be more efficacious on account of developments subsequent to the suit or even during the appellate stage, it is but fair that 'the' relief is moulded, varied or reshaped in the light of updated facts. Patterson v. State of Albama (1974) 294 US 600, 607 Illustrates this position. It is important that the party claiming the relief or change of relief must have the same right from which either the first or the modified remedy may flow. Subsequent 'events in the course of the case cannot be constitutive of substantive rights enforceable in that very litigation except in a narrow category (later spelt out) but may influence the equitable jurisdiction to mould reliefs. Conversely, where rights have already vested in a 'party, they cannot be nullified or negated by subsequent events save where there is a change in the law and it is made applicable at any stage. Lachmeshwar prasad v. Keshwar Lal AIR 1941 FC 5=1940 FCR 84, falls in this category. Courts of justice may, when the compelling equities of a case oblige them, shape reliefs-cannot deny rights-to make them justly relevant in the updated circumstances. Where the relief is discretionary, Courts may exercise this jurisdiction to avoid injustice. Likewise, where the right to the remedy depends, under the statute itself, on the presence or absence of certain basic facts at the time the relief is to be ultimately granted, the Court, even in appeal can take note of such supervening facts with fundamental impact Venkateswarlu, read in its statutory setting, falls in this category. Where a cause of action is deficient but later events have made up the deficiency, the Court may, in order to avoid multiplicity of litigation permit amendment and continue the proceeding, provided no prejudice is caused to the other side. All these are done only in exceptional situations and just cannot be done if the statute, on which the legal proceeding is based, inhibits, by its scheme or otherwise, such change in cause of action or relief. The primary concern of the Court is to implement the justice of the legislation. Rights vested by virtue of a statute cannot be divested by this enquitable doctrine (See Chokalingam Chetty AIR 192 PC 252=54 Mad. LJ 88
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