Back
HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
P. K. Tare & Surajbhan, JJ.
Madhya Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation
Vs.
Munnabai (Shrimati) & others
F. A. No. 60 of 1963 against award of Shri .G. S. Bhatnagar, Claims Tribunal, Gwalior;
Decided on : 21-12-1966
(2) Limitation Act, 1908 - Ss. 29, 3, 4 to 24 Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 - S. 110-A -provisions of Limitation Act-how for applicable to applications under section 110-A of the Motor Vehicles Act.
Sub Section (2) of section 29 of the limitation Act provides that where any special or local law prescribes for any suit, appeal or application, a period of limitation different from the period prescribed by the Schedule, the provisions of Section 3 shall apply as if such period were the period prescribed by the schedule and for tbe purpose, of determining any period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any special or local law, the provisions contained in sections 4 to 24 (inclusive) shall apply only so far as, and to the extent to which, they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law. Therefore, the other sections of the Limitation Act, namely, sections 4 to 24 will be applicable to a case of claim petition regarding a motor accident, unless they are excluded expressly by the special enactment. With reference to section 5 of the Limitation Act, the exclusion will have to be inferred from the provisions of section 110-A(3), proviso, of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. But there can be no doubt that section 4 of the Limitation will be attracted. [Para 8]
(3) Civil P. C., 1908 - S. 9 - suit relating to damages 0'1 account of motor accidents-jurisdiction of civil Courts ousted- only claims Tribunals can try such suits-Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 - S. 110-A.
(4) Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 - S.110-A - claim for damages on account of motor accidents-Claims Tribunals have exclusive jurisdiction-jurisdiction of civil Courts barred – Civil P.C. 1908 - S. 9.
A Claims Tribunal is invested with the power to try disputes of civil nature, which before the constitution of the Tribunals, were ordinarily triable by civil Courts, but which after the constitution of the Tribunals are now triable by Tribunals specially appointed for the purpose. But it cannot be disputed that they are Tribunals constituted under a special enactment which are empowered to try particular disputes of civil nature relating to damages on account of motor accidents. Necessarily the jurisdiction of the civil Courts is ousted due to this. [Para 9]
(5) Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 - S. 110-A - limitation for application for claim of damages-expiring during long vacations-application presented on reopening of civil Courts-is within time- Limitation Act, 1908 - S. 4.
The period of limitation for presenting the application under section 110-A for claiming damages expired during the summer vacation. The application was presented on the re opening of the civil Courts. It was contended that the application should have been presented during the summer vacation, and is thus barred by time, and also that the tribunal could not condone the delay. Held : Where judges of regular civil Courts are constituted special tribunals under special enactments, they are not expected to function during the summer vacation of the civil Courts. Ordinarily they will follow the procedure of their own Courts as prescribed by the Code of Civil Procedure, subject to any special provision made in the special enactment or the Rules thereunder. Thus the question of limitation did not arise in this case. AIR 1953 SC 357 relied on.
Even otherwise, the Tribunal was justified in condoning this delay under section 110-A (3) of the Motor Vehicles Act. [Para 9]
(6) Tort-negligence-accident- burden of proof -cause of accident not known-presumption is of negligence- the defendant should displace this presumption-maxims-res ipsa loquitur.
(7) Maxims-res ipsa loquitur-scope and extent of applicability -tort-negligance- accident-burden of proof.
The doctrine res ipsa loquitur only means that an accident by its nature be more consistent with its being caused by negligence for which the defendant is responsible than by other causes, and in such a case the mere fact of the accident would be prima facie evidence of such negligence. The burden of proof should be on the defendant to explain and to show that the accident occurred without any fault on his part. Thus the applicability of the doctrine to such cases is merely a rule of evidence relating to burden of proof and nothing more. In the absence of any explanation on the part of the defendant, the Court can infer negligence on his part. The doctrine does not apply where the cause of the accident is known. (1930) 99 LJKB 353, (1938) All. ER 621 & (1918) 2 KB 523 relied on, [Paras 14 & 15]
(8) Tort-Damages-death due to motor accident-calculation of probable expectancy of life-death of earn ins member-calculation of amount.
The person killed in the motor accident was 59 years of age. He was drawing Rs. 32.50 paise per month as pension and was employed with a member of Legislative Assembly on Rs. 75/- per month. He was quite healthy and had a robust physique. At the time of the accident he had young children aged 7 years, 5 years and 2 years. His elder brother was alive and was 75 years old.
Held: Where a person is quite healthy and hale and healthy, it can be inferred that his probable expectancy of life might be to the extent that other members of his family might have been found living. Thus, there is no difficulty about fixing the probable expectancy of life of the deceased to be upto 75 years. As such, he could have lived at least for 16 years more. AIR 1962 SC I & (1921) All. ER 528 referred to. [Para 17]
The pension was a fixed amount payable to the deceased till his death. His employment with the M.L.A could last for five years. After the five years the deceased could earn between 60 and 70 rupees per month. Thus the loss due to his death could be assessed at Rs. 17,660. [Para 18 & 19]
(9) Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 – S. 110–B - damages-amount of-statutory notice mandatory-amount beyond the one mentioned in the notice cannot be awarded as compensation-Civil P. C. 1908 - S. 80.
The Madhya Bharat Roadways, in which the deceased was travelling, was a department of the State Government. A statutory notice under section 80, C.P.C, was necessary before compensation could be claimed. The legal representative of the deceased claimed Rs. 15,000/- as damages in this notice. The Claims Tribunal awarded Rs, 20,480/- as compensation, while the High Court computed it as Rs. 17,660.
Held: The respondents in the statutory notice given under section 80, Code of Civil Procedure, had claimed an amount of Rs. 15,000/-, As such it can be asserted that the respondents not having made any larger claim in the notice their claim for any access amount would be without any statutory notice. At the time the notice was given the Madhya Bharat Roadways was a department of the State Government and a notice under section 80, Civil Procedure Code was mandatory. It is only subsequently that the Madhya Bharat Roadways have been incorporated into an independent corporation, known as the Madhya Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation, which is not a department of the Government as such. Of course, in case of non-statutory notices, it might be possible to award a larger claim than mentioned in the notice. But in case of statutory notices, it may not be possible to award a larger claim. Under the circumstances, the claim of the respondents is confined to the amount claimed in the statutory notice. [Para 19]
Tare, J.-
1. This is an appeal under S. 110–D of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, against the award dated 19-9-63, passed by the Claims Tribunal, Gwalior, presided over by the Additional District Judge, in Motor Vehicles Accident Case No.8 of 1962, awarding Rs. 20,480 to the legal representatives of the deceased Laxminarayan, as against their claim for Rs. 31,230.
2. The fact leading to the present claim were as follows: The deceased Laxminarain was travelling in a Bus No. M. P. G. 4131 on 22-3-1962 from Shivpuri to Chanderi. The Bus belonged to the M. P. State Road Transport Corporation and was being driven by the second appellant, Ratanlal. On the way the Bus collided against 'Neem' tree at Mile No. 21/2 at about 9 A. M. Laxminarain died on the spot as a result of severe injuries. Hence the claim by the heirs of the deceased.
3. The appellants' defence was that there was no rash and negligent driving on the part of the driver but it was purely a case of a chance accident and the present appellants could not be held liable for any damage whatsoever.
4. The Claims Tribunal found that the deceased at the time of his death was 59 years of age. As a Government pensioner, he was getting Rs. 32.50 paise as pension per month; and in addition was in the employment of a Member of the Legislative Assembly, Shri Chandra Bhan Singh on a salary of Rs. 75 per month. The deceased was healthy and had a robust physique and his expectancy of life could be assumed to be up to 80 years. For that reason, it was held that the family of the deceased was deprived of an income of Rs. 107.50 paise per month inclusive of pension for a period of 21 years. Excluding the probable amount that the deceased might have required to spend on himself during that period, the Tribunal came to the conclusion that the family was deprived of a probable income of Rs. 20,480, Therefore, that amount was awarded with proportionate costs along with interest at Rs. 6% per annum, from the date of the claim till realisation. As regards the question of rash and negligent driving the Tribunal held that there was no apparent cause for the accident, it was morning time. There was no fog and the road in front was clear and visible. There was no mechanical failure of any part of the Bus. Therefore, the principle of res ipsa loquitur was invoked; and in the absence of any further material to be adduced by the present appellants, the accident could be ascribed to the rash and negligent driving of the second appellant.
5. The learned counsel for the appellants pressed only three questions for consideration by this Court, which we propose to discuss at some length in view of the general importance of the question, which are as follows :
(i) That the claim petition was barred by limitation and the Tribunal was not justified in granting extension of time under the proviso to section 110-A(3) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939;
(ii) There was no rash and negligent driving on the part of the driver and the accident took place on account of natural causes;
(iii) That the quantum of damages awarded is not justified and in no case could more damages be awarded than what were claimed the notice issued by the claimants under section 80 of the Civil Procedure Code, namely, Rs. 15,000.
On the question of limitation, it is urged that the occurrence took place on 22-3-1962. As per section 110-A(3) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1139, the claim petition ought to have been filed within 60 days from the date of occurrence, unless under the proviso the Tribunal was of opinion that there was sufficient cause, which prevented the claimant from filing the petition. The claim petition was actually filed on 19-6-1962, which was the date of re-opening of the civil Courts after the summer vacation. The High Court had issued a Notification stating that the subordinate civil Courts, excepting those presided over by the Revenue Officers were to remain closed from Monday, the 7th May, 1962 to Saturday, the 16th of June
An indispensable Tool for Legal Professionals, Endorsed by Various High Court and Judicial Officers
Please visit our Training & Support
Center or Contact Us for assistance
Scan Me!
India’s Legal research and Law Firm App, Download now!
For Daily Legal Updates, Join us on :
Back to top
