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1969 Supreme(MP) 101

HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
K.L. PANDEY AND A.P. SEN, JJ.
Ram Dulare Shukla
Vs.
M.P. State Road Transport Corporation, Gwalior & others
Misc. F.A. No. 132 of 1966
Decided on : 23-9-1969

Advocates appeared:
S.C. Dube & R.C. Agrawal for appellant
V.S. Dabir for respondent Nos.1 & 2

Headnote:(1) Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 - S.110 - injury by accident - negligence of driver alleged - burden of proof•

       In the case of an injury caused by an accident, the burden of proving negligence is on the claimant, without the proof of which, neither the Owner nor its insurers are liable. [Para 3

       (2) Evidence Act, 1872 - S.33 - deposition of a witness made in a previous case which was between different parties-not admissible.

       Section 33 is not attracted unless there is identity of parties.

       35 MPLC 468 & AIR 1933 PC 202 relied on.

       Where the previous criminal case was not between the same parties, the statements made therein are not admissible in a later case between different parties. [Para 6

       (3) Evidence Act, 1872 - S.61 - inspection report - not admissible unless proved. [Para 6

       (4) Evidence Act, 1872 - S.104 - res ipsa loquitur - nature of the rule - when not applicable.

       The res ipsa loquitur is not a rule of law. If the facts are sufficiently known, the question ceases to be whether the facts speak for themselves, and toe only question is whether on the facts as established, negligence is to be inferred or not. The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur does not, therefore, apply when the cause of the accident is known. (1950) 1 All ER 392 relied on. [Para 8

       (5) Carriers - carriers of passengers - liability to passengers.

       Carriers of passengers are not insurers of the safety of the persons whom they carry. It is sufficient, to discharge the duty of care which lies on a carrier that he should adopt the best known apparatus, kept in perfect order, and worked without negligence by the servants he employs. If he does that, he ought not to be made responsible for the consequences of an extremely rare and obscure accident, which cannot in a business sense be prevented by any known means. [Para 10

       

ORDER

A.P. Sen, J.- l. This appeal under section 110-D of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, filed by the claimant, is directed against a decision of the Claims Tribunal of Bhopal, dated 25th August 1964, dismissing his claim for compensation for the bodily injury suffered by him in a road accident.

2. The relevant facts, briefly stated, are these. On 15th February 1962, at 11.30 A.M., the claimant who is a Sub-Inspector of Police, boarded a bus owned by the Madhya Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation which is a State Road undertaking, at Piparia on his way to Sohagpur for giving evidence in a criminal case. The bus was being driven by one Jagdishprasad, an employee of the Corporation. On the way, the bus met with an accident, near about the village of Karanpur, at about 12.30 P.M. The bus suddenly swerved to the right, jumped over a nullah and crashed into a road-side tree. As a result of the accident, the claimant received severe injuries, and alleging that it was due to negligence of the driver in driving the bus at an excessive speed, claimed Rs.40,996 as compensation for the injuries suffered by him. The Madhya Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation, however, denied the claim, alleging that the accident was not on account of any negligence of its driver in driving the vehicle at an excessive speed but it was caused due to a mechanical failure of the vehicle which, according to it, was an unforeseen event and, therefore, an act of God for which no liability could be saddled upon it. The Corporation was insured with the Indian Insurance Company Association Pool, Bombay, but the insurers entered no defence.

3. The Claims Tribunal has negatived the claim, holding that the accident was due to a latent defect which was not discovered by reasonable care and that, in consequence, there was no negligence on the part of the Corporation or its driver. It observed.

“Assuming that the bus was driven at a fast speed, the question would still arise whether the driver was rash or negligent. The fact that a vehicle is being driven at a fast speed is no ground for holding that the driver was rash or negligent. Negligence may be said to consist in a failure to exercise due care in a case in which a duty to take care exists. If the possibility of danger emerging is reasonably apparent, then to take no precaution is negligence, but if the possibility of danger emerging is only a mere possibility which would never occur to the mind of reasonable man, then there is no negligence. In para 1 (a) of the petition it was suggested that the bus was being driven on the wrong side of the road, but not a mention of it was made in the deposition either by Ramdulare or by Mansaram. As such, it is legitimate to infer that the bus was driven on right side of the road and as the road was free, the driver would not be said to be rash or negligent if he drives the bus at a fast speed. Further, the applicant has not given any explanation as to why the bus suddenly left the road and dashed against the tree. The manner and the circumstances under which the entire accident happened suggest that something must have happened which made the bus to leave the road and dash against a tree on the right side. The driver has given an explanation by saying that the shackle-pin had fallen down as a result of which the bus went out of his control. This explanation appears to me to be reasonable and I am, therefore, inclined to believe that the accident occurred on account of some mechanical failure and not on account of rashness or negligence on the part of the driver who could not be so rash as to endanger his own life.”

In our view, the Claims Tribunal rightly placed the burden of proving negligence on the claimant without the proof of which, neither the Corporation nor its insurers were liable.

4. The Corporation had specifically pleaded that the proximate cause of the accident was due to slipping of the shackle-pin of the right front wheel as a result of which the vehicle wen

































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