Lodha. J.- l. This revision application arises out of proceedings, initiated under Section 110-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939.

2. The petitioners who are members of the same family were going in their Ambassador car No M.P.F. 1442 from Shivpuri to Jhansi on 21st April 1972 At about 5 Kilometres from Shivpuri, the stage carriage No. M.P.G. 9846 owned by the M.P.S.R.T.C. was coming from the opposite direction. It was being driven by non-petitioner No.2, Motilal. The petitioner's case is that the stage carriage was being driven at a very high speed and on account of negligence of the non-petitioner No.2, the bus first hit a bullock cart and then dashed into the petitioner's car as a result of which not only the car of the petitioners was damaged but all the occupants of the car were injured. Hence the petitioners filed a joint petition before the Claims Tribunal on 19-10-72 for awarding compensation to each one of them'

3. Both the non-petitioner filed a joint reply and pleaded inter alia that a joint application for composite reliefs for compensation by more than one petitioner did not lie.

4. After framing issues on the contentions raised by the parties, the Tribunal first took up the following preliminary issues:-

"Whether all the petitioners can present a joint application".

The preliminary issue was decided by the Tribunal against the petitioners and it was held that all the petitioners could not join in one petition. Aggrieved by that order, the petitioners have filed this revision.

5. The learned counsel for the non-petitioners has raised a preliminary objection here also regarding the maintainability of the revision application on the ground that the order is appealable and since no appeal has been filed it cannot be revised under Sec.115 C.P.C. In support of his contention he has relied upon the following authorities :-

(1) A.I.R. 1971 All. 506

(ii) A.I.R. 1969 Mad. 316

(iii) A.I.R. 1966 Mad. 332.

6. In A.I.R. 1971 All. 506, it was held that an order dismissing application under S.110-A as time-barred and refusing condonation for want of sufficient cause, effectively terminates the proceedings and disposes of the application and consequently, is an award and as such appealable under Sec.110-D of the Motor Vehicles Act. The same proposition was laid down in A.I.R. 1969 Mad. and 316/A.I.R. 1966 Mad. 332.

7. In A.I.R. 1966 Mad. 332, it was observed that :-

"the expression 'award' in Sec. 110-D must be understood as the decision of the claims Tribunal whether involving a total dismissal of the claim or the determination or a particular amount of compensation.

In this view of the matter, it was held that there was no substance in the argument that an award can only mean a decision of the Claims Tribunal determining the amount of compensation and not a decision dismissing the application.

8. In my opinion the principle laid down in the above-mentioned cases has no application to the present case. No Decision or determination as to the merits of the case has been given by the Claims Tribunal. It cannot be said by any stretch of imagination that in the present case the Tribunal has disallowed the petitioner's claims or dismissed their application for compensation. The only interpretation that can be put on the order of the Tribunal is that the Tribunal has refused to entertain a joint application on behalf of all the petitioners on the principle which may be described in the language of Civil Procedure Code as mis joinder of parties. In fact, there is no determination at all. I am, therefore, of the opinion that the impugned order is not appealable under Sec. 110-D of the Motor Vehicles Act. In this view of the matter, the preliminary objection is overruled.

9. Coming to the merits of the revision, learned counsel for the petitioners has urged that the language of Sec.110-A does not necessarily envisage that even in respect of the same cause of action more than one claim cannot be joined. It is argued that even though the word 'p